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SUMMARY 
This is a study about the trade union movement
in colonial and early post-colonial Malaysia. This
is done by examining the role and development of the
country's national labour centre, the Malaysian
Trades Union Congress (MTUC), and in particular, its
leadership from 1949 to 1981.
The central argument of the study is that the
HTUC was a reformist organisation because of state
control and the dominance of "moderate" and
"responsible" leadership. It is also argued that the
national centre was unable to effectively represent
the interests of labour because the leadership lacked
a working-class ideological perspective. These
arguments are developed with reference to a number of
ma j or themes or issues during the period under review
Such as "responsible unionism", government
incorporation of the movement, politics, tripartism
and industrial peace, "worker capitalism", conflicts
within the movement, and communalism. An essential
part of the exercise has been to reinterpret the
history of the national centre during its first three
decades of existence.
After the first two introductory chapters,
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the formation and early
development of the MTUC during the colonial era. The
role of government and "moderate" labour leaders is
highlighted. Chapters 5 and 6 consider the position
and role of the MTUC with respect to labour disputes
and politics
	 under the	 post-colonial	 Alliance
government. The following two chapters analyse the
compromising ideology and divisions and split within
the movement under the Barisan Nasional government.
The study is an appraisal of the Malaysian trade
union movement attempting to contribute to an
understanding of trade unionism in an ex-colonial
"Third World" setting.
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1CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Themes 9f qtudv
The central argument of the study is that the
Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC)* was a reformist
organisation because of state control and the dominance of
particular leadership grouping. While the whole question
of state control does feature throughout the chapters,
particularly through the discussions on MTUC-government
relationship as well as government labour policies, the
focus here is on the role of the reformist leadership of
the MTUQ; who they were, what they did, and why they were
able to maintain their leadership positions. The focus on
leadership is necessary to understand the role and
development of the MTUC not only because most of the
policies and issues undertaken by the centre were decided
Iv a small coterie of leaders, but also because this
leadership itself was sustained, throughout most of the
period under review, by a few relatively large affiliated
unions.	 The outcome	 was a	 reformist peak union
organisation.
The period under review is from 1949, the year when
* At its inception the centre assumed the name of Malayan
Trade Union Council. This was changed to Malayan Trades
Union Congress in 1957, and again to the present name,
Malaysian Trades Union Congress, in 2963 with the
formation of Malaysia. "Malaysia" refers to the
Federation of Malaysia formed in 1963 consisting of
. Peninsular Malaya (also known as West Malaysia), and Sabah
and Sarawak (together as East Malaysia). The term
"Malaya" here and throughout the study refers to
Peninsular Malaya prior to the formation of Malaysia.
2the first steps were taken to establish the MTUC, to 1981.
The latter year was chosen as an appropriate year to
conclude the ,tudy because this was when the public and
private sector unions in the MTUC-led movement split and
went their separate ways.	 Although there had long been
tension between the two wings of the MTUC the final
occasion for the separation was the centre's response to
the government's new labour legislation of 1980. Further,
1980/81 was an important turning point in the history of
the country's trade union movement as it marked the
implementation of another round of even more restrictive
labour legislation. With reference to the MTUC-
government relationship, 1981 was also as an appropriate
year to end this review of the national labour centre
because it marked a change in the leadership of the
government from Hussein Onn to Mahathir Mohammad.
Although both administrations were still under the same
ruling party, the Barisan Nasional, and both demonstrated
an uncompromising policy towards labour, the change in
government leadership in 1981 nevertheless signified a
"new" shift in the political and economic approach of the
government, which deserves special treatment or a more
extensive study than the present one.[1] It is for these
various reasons that the study is confined to 1949-81, a
period which covers the formation and development of the
MTVC during the colonial era and into the early post-
colonial years of Malaysia.	 This suggests that the
periodization of the study is sufficient for a proper
3appraisal and understanding of the development of the
national labour centre to be made.
The study focusses on social institutions and should
be read in this light. This is necessary given a context
where comprehensive labour studies are not yet well
developed.	 There is neither a tradition of debate on the
working-class movement, nor complementary institutional
histories of trade unions. For this reason, an
institutional study is an important first step for a
comprehensive study of the country's trade union movement.
This will be done by examining the following themes.
First, I shall study the character of leadership
evident at the MTUC. By leadership I usually mean those
elected Principal Officials who made up the Central
Committee or Working Committee of the MTUC, particularly-.
the President, Deputy President, Secretary General, and
Treasurer although in some cases the much bigger quasi-
legislative General Council, which was made up of the
Central Committee and representatives of the affiliated
unions and state/divisional committees, and the Council's
appointed Executive Committee (which also included the
elected officials)
	 are	 also	 loosely	 regarded	 as
constituting the leadership. As indicated earlier, the
leadership question is important in understanding the MTUC
because most of the policies and issues undertaken by the
centre were, by and large, decided by these leaders,
particularly the Secretary General (who was also the
4MTUC's Chief Executive) as well as and the few elected
officials just mentioned.
In discussing the leadership of the MTUC and the
unions as	 a whole	 such terms	 as "moderate"	 and
"responsible" are regularly employed. These terms are
generally used to describe those labour leaders and their
unions (or "new" unions) who were essentially anti-
communist and non-militant in their attitude towards
various issues of labour and trade unionism as opposed,
for instance, to the militant or radical labour leaders
and trade unions of the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade
Unions group who dominated the labour scene in the
immediate post-war years. Of course, apart from the term
responsible",	 such	 terms	 as	 "healthy",	 "sound",
"independent" and "democratic" have also long found place
in official	 circles (and	 their sympathisers)	 when
referring to	 the kind	 of unions acceptable to or
encouraged by the establishment. 	 They were also used to
imply that other unions, that is, the PMFTU-type or other
radical unions,	 were undemocratic	 and were	 either
controlled or influenced by the Communists.	 The theme
"responsible unionism" is pursued in the discussion to
describe the general character and posture of the MTUC-led
movement. In elaboration of the above, responsible
unionism" is also used with reference to a unionism
committed to reform within the capitalist structural
framework.
	
This is a unionism which sees its future and
the future of the working class as being determined by
5close cooperation with capital and the government of the
day, and that it was only prepared to exert its role to
the extent that this did not antagonise the power
structure.
Second, I consider the relationship between the MTUC
and	 the	 government,
	 colonial	 and	 post-colonial,
particularly with reference to the question of the
centre's influence on government labour policy. Indeed,
as a central labour body whose main task was to coordinate
and to serve as the spokesperson for the union movement in
relation to	 the employers group and especially the
government, the extent or even the ability of the MTUC to
influence government
	 labour policy was certainly an
indication of the centre's overall effectiveness in its
role.
	 All this is pursued through a close look at issues
which appeared to preoccupy the movement such as
government labour legislation, tripartite cooperation, the
codes of conduct for industrial peace, and the like.
A major theme which features prominently in the study
is government Incorporation of the "moderate" labour
leaders and the MTUC-led movement. This idea of
incorporation is adapted from Trotsky's thesis on trade
unions in the era of capitalist economic and political
crisis in	 Europe.I21
	 I also draw on notions of
corporatism and corporatist structure elaborated by
Panitch (1986) when discussing the close partnership
between labour, capital and the state in the context of
Western liberal democracies.
	 As shall be shown in the
6following chapters, the process of incorporation which
entailed an active collaboration of the "moderate" labour
leaders, and which was also facilitated by the
governments' anti-communist Emergency rule (1948-60) and
policies, started very early in the history of the MTUC-
led movement and continued in varying degrees throughout
the period under review.
Third, I study the position and role of the MTUC with
.regard to "politics". This is examined in terms of union
(as well as MTUC) relations to the parliamentary political
process, such as union participation or involvement in
political parties, campaigning for electoral support, and
the like. The varying and conflicting opinions among the
trade unionists regarding their political role and trade
union roles as well as government responses is studied.
This allows me to address in a rather specific way the
distinction between "politics" and industrial relations.
Fourth and finally, I shall briefly consider the
general character of the MTUC-led movement, and to a
limited extent, the relationship between the MTUC and
affiliate unions. For instance, I shall examine some of
the main internal divisions within the MTUC, although this
is not a comprehensive examination of the relations
between the MTVC and affiliate unions, a subject of
another study. Related to this I shall also deal with the
question of communalism within the MTUC.
	 The term
" communalism" in this thesis refers to communal or ethnic
divisions which had come to characterize the country's
7social and political structure. Following its widespread
public usage in the country, the term is employed
interchangeably to mean "racial" and "ethnic".(3] In this
study, communalism, or rather problems of communal nature,
refers to the circumstances that arose from the prevailing
pattern of ethnic divisions within the MTUC leadership and
the impact this had on the centre's relationship with
government and capital.
On the basis of the study of these themes, I shall
develop the following arguments:
1. I shall claim that the formation of MTUC at the
beginning of the Emergency years underlined the close
collaboration between the colonial government,
particularly the Trade Union Adviser and the "moderate"
leaders of the unions. Following on from this I shall
argue that the scheme, which was facilitated by the
circumstances of the Emergency rule, further reinforced
the incorporation of these "moderate" labour leaders, and
hence the MTVC, by the government.
2. I shall argue that the fear of communists usurping
the unions	 prompted the
	 government to place trade
unionists and
	 the MTUC-led	 movement under constant
surveillance. This surveillance tended to inhibit the
growth and development of the union movement, which in
turn resulted in a weak and ineffectual movement.
3. I shall argue that the inclination towards
"responsible unionism" by the MTVC leadership was largely
due to the continued labour disciplinary and restrictive
Bmeasures undertaken by the government, as well as the
compromising attitudes of the labour leaders. The
approach of the leaders, and most of their policies, were
informed by their desire to secure the acceptance and
recognition of the government, which in turn guaranteed
their personal as well as institutional importance within
the country's industrial relations framework. Further I
shall suggest that the "moderate" leaders in the MTUC were
opposed to union involvement in "politics" because they
feared that this might antagonise the government, and
would, therefore, threaten their broker-leadership role
within the existing industrial relations framework. The
approach of these leaders also served to confirm the
predominance of the "responsible unionism" tendency or the
reformist character of the MTUC-led movement.
4. For the government, strong opposition to union
Involvement in "politics" was also informed by its fear of
a possible strengthening of class politics, which in turn
might pose	 a threat	 to its communal, elitist and
especially pro-capital policies. 	 It was also this same
worry which	 underlined the	 government's sensitivity
towards	 labour	 militancy,	 hence	 its	 restrictive
legislation and other disciplinary measures against labour
and the unions.	 I shall suggest that on the whole, the
policy pursued by the government was essentially and
increasingly anti-labour.
	 I shall claim that these
policies created a web of constraints for the MTUC-led
9movement and contributed to its overall ineffectiveness
during the period under study.
With regard to communalism I shall argue that it
constituted a major obstacle to worker mobilization. The
MTUC leaders lacked a working-class ideological
perspective and were not prepared to educate and to lead
the movement in a class-based struggle. Specifically, I
shall suggest that the Indian-dominated MTUC leadership
operating in an ethnically-conscious socio-political
environment, could hardly exert an effective influence on
the labour policies of the Malay-dominated government.
This further	 contributed to	 the development	 of a
"reformist" leadership approach.
tiotes on Spoly Material 
My aim in this study has been to reinterpret the
history of the MTUC, using primary and secondary source
materials. As listed in the bibliography the primary
materials consulted include MTUC reports and minutes of
meetings, texts of speeches, government reports, and trade
union reports. Part of the primary data was generated
through a range of interviews with a number of key
informants who played leading roles, or were involved in
trade union politics, at the time under review (see
Appendix B). This information is important in areas where
other source material is scarce, either providing
additional information and perspectives that complement
current literature, or, in some cases, providing the basis
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for interpretations of MTUC history where there has been
little commentary and analysis.
There are, it should be noted, a few studies on trade
unionism in	 Malaya/Malaysia which
	 together form an
essential background	 and reference material for the
present study. These include Gamba (1962b), Josey (1958),
Stenson (1970),	 Zaidi (1975),	 and Todd
	 and
	 Jomo
(forthcoming).(4) While all these works deal with the
development of trade unionism in the country at some
particular periods during the colonial or post-colonial
years, only Zaidi specifically deals with the MTUC.
Irrespective of
	
their focus	 and approach to trade—
unionism, these studies contribute significantly to our
understanding of labour and trade unionism both in the
colonial and post-colonial Malaysia, and together, apart
from the primary sources referred to above form a crucial
background and information resource for the present study.
Gamba's pioneering work, The Origins of Trade Unionism
in Malaya, as the name suggests, traces the history of
union growth and development in Malaya up until the early
1950s, after the formation of the MTUC. A major part of
the work is devoted to the situation and development
between 1945 and 1950 which witnessed the return of
British rule to Malaya after World War II, the problems it
encountered with respect to labour and the economy, and
the British handling of the militant unions and the
Communist threat which culminated in the declaration of a
state of Emergency in June 1948.
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It should be noted that while critical of colonialism
Gamba is obviously sympathetic with and exhibits high
respect for the colonial Trade Union Adviser (TUA), John
A. Brazier whom he regards as " anti-colonial" and "the
father of contemporary Malayan trade unionism" (Camba,
1962:ix). For all their weaknesses and limitations which
he acknowledges Gamba also shows sympathy for the "new"
and "independent" (read independent from the communists)
unions which were promoted and supported by Brazier.
Gamba's notes based on Brazier's views and personal
documents
	 also	 provide	 valuable	 and	 interesting
information about the role and attitude of this man,
particularly in respect of the growth and early
development of the "new" unions as well as the formation
of the MTUC itself. My Chapter 3 on the formation of the
MTUC draws substantially but critically on a number of
suggestions and observations made by Gamba.(5)
Stenson's Industrial Conflict in Malaya is another
major work on Malayan labour and trade unionism prior to
the declaration of the Emergency in 1948. However, unlike
Gamba, the focus in Stenson is on the PMFTU-led militant
unionism -- its growth, development and demise. Stenson
is equally critical of the conduct of the PMFTU-led
militant unionism and the MCP as well as the approach to
unionism by the colonial interests. For him the failure
of the MCP-led militant Left to win the support of the
wider population in the struggle against British
colonialism, was as much responsible for its eventual
12
demise as was the combined opposition of capital and the
colonial state.
Unlike Gamba before him Stenson is also critical of
the role of the TUA (see Stenson, 1970:133-48). According
to Stenson, the TUA's efforts to build "independent" and
"democratic" unions up until early 1947 were more informed
by his "highly developed sense of paternalist
responsibility" and strong hostility to the PMFTU-led
militant unions, rather than his devotion to democracy as
many others believed.[6] Indeed, for Stenson, the TUA was
very much part of the colonial regime, adjusting himself
and responding to the overriding interest of British-led
capital. Stenson's work is especially useful for Chapter
2, particularly in tracing the rise and fall of militant
unioni$m in the 1945-1948 period.
As indicated earlier, Zaidi's account "from inside",
Malaysian Trades Union Congress 1949-1974 is, to date, the
only published work which specifically deals with the
development of the MTUC. Zaidi served as the Secretary
General of MTUC from the 1963/64 session to 1975 and was a
member of the MTVC Central Committee for most of the time
from the 1956/57 session to 1975. The book was written in
Zaidi's capacity as MTUC Secretary General (near the end
.
of his
	
trade union career) as the MTUC's official
publication to commemorate the centre's 25th anniversary.
The book which draws heavily from the reports and other
documents of the MTUC, and which includes some description
and justification for the centre's positions on various
13
issues of importance, provides an important source of
information for the study. Indeed, as one of the major
participants for nearly two decades, Zaidi's views and
position on various issues, and to a certain extent, his
sense of priority in the work, reflects the thinking of
the MTVC leadership itself throughout most of that 25-year
history of the national centre, thus making the work more
than an official documentation of the centre. In this
context the present study which adopts a more critical
view of the MTUC should be seen as an attempt to provide
another more critical and rigorous version of the MTUC,
this time from an "outsider".
The underlying theme running through Zaidi's work is
that the MTVC was a "responsible" leader of the country's
trade union movement. The author attempts to highlight
the various efforts undertaken by the leadership to defend
and to work for the democratic rights of the unions, and
also to be accepted by both government and employers as
partners in nation-building. Although at times appearing
inconsistent, and in many others lacking the substantive
arguments and documentation, Zaidi (and of course, the
MTUC leadership he represented), continuously reasserts
MTVC's opposition to labour militancy, and to union
involvement in political parties competing for electoral
support. He ,also continuously supports the MTUC's quest
for an "orderly conduct" of industrial relations, for a
harmonious relationship between labour and capital, and
for its readiness to contribute towards industrial peace
19
in the country.	 This approach and interpretation is
critically assessed in the present study.
A more comprehensive historical account of the trade
union movement in Malaysia can be found in Todd and Jomo,
"Trade Unionism in Malaysia : A Preliminary History"
(forthcoming). 7] Most of the works or studies cited
above deal with trade union developments during relatively
short historical periods. 	 In contrast, the work of Todd
and Jomo traces the development of trade unionism in
Malaysia up until the 1980s.	 To this extent it is an
Important work despite a generality and superficiality
evident in the argument.	 It should be noted that the
authors' description of the role and impact of a number of
important radical unions in the era of MTVC-led
"responsible unionism", and their account of the inter-
play of economic and political forces in influencing trade
union conduct and development provides an informative
account of the movement through these years.
1,_2..L_Itrag..t.ux.ri_AusLgraa_n_i_u_licw_g&-tha--Isg-
The following chapters chronologically deal with the
formation and development of the MTUC during its first
three decades of existence. The priodization of the
thesis has been determined in relation to key moments in
the MTVC history. Chapter 2 outlines the background
history of labour and its organisation in colonial Malaya.
Drawing on secondary source material the chapter provides
a brief history of the importation of labour, especially
15
from China and India, the early forms of labour
organisation, :he labour movement before and during the
Second World War, the PMFTU-led militant unionism during
the immediate post-war years until its eventual
suppression by the British colonial government in 1948,
and the promotion of "responsible" and "independent" or
"new" unionism by the colonial government. This provides
the essential backdrop to a consideration of the emergence
and development of the MTLIC.
Chapter 3 deals with the formation of the MTUC. It
discusses the ideas and rationale behind the formation of
MTUC and the role played by the TUA in this formation.
Following on from this, Chapter 4 provides an account of
the early years of the centre before independence from
British colonial rule in 1957. The chapter also addresses
the upsurge in labour militancy prior to independence, and
thus enables a preliminary consideration of the question
of MTUC and "politics", a feature during the colonial
years.
The developments during the post-colonial years are
taken pp in four chapters: Chapters 5 and 6, which cover
the 1957-69 period under the Alliance government, and
chapters 7 and 8, which cover the 1970-81 period under the
Barisan Nasional government. Chapter 5 discusses the
situation of labour unrest and the MTUC's approach towards
this and the government's labour policy. The focus here
is on	 the Railway	 Dispute/Strike of	 1962/63, the
government's Code of Conduct for Industrial Peace, and the
16
labour laws of 1965 and 1967. "Politics" and communalism
within the movement are the subjects of Chapter 6. This
chapter considers the controversy surrounding union
involvement in "politics" and communalism which tended to
undermine the MTUC-led movement. Following this, Chapter
7 analyses
	
the compromising	 ideology of
	 the. MTUC
leadership.
	
The chapter focusses on the MTUC's campaign
for labour's involvement in economic ventures (also
referred to as "New Frontiers of Trade Unionism"), as well
as its role in attempting to secure industrial peace in
support of	 the government's	 New	 Economic	 Policy.
Following this,	 Chapter 8	 deals with the internal
divisions and split within the MTUC.
	 This is first
undertaken by considering the dissatisfactions with and
the challenge
	 against the	 incumbents in	 the MTUC
leadership. A section on the Malaysian Airlines System
(MAS) and the Airlines Employees Union (AEU) dispute and
1980 laws highlights the ever-compromising posture and the
incapacity of the MTUC to serve as the spokesperson for
the union movement.	 This section also highlights the
increasingly tough	 line of	 the government	 towards
organised work'ng class. In relation to this another
section deals with the conflicts and split between the
public service and private sector unions in the MTUC, a
division which	 further undermined	 the MTUC	 as	 a
potentially united movement.
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the study by drawing
attention to the main themes of the discussions, namely,
17
the MTUQ leadership; MTUC and the government; MTUC and
"politics"; HTUC, the unions and labour; and MTUC and
communalism. The chapter ends with a note on the future
of the MTUC which draws on the analysis undertaken in the
the previous chapters to suggest possible reasons for
recent developments in the MTUC.
Notes
[13 A brief but interesting work on these developments in
the 1980s could be found, for example, in Wad (1988).
[2] See these views of Trotsky in Hyman (1971:17-20,
33-35); Clarke and Clements (eds.) (1977:28-29, 77-92).
[3] Hua Wu Yin (1983:2) defines communalism as "the
division of the masses along national lines in order to
prevent them from acting as a unified political force". A
brief note on the more precise usage of the terms "race",
"ethnic" and "communal" could be found in Syed Husin Ali
(1984).
In Other important contributions on the subject which,
although not noted here, but are cited in the following
chapters, include Parmer (1955), Gamba (1962a), Rudner
(1973), and Morgan (1977).
(5] For a critical review of Gamba, see Blake (1963).
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[6] For example, even V.David, Secretary General of the
Transport Workers Union (TWU) and former Secretary General
of the banned National Union of Factory and General
Workers (NUFGW) who was of more radical persuasion states
that "Brazier, though appointed by the Colonial Office,
displayed an encouraging element of sympathy towards
workers. At times he had to confront compatriots who were
well entrenched, powerful and influential planters". See
David (c1984?:iv).
[7] Part of this work has appeared as an article, "The
Trade Union Movement in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1969" in
Journal of Asian and African Studies XXIII, 1-2 (1988),
pp. 102-124.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BACKGROUND 
The argument in this thesis is that the MTUC was
established/promoted to meet a problem that confronted the
colonial government, namely to prevent the development of
nationalistic and politically progressive, or communist
trade unionism. In doing this, the colonial government
underwrote communal divisions and prohibited communist and
left politics. This was possible because of the long
colonial rule of Malaya which allowed any indigenous union
movement to be suppressed. In this chapter I shall trace
out some of the key features of Malayan history which have
bearing on this argument.
This chapter which draws heavily from a number of
important works describes briefly the history of labour
and the unions in colonial Malaya before the formation of
the MTVC in 1949-50. Four major features of union history
in Malaya will be outlined, namely, the colonial economy
(including the importation of foreign labour and the early
labour organisations), labour situation prior to 1945
(including the Japanese Occupation and its impact on the
general population and labour), the rise and fall of
communist militant unionism during the immediate post-war
years (1945-48), and other aspects of colonial legacy such
as communalism, the regulations of unions by legislative
means, the use of Imergency rule to legitimise repression
of labour, the promotion of "new" unionism, as well as the
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process of incorporating the labour leaders and their
("new") unions. Implicit in this description is the
argument that the formation and development of the MTUC
cannot	 be	 understood	 without	 understanding	 this
background.
1	 an	 anisations 
Cplonial Economy and Immigrant Labour 
The economy of colonial Malaya centred around two
major commodities, tin and rubber. Tin had initially been
mined by the Malays and later, especially by the end of
the 18th century, developed and largely overtaken by the
Chinese mining interests due to capital expansion, better
technology and more intensive utilization of imported
Chinese labour. Rubber was only introduced during the
last decade of the 19th century by the British after the
sharp fall in the prices of the other commercial crops
(example, gambler, pepper, sugar and coffee). Large
rubber plantations were soon opened up by employing
largely Indian labour, following an increasing demand for
rubber by western market.
Because of the lack of indigenous Malay labour as
well as other considerations which will be touched upon
shortly, the labour needed for the two industries was
mainly brought from southern China and India. This, and
the later British immigration policy to meet the needs of
the economy set the stage for the development of a multi-
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ethnic population and dominant immigrant character of the
country's work force.
A number of reasons were suggested to explain the
lack of indigenous Malay workers and why the British and
the other earlier mining employers appeared to prefer
immigrant labour. Most of the rice-peasant Malays were
economically self-sufficient in their communal kampung
(village) setting	 and were reluctant to work under
strenous working
	
conditions and	 strict disciplinary
regulations of wage employment. It was also in the
interest of the mining and plantation owners to rely on
cheap and plentiful supply of immigrant workers who
laboured solely for money, whereas the Malays were
regarded as an unstable source of labour supply, since
they could always return to their kampung whenever wage
work became unpalatable. Further, it was also part of the
British policy to encourage the Malays to continue with
their rice production activities as more of this staple
food was required to feed the growing immigrant workers
(Jomo, 1986:56). All this suggests that it was
economically cheaper and politically less problematic for
the colonial administration and the investors to rely on
immigrant labour.
The above approach helped to offset the dominance of
any particular ethnic group in Malaya, including the
Malays. Here the notion of "divide and conquer" which has
become part and parcel of the colonial governing ideology
is relevant, prticularly when seen in the context of lack
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of inter-communal interaction between the Malays, Chinese
and	 Indians	 following
	 jobs	 II specialization" .
	
and
consequently, residential segregation.
Around the turn of the century, employers began to
demand better access to supplies of labour, with the
increased use of tin, especially for food canning
industry, oil barrels and corrugated roofing in European
industries, and rubber grew in importance particularly in
tyre manufacturing.
	 Immigration and other forms of
recruiting labour
	 (for example,
	 the "kangany"
	 and
professional systems)
	
were then
	 encouraged by
	 the
British.(1) Likewise, with expanding tin and rubber
trade, communication and other economic activities also
began to grow. Roads, railways, docks, engineering works,
other skilled trades, menial jobs, and commerce, created
further employment. The increased demand for labour
tended to push pp wages slightly and generate workers'
mobility which hitherto were confined to a limited few.
Thus, as indicated above, the colonial administration
resorted "to t_Jrn on the tap of immigration", resulting in
the arrival of more people from China and India.(2)
Following the steady expansion of British and other
European interests in the country, which also saw the
annexation of the economically important states (mainly
for their mineral deposits) of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and
Negeri Sembilan,
	 and the
	 setting up of a central
administration for
	 these states (also known as the
Federated Malay States) in Kuala Lumpur, the British were
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in the position to streamline their economic policy,
including the control of the supply of labour. With
continued waves of immigration the size of the Chinese and
Indian communities in Malaya also began to increase
rapidly. (3)
The depression of 1929-1933, however, placed a check
on these immigration trends.
	 As rubber and tin prices
fell production was severely cut.
	 Thousands of workers
were retrenched.(4) Fearing that widespread unemployment
would create chaos in the economy the British decided to
repatriate many Chinese and Indian workers to their
homelands. The Immigration Restriction Ordinance, 1930
4nd the Aliens Ordinance, 1933 were introduced primarily
to that effect. A further dimension of these decrees was
that the Aliens Ordinance was used to deport communist
leaders and cadres from Malaya. In view of the prevailing
hardships at home this immigration restriction forced many
of the remaining immigrants to make Malaya their new,
permanent home. The decision is important in the sense
that it gave a sense of permanency or "stability" to later
generations of Chinese and Indians.
The segregation of labour, and residential separation
between the people of the three major communities -- the
Malays, Chinese and Indians -- did not provide a good
basis for inter-communal interaction.
	 Together with the
management policies	 of	 segregation,
	 this	 communal
isolation tended to obscure the people's identification
with their workplace or economic commonalities.
	 Under
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these circumstances suspicion and even mistrust between
the communities could hardly be avoided, and, as 1 will
show, this would continue to undermine the people's
broader national consciousness, and also that of trade
unionism.
Foilx_12122.1as_as...4alaAlign_s_
The earliest forms of labour organisations in Malaya
were the guilds and triads (secret societies) found among
the Chinese workers, both of which had a long tradition in
mainland China. The guilds and secret societies were not
only confined to the workers, they were in fact part and
parcel of the cultural and communal life of the Chinese
community. (5]
The guilds which were especially popular among
tradesmen and skilled workers (for example, tailors,
shoemakers, goldsmiths, carpenters and builders)
functioned both as trade unions and welfare associations.
They also served to regulate the labour supply of their
members, determine the quality of products, wages and
hours, and coordinate the terms of apparenticeship. While
there were guilds solely for workers and separate guilds
for employers, most catered for both employers and their
workers.
An offshoot of these guilds were the associations of
skilled tradesmen such as mechanics, fitters, plumbers,
welders and draughtsmen which began to emerge during the
last quarter of 19th century.
	 Although they grew into
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larger associations with branches in many states of Malaya
in the early part of this century, they were pushed into
the background with their alleged connections with the
secret societies which brought them under the surveillance
of the state, and the rapid development and dominance of
the western-type trade unions during the period.
Another very important form of labour organisation
was the triad (secret) society (Blythe, 1947; Purcell,
1948). These also originated in China. The early
concerns of these societies in Malaya were commerce and
tin trade.	 The contests for territorial control, and the
competition for	 the collection of "protection" dues
sometimes resulted in fierce and bloody clashes between
rival societies.	 Further, secret societies were often
employed by the mine owners to control their immigrant
labourers.
	
The state at first did not find it necessary
to check the growth of these secret societies, as they
benefitted the organisation and control of labour.
However, when inter-society rivalry and clashes became
widespread, and proved to be a liability to the economy
(in the sense that they began to threaten the further
inflow of investments) the authorities began to take
measures to curb them.
In contrast with the Chinese workers, organisations
among Indians were not established until the end of the
1930s. Major inhibiting factors on organisation were
strict control and managerial paternalism, strong caste
and regional
	
differences, and	 the almost	 complete
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isolation in the rubber jungles (see Parmer, 1960; Jain,
1970; Asaratnam, 1970). Although Indian workers acted in
collective ways as early as the 1920s, the greater risks
of dismissals and the possibility employers' reprisals
(particularly in the tightly-controlled working
environment) made it difficult for these workers to
develop more permanent forms of organisation.
.2.	 bour Peforp and During he Second World War 
As indicated above, the demand for tin and especially
rubber around the turn of the century boosted the Malayan
economy.	 Skilled and semi-skilled labour was much in
demand. This situation, coupled with the Impact of the
socio-political developments in China, particularly the
Nationalist Revolution of 1911, made the Chinese workers
more conscious of their position in the economy and served
as a breeding ground for the growth of modern trade
unionism in Malaya. Later, when the rivalry between the
Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and the Chinese Communist
Party took the centre stage, their supporters in Malaya
also took sides and began to Intensify their organising
campaigns, thereby further boosting the growth of unions
in Malaya.	 However, as the unions appeared to be more
politically oriented and militant, they were also a source
of worry	 to the	 colonial government	 and business
interests.	 This delayed the process of obtaining legal
recognition from the colonial government.
27
An important development in the 1920s was the
establishment of the Nanyang (South Seas) General Labour
Union (GLU) by the communists (Stenson, 1970:8). Set up
in Singapore in 1925 the GLU was thought to have
Influenced a number of important strikes between 1926 and
1928 by the Chinese fitters, the workers of the Singapore
Traction Company, and Singapore shoemakers and other
workers. They did not survive long because of police
raids and repression between 1928 and 1931. At any rate
by this time, another important organisation which was to
provide the ideological impetus and organisational drive
for the continued organisation of labour in Malaya, the
Malayan Communist Party (MCP), was already active. It had
been formed around the late 19205 with membership drawn
largely from	 the Chinese	 working- and lower-middle
classes. The Party, believed to have been the offshoot of
the earlier Singapore-based Nanyang Communist Party,
played an important role in the strikes of the second half
of the 1930s.
As indicated earlier, the organisation of the Indian
workers did not take place until some time later. In the
1920s close contact with the Chinese workers, especially
in other (non-plantation) industries, knowledge of
political and trade union struggles in India, and the rise
of a more educated generation of workers contributed to a
greater union consciousness among the Indian workers. For
example, organised industrial actions by Indian workers
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were reported both in the private and public sectors
(Asaratnam, 1970).
By 1940, the Central Indian Association of Malaya
(CIAM) which has been in operation since 1936, and other
Indian organisations, such as the Kiang District Indian
Union, served as the main voice of Indian workers.(6) The
strikes by Indian estate workers in the Kiang area
(Selangor) in early 1941 under the leadership of the Kiang
District Indian Unions are of particular significance
(Wilson, 1981; Stenson, 1970:25-33). They were organised
not only in demand of improved wages and conditions, but
also in protest against the poor treatment of the workers
and their families by the management and the lack of
social amenities in the estates. The strikes later spread
to many othe.- estates in Selangor and Negeri Sembilan
prompting the British to send in troop reinforcements and
declare a state of Emergency in Selangor (on 16 May) to
crush them. Government repression resulted in serious
injuries, the death of five workers, and also in the
deportation, arrests, and detention of strike leaders and
activists.
Compared with the moves by Chinese and Indian workers
to establish unions the Malays lagged far behind.(71 Of
course, Malay workers did play an active part in the
unions, and the multi-racial character of the strikes at
the Batu Arang collieries (Selangor) and Singapore
Traction Company, for example, confirmed their union
involvement.	 Nevetheless, the evidence suggests that
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their numbers were small, involving particular sections of
the Malay working class. As indicated earlier, the Malays
were slow to be recruited into waged employment in the
first place. Their strong ties with the kampung tended to
mean that waged work was an "option", rather than a must
for their economic survival.
Colonial Pol.cy on Trade Unionism 
As far as the colonial government was concerned trade
unions were not recognised as legal entities until after
the Second World War. The virtues of strict labour
discipline and managerial paternalism, which the European
employers had long upheld, militated against the state
according any legal status to workers' organisations.
Indeed, legislation concerning labour only dealt with the
questions pf labour recruitment and supervision and, at
most, with the treatment and "basic" welfare of migrant
labour in Malaya.
	
However, labour organisations in the
form of guilds, secret societies, and others had already
been in operation. Although there was no legislation
concerning trade unions, there was the Societies Ordinance
of 1895 (and 1889 in Singapore) which provided for the
registration of associations of the guild type.[8]
There were, however, moves by the colonial
administration to regulate the labour market, as well as
to conform to some international labour standards (in the
4.0 conventions) which Britain had earlier ratified. This
led to a shift in the colonial labour policy.(91 Labour
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unrest in the 1930s also prompted the authorities to
consider regulating the unions in the hope of making them
more accessible to the state. Thus the Trade Unions Bill
and the Industrial Courts Bill were introduced in the
Legislative Council (of the Federated Malay States) for
the first time in late 1939, and enacted in 1940, while
the Trade Disputes Ordinance was passed in late 1941. A
Trade Union Registrar was also appointed to deal with the
registration of unions. However, nothing followed until
after the war as there was strong opposition from the
employers and because the country, by the end of the year,
had already come under the grips of the Japanese Military
administration.
From this brief account it is clear that the multi-
racial character of the population and more particularly,
the work force in Malaya was very much a legacy of the
colonial economic circumstances. The Chinese and Indians
together made up the bulk of the country's industrial work
force, while	 the Malays on the whole, were not a
significant factor. It is also clear that the early
organisations and activities of labour, at least prior to
the 1940s, were largely a Chinese phenomenon, and that
this was	 much influenced	 by the	 politico-economic
situation and developments in mainland China. 	 As will
become evident, the exploitation of communal differences
by the	 new Japanese	 overlords still posed serious
organising problem for Malayan labour.
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Labour During the Japanese Occupation (1942-45) 
Although Japanese military rule in Malaya during the
Second World War lasted less than four years (from 1942 to
August 1945) it nevertheless created a significant impact
on the people. The rise of organisations among the Indian
workers, the enhancement of organising work mainly among
the Chinese workers, the increased tension in communal
relations, and the upsurge in the quest for freedom (from
colonialism) could substantially be attributed to the
impact of this rule.
Briefly Japanese rule was noted for the tremendous
hardships caused to the people. The economy was in a
constant state of anarchy with prolonged shortages of
essential items.	 Jobs were scarce and unemployment
mounting. To consolidate their rule and expand their
territorial ambitions, the Japanese militarists introduced
forced labour schemes whereby workers were assigned to
various posts in the country as well as to other areas
under Japanese control. Tens of thousands of workers,
mostly Indian plantation workers were transported to
Thailand and Burma to work in the Siam-Burma Railway
pro j ects.(101 Under the circumstances prevailing at the
time it was impossible for unions to operate openly. The
main resistance to Japanese rule was led by the MCP
through its major united front organisations the
Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU) and the armed
unit, the Malayan People's Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA), and
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labour activists formed part of this broader united front
movement.
Although the efforts of the resistance forces to
fight the Japanese served to unite the people, the serious
communal conflicts caused by the Japanese policy of
treating people along communal lines tended to outweigh
the forces toward unity. The Chinese, in particular, were
singled out for brutal treatment by the Japanese, mainly
for the role played by the predominantly Chinese MPAJA
against the Japanese rule, and for the anti-Japanese
impact of the Sino-Japanese war (in China). Many Chinese
were brutally murdered and tortured. On the other hand,
the Japanese exhibited some degree of tolerance towards,
and even encouraged, Malay and Indian nationalism. For
instance, the Pembela Tanah Ayer (PETA), an anti-British
Malay organisation believed to have been the offshoot of
the earlier radical Malay organisation, the Kesatuan
Melayu Muda (KMM) that was earlier suppressed by the
British was allowed to operate by the Japanese.
The Japanese also underwrote some forms of Indian
nationalism. Encouragement and support were given to the
Indian Independent League (IIL) and the Indian National
Army (INA) whose primary aim was to struggle for the
independence of
	 mother India from the British rule
(Stenson, 1980:91-102). The Japanese anti-British
strategy aside, many Indians in Malaya regarded the IIL
and the INA as a salvation to their problems and misery.
Understandably, the cause of freedom for the motherland
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served to uplift the morale, sense of dignity and national
pride of the especially oppressed Indian workers in
Malaya. Their identification with and participation in
this movement also, apart from the breakdown of the
tightly-controlled estate employment structure and their
coming into contact with the well-organised Chinese
workers boosted their confidence for union organisation
later on after the war.
This differential treatment, and consequently the
suspicions led to tensions between the ethnic communities,
especially between the Malays and the Chinese during the
aftermath of the Japanese withdrawal in 1945 and 1946.
This experience complicated the country's ethnic relations
and certainly the task of unifying the workforce.
The war and the Japanese Military rule in Malaya had
a strong impact on the people. The immediate collapse of
the British and their allies when faced with the Japanese
onslaughts in late 1941; the severe economic hardships,
and the brutal force and humiliation experienced by the
people at the hands of the Japanese; the rise of
especially the MPAJA as a new force to challenge the
Japanese rule and, in the process, acquired experience and
confidence. This prompted many to organise themselves,
and to play what they considered to be their proper role
in the new Malaya, especially with the arrival of the
British to reimpose their rule.
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2,3J_The Fie3nd_Fall of Militant Unionism (19 45-48)
The immediate post-war years saw the people
responding to the new circumstances by organising
themselves under various shades of social and political
organisations, all of which played important role in
defining new political terrains of the country. Communal
divisions continued
	 to	 be	 a	 feature
	 of	 labour
organisations.	 These divisions were rooted in British
colonialism and exploited by the Japanese during their
occupation years.	 With the reimposition of British rule
these divisions were maintained and extended.
Nevertheless, the development of militant, communist-led
unionism from 1945 to 1948 was a moment when these
divisions were challenged.
On the labour front the role of organising the
workers was undertaken by the front organisations of the
MCP, the General Labour Unions (GLUs) and their central
organisation, the
	 Pan-Malayan General
	 Labour	 Union
(PMGLU).[11]	 The PMGLU was later reconstituted as the
Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU). This
organisation had gained important organisational as well
as political experience, especially through the part
played by its (earlier) front organisations like the MPAJA
and MPAJU during the war. The MCP's earlier
Organisational and political network (established during
the resistancr against the Japanese rule) stood it in good
stead in the months immediately following the Japanese
surrender.	 In late 1945 there was a dramatic rise of the
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district-based GLUs in various parts of the country.
Workers in urban industry, transport services (bus and
railways), ports, rubber plantations, and the mines were
organised, with lightning strikes and demonstrations
demanding improvements in wages, conditions of work and
other social amenities becoming a commonplace. As demands
for rubber and tin rose and employers wanted production
Increase, the GLU-led workers were also increasingly
successful in employing the strike weapon to back their
demands.
Working as a labour front of the MCP, the GLUs began
to pursue
	 both economic	 and	 political	 objectives
identified with the party. Stenson (1970:61) notes that
the actions of the GLVs were "not so much for immediate
economic gains.., but for the long-term objective of
worker solidarity and awareness". This "planned campaign"
was evident in a series of strikes and demonstrations
which began in mid-October 1945 involving workers of the
Sentul railway workshops and Batu Arang collieries near
Kuala Lumpur which later spread to other towns in the
country. The demands by the strikers and demonstrators
for more rice, freer movement of foodstuffs, exemption
from water and electricity dues and higher prices for
rubber and tin were also clearly popular demands affecting
wide section Qt the population, and not restricted to the
"rice and fish" issues only. The strikes later affected
Singapore where heavy concentrations of workers and better
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labour organisation	 guaranteed a more prolonged and
intense labour protest.(12]
The organisational capacity of the GLUs was enhanced
by the formation of their central organisation, the PMGLU
in February 1946. The proclaimed objectives of the PMGLU
included a struggle for the improvement of the livelihood
of the labour class; to fight for the realization of
democratic government in Malaya, and to support the
independence movements of all weak and small nations
(cited in Khong Kim Hoong, 1984:68). Through this central
body a proper coordination of the educational and
propaganda work, as well as support network for strike
actions by the unions was possible, while negotiation and
other labour support services, strike reliefs, and
protection from victimization were also carried out or
provided for the workers.
At this point, apart from its political orientation,
the general and non-communal character of the PMGLU needs
to be underlined. Whereas history and colonial economy
had shaped the "specialization" of economic tasks of the
predominantly immigrant labour, making multi-racial worker
interaction and unity problematic, the general and multi-
racial character of the GLUs transcended these economic
and communal boundries. The PMGLU's campaign to attract
the Indian-based estate unions throughout 1946 as a way of
breaking down communalism proved successful when all the
newly formed Indian unions, with the exception of the
Negeri Sembilan Indian Labour Union led by H.K.Choudhury
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and P.P.Narayanan, were brought together under the PMGLU
-
(Morgan, 1977). As pointed by Morgan, without the PMGLU,
labour which had a tendency to divide into separate unions
and, in the case of Malaya, also along racial or ethnic
lines, would be further subject to the old cardinal rule
of "divide and rule".
Of course this is not to imply that there was no
problems of communal nature in the PMGLU-led unions. In
fact, as Stenson (1970:132) points out, their inability to
influence Malay labour later proved helpful for the
employers who saw the ready supply of non-unionised labour
in the Malays could make up for the labour shortage as
well as meet the threats of the organised Chinese and
Indian workers. Nonetheless, among the Chinese and Indian
workers, who constituted the bulk of the industrial
workforce, the leadership and influence of the PMGLU were
unquestionable. In short, the establishment of general,
multi-racial and political unionism became something that
worried both the colonial government and the employers.
At this juncture it should be noted that the success
of the GLUs' industrial and political campaigns in 1946
must also be attributed to other factors, in particular,
the high demand for Malayan commodities by the western
industries, and the tight (local) labour market
immediately after the war. Demands for wage increase were
usually successful as employers, especially of the smaller
Chinese-owned industries, who wanted quick profits and did
not want production hampered. This, in effect, helped to
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heighten unionism among the workforce.
	 In the same
context the workers themselves had genuine economic and
social grievances which prompted them to resort to
industrial actions which in turn helped to boost the
movement (Todd and Jomo, forthcoming).
These developments were a cause for concern by the
British who h-4dly needed Malayan rubber and tin for
Britain's post-war recovery efforts (Morgan, 1977). From
the employers side pressure was also building for the
administration to take some action to check the trends. A
series of measures aimed at breaking the strikes were
employed by both the employers and the government,
including the use of "blacklegs" and arrests of union
leaders and activists. For instance, as noted by Stenson,
the British also ordered the Japanese war prisoners, who
were still kept in Singapore until 1947, to carry out the
work of the strikers and "as a means for staving off
pressure for wage increase". The Japanese war prisoners,
estimated at 30,000 during 1946 were also used in various
government installations (Stenson, 1970:86).
The government's preoccupation with the political
reconstruction of the country underwrote their opposition
to these developments among workers. The British proposed
a constitutional and political reform through the "Malayan
Union" scheme which was strongly opposed by the people.
The proposal called for the restructuring of Malaya into a
centralised state system under the direct rule of the
British Governor, the island of Singapore to be made a
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separate Crown Colony, and the granting of citizenship
rights to the non-Malays.(13] This was to be an imposed
solution and not one that met the aspirations of the
people, including workers, via their unions.
There were also other developments which tended to
caution, at least temporarily, the colonial government
approach to labour situation at the time. For example,
despite the initial scepticisms on the part of certain
quarters in the bureaucracy and among employers the
government was also considering the possibility of
bringing the unions under state control and supervision
through a "proper" system of industrial relations. This
would allow
	 the government
	 to regulate labour and
belatedly and secondarily to honour the ILO conventions.
Such view appeared plausible, especially with the
thinking within the British colonial circles in Britain,
that trade unionism, especially modelled on the British
type, was necessary for a healthy development of democracy
In the colonies. The thinking, though debatable, is
understandable especially when coming from a tradition
where trade unionism had long been incorporated into, and
part of the state institutions.(14] It was also part of
that thinking that far too many in the colonies did not
have the know-how of trade unionism and "proper" trade
unions should be encouraged (see Morgan, 1977: footnote
85). The whole thinking was given a boost with the
dispatching of Trade Union Advisers (who were recruited
from among the British union officials) to the colonies by
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the new (post-war) Labour Party majority government in
Britain.
	 Further, the government also issued a model
Trade Union
	 Ordinance which	 was to be implemented
throughout the Empire. As indicated by Morgan, this
actually formed part of the broader colonial strategy to
ensure that the development of trade unions in the
colonies did not challenge British hegemony.
The major pre-war legislation, the Trade Unions
Ordinance, 1940, with certain amendments based on the
recommendatio' from London, was finally implemented in
Malaya from 1 July 1946 (Gamba, 1955:14). A post of Trade
Union Adviser (TUA) was created, with John A.Brazier, a
British trade unionist who had worked as Railway engine
driver and served on a number of government boards,
appointed to the post. A department under his charge, the
Trade Union Adviser Department, was also set up. In
addition, two other separate departments were established,
concerned with labour matters, a Department of Labour and
a Department of the Registrar of Trade Unions.
Brazier's role was to encourage the formation, growth
and development of "sound", "responsible" or "independent"
(that is, independent from the communists and the GLUs)
trade unions in Malaya . In fact, according to Gamba
(1962b:171, footnote 6), Brazier had been asked "to
liquidate the GLU" upon his arrival in Malaya. Strongly
anti-Communist himself, Brazier wasted no time and effort
to execute his job. In this work, he managed to organise
white-collar unions and some predominantly Indian unions
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with little bargaining power. Although less successful in
his initial task, the unions he helped organise or
encouraged, nevertheless provided the government with an
alternative labour group to the militant PMGLU (Morgan,
1977).
Regulation for Union Registration 
The implementation of the Ordinance marked a new turn
in the country's trade union situation. With it not only
the whole idea of bringing the unions under state control
became possib1_, but so did the notion of curbing the
growth and development of the PMGLU-led militant unionism.
The Ordinance made union registration compulsory and
accorded considerable discretion to the Registrar of Trade
Unions (RTU) (Stenson, 1970:42-43; Morgan, 1977). The
RTU, for instance, could refuse to register a union if in
his view the union was likely to be used for unlawful
purposes or purposes inconsistent with its objects and
rules. He was also granted the right to ensure that union
funds were restricted to "trade union purposes".
	 The
Ordinance prohibited public employees from joining or be
affiliated to unions of non-public employees. It also
required at least two-thirds of the union officers to be
engaged with an industry or trade with which the union is
concerned.
	 Following the Ordinance a campaign was
launched to register the unions by September 1946.
Although at first opposed to the Ordinance,
particularly the registration requirement, the PMGLU later
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decided to allow its affiliates, now to be reconstituted
as craft, industrial or regional unions, to be registered,
while itself, and its state-based affiliates/branches,
were reformed into federations of trade unions. Following
this on 25 August 1946 the PMGLU was reformed into the
Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU) and its
state-based affiliates/branches established as Federations
of Trade Unions (FTUs).
	 According to Stenson
35) the change in the PMGLU's position with
registration was because the centre was in the
consolidating its support while, at the same
seeking government recognition.
(1970:134-
regard to
process of
time, also
However, once the process of registration began, the
RTV insisted that unions should neither include (in their
union rules) any references to accepting the guidance of
the federations, nor provide for payments of dues (about
20 to 25 percent of the subscriptions collected) to any
federation (see Stenson, 1970:136).	 To further restrict
the movement union funds were also not permitted to be
used for political purposes or sympathy strikes. In
October the government also ruled that all federations
including the PMFTV had to apply for registration or for
exemption, and to follow the regulations applied to
individual unions. The RTU also declared in November that
all the state FTVs should dissolve and wind up their
assets and could only reconstitute as federations upon the
wishes of the affiliates already registered. He further
insisted that	 any federation formed should have no
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executive powers and only act in an advisory capacity (see
Stenson, 1970:136-37; Khong Kim Hoong, 1984:127-28). The
new rulings were clearly intended to stifle the
centralized power of the PMFTU. They were also meant to
destroy the main bases of PMFTU's influence and hence its
leadership of the movement.
Although strongly resisting the registration rule the
state FTUs finally conceded in March 1947. There was no
reply from the RTU office until over a year later when a
decisive blow against the movement was delivered. While
the compliance was perhaps unavoidable for the FTUs to
enable them to continue working legally and to win
recognition, it also sent a signal to the government and
the employers that their efforts to control and curb the
movement were paying off. According to the RTU source, by
1 March 1947, 147 unions or about half of the unions in
existence in peninsular Malaya were registered (cited in
Stenson, 1970:138).
The combined government-employers offensive against
the unions escalated in 1947. Strikes which continued
during the year were met with increasing police violence
such as that which characterized the Kedah unrest of early
1947 when police opened fire to break strikes and meetings
of the estate workers, resulting in injuries, imprisonment
and even	 deaths of	 the	 workers	 (Morgan,	 1977).
Harrasment, disciplinary action, victimization and
dismissals pf PMFTU organisers and branch leaders by the
management with the help of police became more frequent.
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The trespass law was rigorously enforced by police and the
employers making
	 organising
	
work	 in	 the	 estates
increasingly difficult.	 Further	 restrictions	 were
introduced with the Labour Department and the TUA Office
ensuring that the requirements of the law, especially
those which denied PMFTU's access (financial and
political) to the unions, were complied with, as well as
preventing other unions from joining the PMFTU. Even the
judiciary, whose infamous Willan Judgement of October 1947
which ruled that workers who absent from work (because of
strike) in effect broke their employment contract and
were, therefore	 (in the eyes of the law), legally
dismissed, also militated against the unions.
In addition, the political climate of the country had
become more settled by 1947 thus enabling the government
to shift its focus and move towards a ban of the PMFTU and
its affiliates. In 1946 the major controversy surrounding
the proposed "Malayan Union" was "resolved" with a Draft
Agreement on the new "Federation of Malaya" structure
published.(15( This allowed the colonial government to
prepare for the suppression of PMFTU. Meanwhile the PMFTU
continued its campaign to extend its organisational and
political base. In fact, more than 300 strikes with a
total 696,036 person-days lost were reported for 1947.(16]
Labour unrest continued in 1948 although, by this time,
the movement on the whole had already been on the
defensive.
	 The police and military were increasingly
employed to back up the employers and to arrest union
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leaders.	 The strikes however escalated in April and May.
This prompted the government to introduce three amendments
to the Trade Unions Ordinance through the Federal
Legislative Council (FLC) on 31 May. The first amendment
allowed only persons with at least three years' employment
in an industry to hold official trade union posts in that
industY.
	
This amendment was aimed at professional trade
unionists.	 The second amendment prevented anyone who had
been criminally convicted from holding a trade union
office.	 As commented by Morgan (1977), since it was so
easy "to
	
secure convictions	 against militant trade
unionists" at the time the aim was clearly to fill the
unions with the proteges of the government. The final
amendment prohibited federations of trade unions other
than those based on similar trade, occupation or industry.
With the last amendment the PMFTV and the FTUs were
considered illegal.
Following the amendments, and after the murder of
three European planters in Perak in June the FTUs were
officially refused registration and, therefore, declared
illegal. The MCP and the PMFTU were banned. Wide powers
of arrest and deportation of those alleged to have been
involved in the violence were introduced. The government
first declared a state of Emergency in central Perak and
west-central Johor on 16 June, and later, on 12 July, the
Emergency was extended throughout the country.
The Emergency Regulations provided the government
with almost every legal means "to restore order".(17] The
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Governor was empowered to legislate any rule he deemed
necessary. The Regulations gave the police the right to
disperse any meeting or assembly of five or more workers.
Strikes were considered illegal if the employers were not
given two weeks' written notice signed by seven people
representing the group concerned. With the employers
resorting to various forms of intimidation of the work
force and reprisals against the unions, workers were in
disarray, fear and confusion.
The state of Emergency which began in mid-1948 marked
the end of the militant unionism in Malaya. The
suppression of unions and unionists identified with the
PMFTU's militant tendency or suspected of being
subversives was extensive. On 21 June police raided union
premises and arrested some 600 people, mainly unionists
(Morgan, 1977). Many others were also banished from the
country or repatriated, especially to China. The scale of
repression can be gauged from the sharp fall in the total
person-days lost due to strikes, the number of unions and
their membership after the Emergency was declared. Thus
whereas the total man-days lost for April, May and June
1948 in peninsular Malaya were 12,773, 178,634 and 117,154
respectively, the figures for the following three months
were 3,394, nil, and 348 respectively (Labour Department,
AR 1948).(181 Likewise, between December 1947 to
December 1949 union membership fell from 195,113 to 41,305
(cited in Gamba, 1962b:364, Table 30).
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The Emergency rule, however, did not seriously affect
the "responsible" and "independent" unions which Brazier
and the government had been encouraging since 1946. Thus,
whereas many unions were deregistered by the RTU on the
ground that they contravened the Ordinance the "new"
unions continued to mushroom. In cases where genuinely
independent unions survived it was under heavy constraints
with close police scrutiny and surveillance.
2.4. "New" Unionism and the Emergency 
As indicated earlier, one of the important moves by
the colonial administration via Brazier, the TUA, to break
the PMFTU-led militant unionism had been to encourage the
growth and development of "responsible" and "independent"
or "new" unions. As noted by Stenson (1980:138-39), this
was initially directed to the white-collar and Indian
workers because "in the main they were English-speaking
and because they were amenable to persuasion". Brazier's
task started in early 1946 with railway employees and
other government unions and clerical employees and
continued later in the year in the attempts to woo the
plantation workers away from the PMFTU-led unions. In the
latter case, he and the RTU are noted to have established
close rapport with the Negeri Sembilan Estate and Other
Workers Union and the Perak Estate Employees Union headed
by P.P.Narayanan and John Emmanuel respectively who were
known to be stunchly anti-communist and who cooperated
closely with	 employers.[19)	 By 1947,
	 the "new",
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"independent" unions
	 were	 reported	 to	 have	 been
established, for example, among clerical workers, rubber
plantation workers,	 Agriculture	 Department	 workers,
electricians, hospital employees, mechanics, railway
workers, and Public and Works Department workers (Trade
Unions Registry, AR 1947).
The support and encouragement given to the "new"
unions could also be seen as an attempt on the part of the
colonial government to incorporate the "moderate" labour
leaders and the unions. This is evident from the
appointment of a number of these labour leaders to some
important state bodies and the supportive role they were
to play in furthering the government's labour scheme.
Such English-speaking labour leaders of non-PMFTU unions
like V.M.N.Menon (Estate Staff Union) and M.P.RaJagopal
(Pan-Malayan Railway Workers' Union), for example, were
appointed to the Malayan Union Advisory Council, while
P.P.Narayanan (Negeri Sembilan Indian Labour Union), Osman
Siru (Penang Postal Uniformed Staff's Union), Khong Soo
Chin (Selangor Clerical and Administrative Staff Union)
and also M.P.Rajagopal were appointed to the Labour
Advisory Board in 1947 (Trade Unions Registry, AR 1947).
In addition, the following were appointed to sit on the
country's legislature, the FLC in early 1948:
P.P.Narayanan, M.P.Rajagopal, Mohd.Yusoff bin Mohd.Noor
(Penang Municipal Services Union), Nasaruddin bin A.Rais,
Khoo Khoon Huat (Perak Hydro Employees' Union), and Lee
Woon Mun (RP, ADC 1950).[20]
	
For the government, this
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exercise was necessary to show its strong support and
recognition for	 a	 "responsible"
	 and	 "independent"
unionism.	 With their sudden rise to prominence, and with
the prestige	 and glamour
	 they now enjoyed by the
appointments, these "moderate" labour leaders were more
grateful to the government and felt obliged to support it.
This was evident in the part they were to play in setting
up the MTUC and in their "responsible" manner in leading
the trade union movement. This fulfilled the expectations
and hopes of the government.
Brazier's task of building up and encouraging "new"
unions also	 continued
	 more	 vigorously	 after	 the
declaration of	 Emergency and repression of militant
unionism began. With the state organised against the
communist organisational network, including the remnants
of the PMFTU-led unions, his task was made easier. Again
he and his colleagues in the TUA Department concentrated
their efforts on the rubber plantation workers as well as
the public sector employees where he already had some
important links established and from which he could expand
the work. Apart from that, the plantation sector was also
a crucially important sector in the economy and if he
could reorganise the rubber workers under "sound" and
"responsible" unions this would benefit the state as a
whole.
However, most of the"new "
 unions were small,
fragmented and weak with a limited capacity to bargain
with the employers. Even in the case of a few relatively
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large ones, like the railway and the plantation unions,
the kind of union leadership produced by the Emergency
circumstances, and state patronage tended to weaken or
"moderate" the unions' position in their dealing with the
employers. Under the tense Emergency climate and strong
employers' suspicions of unions, most union leaders tended
to look to the government, particularly the TUA Department
for support to enable them to carry out their trade union
work, and submitted themselves further to the influence if
not control of the government. Indeed, continuous police
surveillance and government expectation that they served
as the "eyes and ears" of the state (in the war against
communism and	 militant	 unionism)	 encouraged
	
their
subservience to the state.
At this stage, the labour leaders were without a
proper union	 structure.	 The "new"	 unions, being
ineffective, received limited support from workers. In
these circumstances the government became concerned lest
the situation be exploited by the very elements which they
hoped to uproot from the unions, namely the communists and
other "militant" workers. Indeed, without the support of
the workers, these labour leaders would not be in the
position to play the role expected of them by the
government. In that respect a proper union structure was
necessary, as well as the "official" recognition of this
"new" unionism within the overall polity. It was partly
in this context that the idea of establishing a new labour
centre, the MTUC, evolved.
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2.5. Summary 
The history of trade unionism prior to the
establishment of the MTUC had three features to it.
First, dating back to the earliest origins of unions there
was a marked communal feature to unions in Malaya. Unions
and their forebears were organised along communal or
ethnic lines,
	 as guilds
	 and secret	 societies and
subsequently as unions.
	 Even under Japanese occupation
these divisions were confirmed and extended. This also
was a feature of British rule both before and after the
Second World War. Second, and related, the main moves for
"political" unionism came from the Chinese community,
although the establishment of the PMFTU was characterized
by an attempt to go beyond communal boundries. The
evidence suggests that this was partly successful. Third,
the British saw the development of PMFTU as a threat to
their continued
	 rule and,	 in	 a	 post-independence
situation, their continued influence in Malaya. A non-
communal and communist PMFTU threatened to become a focus
for nationalist forces in Malaya and the British acted to
suppress this development, first with the imposition of
the Emergency rule and, second, by further underwriting
communalism, particularly through the promotion of Indian
led "new" unions.
Following the Emergency, the colonial government was
faced with a problem.	 The "new" unions were small,
fragmented and without effective leadership. They could
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not be expected to secure the confidence of the workforce
without which they could hardly play the proper role
expected of them by the government. At the same time the
vacuum in the national trade union leadership created by
the demise of-the PMFTU was a concern for the government
lest this was filled by other "undesirable" elements. A
solution to this was found by Brazier with the support of
his superiors in the government, in the creation of a new
apex union structure that would serve to coordinate the
"new" unions, and which would also help to facilitate the
liaison between the government and the unions. This was
, the background to the setting up of the Malayan Trades
Union Council (MTUC), the concern of the next chapter.
Notes
(1)	 The new forms of recruiting labour include the
"kangany system" and professional recruitment as compared
to the previous "indenture system". For details of the
systems of labour recruitment see, for example, V.Thompson
(1947:65-80); W.L.Blythe (1947) and J.N.Parmer (1960).
[2] Of course, as noted by Caldwell (1977a) the influx of
these immigrants also served to increase the pool of
reserved labour needed by capital to force wages down.
[3] For example, in the Federated Malay States where
there was
	 concentration of	 tin mining	 and rubber
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plantation industries the Chinese and Indians together had
overtaken the Malays by the year 1901, whereas in the
other Malay states, Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu,
and Johor (collectively termed as the Unfederated Malay
States) where subsistence agriculture was still prevalent,
the Malays continued to predominate. Population census
(various years) cited in Jomo (1986:324, Appendix 3).
[4]	 According to Caldwell (1977b), employment in the
estates fell from 258,780 in 1929 to 125,600 in 1932.
(5] For a brief explanation of these organisations in
Malaya see Gamba (1962b:1-5).
(6] For an elaborate account of the Indians and their
organisations in Malaya see Stenson (1980).
(7] The Club Kapitan2 dan Injinir2 Melayu formed by Malay
shipping captains and engineers in Singapore in 1893 noted
in Roff (1980:182) is often cited as an early example of
Malay industrial combination.
[8] See Gamba (1955:10-12). This legislation was more
for the purpose of curbing secret societies and other
secret labour unions which were causing problems to the
employers and the administration then.
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[9] A circular from Lord Passfield, the Secretary of
State for the Colonies in 1930 which called for the
legalization of trade unions in the colonies is often
cited as an example of this policy change (Gamba, 1955:10-
12).
[10] It was estimated that 73,000 workers were sent to
these projects and most of them never returned (cited in
Gamba (1962a:13).
Ill] A detailed account of the rise and fall of this
militant unionism is given in Stenson (1970). A brief but
excellent account on this unionism is provided by Morgan
(1977).
[12]	 Here it should be noted that as far as the MCP was
concerned, Singapore has always been a part of Malaya.
[131	 For a discussion of this see Khong Kim Hoong
(1984:73-122).
[14] See, for instance, Eric Hobsbawn (1951) for an early
account of how British capital incorporated labour into
the state.
[15] For some details of this see Khong Kim Hoong
(1984:98-121).
55
(16) Cited in Khong Kim Hoong (1984:149). Compare this,
for example, with the 1946 figure estimated at 476,101 in
Gamba (1962b:288).
[17] For an account of the Emergency Regulations and its
impact on the country see Caldwell (1977c).
[18] "AR" here and throughout the thesis refers to
"Annual Report".
[19] Gamba (1962a:25) and Stenson (1980:139, 168).
According to Stenson, together the RTU, the TVA and the
police Special Branch also played an important role to
promote the rubber union led by John Emmanuel to try to
break the radical Indian leadership in Perak. The close
relationship between these "moderate" and "responsible"
labour leaders with the colonial government is also
confirmed by a number of veteran unionists interviewed by
this writer.
[20] "RP" and "ADC" used here and throughout the thesis
refer to "Report of Proceedings" and "Annual Delegates
Conference" respectively (see bibliography).
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FORMATION OF MTUC (1949-50) 
Colonial government encouragement of "new" unions
after the war, and the imposition of Emergency rule to
fight communism and militant unionism beginning in mid-
1948 set the stage for the establishment and development
of the apex structure of this "new" unionism, the Malayan
Trade Union Council (later, the Malaysian Trades Union
Congress). As will be argued in this chapter the MTUC was
created by and in a colonial context. It was an imposed
structure, based	 on	 an	 official
	 recognition	 and
affirmation of communal divisions. In this respect the
colonial government attempted to place its stamp on trade
union organisation in Malaya and this is most evident
with regard to the formation of MTUC.
This chapter deals with the formation of MTUC between
1948 and 1950. It was mainly with the idea of having an
alternative movement to the PMFTU-led militant unionism
after the war that the "new" unions and the MTUC were
encouraged and, sponsored by the colonial government. I
shall suggest that the formation of MTUC at the beginning
of the Emergency years underlined the close cooperation
between the colonial government, particularly the TUA and
the "moderate" labour leaders at the time. Following on
from this, I shall suggest that the whole scheme, which
was facilitated by the circumstances of the Emergency
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rule, served to reinforce the incorporation of the
"moderate" labour leaders and the trade union movement by
the government.
The discussions and arguments in this chapter draw
heavily from the works of Gamba (1962b), Josey (1958), and
Zaidi (1975); from MTUC reports and minutes of meetings,
and also from the interviews with some veteran unionists.
It should be noted that, together, the material and
information from these obviously varied perspectives,
enal7le a brief discussion on the formation of MTUC, which
extends the usual argument about the formation of the
MTUC.
The chapter first considers the major circumstances
and rationale which led to the formation of the MTUC. The
role of the centre within the context of the colonial
anti-communist strategy is highlighted in this section. A
second section deals with the formation of the MTUC
itself.	 The section focusses the part played by the
colonial TVA,
	 John Brazier	 and the
	 "moderate" or
"responsible" labour leaders in the formation of the
centre. Finally, I conclude by pointing to the key
features of this history and noting the importance for
the subsequent development of the centre.
3.1. Why was the MTUC Formed? 
As implied above the formation of the MTUC in 1949-50
should primarily be seen in the context of the anti-
communist and anti-labour militancy campaign being waged
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by the colonial state especially with the declaration of
the Emergency rule at the time. The new labour centre was
needed to help the government in its fight against
Communism and iailitant unionism on the labour front.
With the Emergency, the government became convinced
that it needed the support of the "moderate" labour
leaders and their unions to fight communist influence
among the workers and in the government view improve
industry. The government, and some section of employers,
were also convinced that it was in their interest to
assist the	 development of "sound" and "responsible"
unions. The structural network for this development had
already been started with the encouragement and support
for the formation of "new" unions. It was believed that
these unions would help provide the workers with a channel
to express	 their grievances	 and	 reciprocally	 the
authorities could maintain links with and monitor labour.
In this context, the steps taken earlier by the
government to promote a number of "moderate" labour
leaders to places of prominence such as the Malayan Union
Advisory Council, the Federal Legislative Council (FLC),
and the Labour Advisory Board were steps towards the
incorporation of labour. However, most of these unions
were poorly organised and there was no national labour
leadership structure to which the government could have
ready access. The government became worried about the
possibility of communists usurping the unions' leadership.
The solution was to continue to build and support the
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"new" type of unions, and at the same time establish a new
labour centre that would play a watchdog role against a
possible communist "infiltration" into the movement.
Indeed, the idea of filling the "dangerous vacuum"
following the demise of the PMFTV, as explained by Gamba
(1962b:399) clearly points to this anti-communist strategy
in the formation of MTUC. At such an early stage of the
Emergency rule, in fact, just about a year after the
Emergency was declared, a new labour centre would not have
been possible unless the government was confident that the
centre could and would play a complementary role in its
anti-communist efforts. The anti-communist strategy of
the government was supported by the "moderate" leaders of
the unions who were themselves anti-communist and who also
identified themselves with the colonial order. Indeed, in
the opening speech as the chairperson of the MTUC
inaugural conference (1950) and on behalf of his other
colleagues, M.P.Rajagopal, the leader of the All-Malayan
Railway Workers Union (AMRWU) (who was also a nominated
member of the FLC), reaffirmed the commitment of the
labour leaders to fight communism and to stand "solidly
behind the government" but made no mention of independence
or freedom from the colonial rule (see RP, ADC 1950). At
the same time, these labour leaders must have had some
idea of their future role in a labour centre. For
example, the first circular informing the unions about the
proposal to hold the first conference of unions "to
examine the possibility of forming a Malayan Council of
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Trade Unions" was signed by V.M.N.Menon, another nominated
member of the FIX (Gamba, 1962b:396). The government also
sent three members of the same group of labour leaders,
Mohd.Yusof bin Mohd.Noor (Penang Municipal Services
Vnion), P.P.Narayanan (Negeri Sembilan Plantation Workers'
Union) and Tan Tuan Boon (Interpreters' Union, Kuala
Lumpur) as observers to the ICFTU inaugural conference in
London in
	
late 1949
	 which also	 was important in
socialising these trade unionists for their new roles in
the mTpc.
The MTUC was primarily envisaged as a coordinating
body for the unions in the country. It was believed that
this coordinating role would enable the MTUC to maintain a
close rapport with the unions, and make representation to
the government, particularly via the advisory councils/
boards and commissions mentioned above. Indeed, the two
major terms of reference for the formation of the centre
as recommended by the Working Committee formed by the
unions (in 1949) to study the proposal were: 1) to
ascertain further steps for establishing closer inter-
union liaison, and 2) to consider the type of machinery
and organisation which would allow regular consultation
and discussion
	 between trade unions and the labour
representatives	 on	 various	 government	 bodies	 and
committees". (1]
According to Gamba, in the wider context of British
(and their allies) interests in the region a "responsible"
labour centre in Malaya was also seen as a buffer against
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the influence of the left-inclined World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU). The WFTU was said to be planning to
intensify its campaign in the colonies. This followed a
split in the aris-based WFTU between the Soviet-led and
the Anglo-American-led camps which culminated in the
withdrawal of the British, American and Dutch labour
centres from the federation in 1945. The breakaway group
was soon moving to set up an alternative confederation
with the active support of Whitehall.(2] The split led
to the convening of a preparatory conference in Geneva in
June 1949, and then to the Free World Labour Conference in
London in November the same year which witnessed the
inauguration of the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU). As indicated above three Malayan
labour leaders representing the major ethnic communities
in Malaya were sent by the colonial government to observe
the proceedings of the London conference and to express
the support
	 of the
	 Malayan	 unions	 to	 the	 new
confederation. It is important to note here that these
labour leaders were sent to London at the time when the
MTUC was not yet inaugurated. It is also interesting to
note that one of them, P.P. Narayanan, a government-
nominated member of the FLC (from the rubber unions group)
soon was to head the newly formed MTUC.
The above explanation of the formation of MTUC
Implies that the MTUC was a scheme envisaged by the
colonial interest at the beginning of the first Emergency
rule In Malaya. It also suggests that the trade unionists
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or the "moderate" labour leaders played a subsidiary, or
rather, a collaborative role to that of the government,
and not as the prime mover as suggested by Zaidi (1975:15-
19). The unions at that time were weak and divided and
their leaders, including those appointed by the government
to the bodies mentioned above, were themselves very
dependent on the government. According to T.Narendran and
K.George, two veteran unionists, even the plantation
unions which were regarded as the backbone of the movement
were in very bad shape.(3)
	
With respect to union
organisation and the dependence of the union leaders on
the government, the "new" unions were not in a position to
establish the MTUC, which required considerable resources
and the active support of the colonial government.
In any case, as noted by Gamba (1962b:398), there
were also reservations and scepticism among the colonial
officials and employers with regard to promoting a trade
union movement on a pan-Malayan basis. The fear of labour
militancy with its waves of strikes (of the recent past)
still haunted them. They were also sceptical of the idea
of the state paving the way for "active" unionism in what
was considered to be an unsettled Emergency environment,
fearing that a new movement, whatever its beginning, could
well be a fore-runner of another round of militant
unionism and that it might be susceptible to renewed
activity by the communists. In the event the colonial
administration was apparently sure of the need for such an
apex union structure as part of their overall strategy to
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counter communism. High Commissioner Henry Gurney and his
other colleagues were said to be well aware that trade
unions were there to stay and thought that it was better
to encourage the growth of "healthy" and "responsible"
unionism, and to incorporate it into the government's
counter-revolutionary strategy. Ignoring the working
class organisationally might possibly result in the "new"
unions falling under the influence of the communists and
other so-called "undesireable" elements. The TUA who
enjoyed a close working relationship with a good number of
leaders of the "new" unions, as seen earlier, also had
every reason to be confident that he could count on these
"moderate" labour leaders.
3 ‘ 2. The Estakaishment of the MTUC 
The first conference to discuss the formation of the
new centre was convened on 27 and 28 February 1949 upon
the initiativr, of the TUA and his department, and the
government-appointed labour leaders in the Legislature
(also referred to as the "Labour Group").(4) 	 More than
150 delegates representing about half of the 165
registered unions at the time attended the conference
which also heard speeches by the pro-British leaders of
the three ethnic communities, Onn Jaafar, Tan Cheng Lock
and R.Ramani.	 The conference set up a Working Committee
whose terms of reference were to ascertain further steps
for establishing	 closer inter-union liaison, and to
consider the type of machinery and organisation "which
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would allow regular consultation and discussion between
Trade Union movement and the labour representatives on
various Government bodies and committees". The members of
this	 Working	 Committee	 were	 K.C.Chia	 (Chairman),
V.M.N.Menon (Secretary),	 Pritam	 Singh,	 A.G.D.Alwis,
Mohd.Nasir bin Budin, P.P.Narayanan. M.P.Rajagopal, and
B.Ujagar Singh (RP, ADC 1950).
The inaugural conference took place a year later, on
25 and 26 March, 1950 in Kuala Lumpur. It was attended by
174 delegates representing 111 unions out of the 168
registered during the year.[5) The members of both the
Standing Orders Committee and the Credentials Committee
were appointed by the 1949 Working Committee. The
delegates again heard speeches from the three community
leaders above, Onn Jaafar, Tan Cheng Lock, and R.Ramani.
Chaired by an appointed member of the FLC, M.P.RaJagopal
of the AMRWU, the conference was asked to adopt the report
and recommendations of the (1949) Working Committee. It
also adopted a resolution to form the Malayan Trade Union
Council, and went on to elect the members of the Central
Committee.	 This committee consisted of the President,
Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, two Auditors, three
Trustees, and	 nine other	 members representing	 the
following groups	 of unions;	 1) Estate unions (two
members), 2) Mining unions (two), 3) Government employees'
unions	 (two),	 4)	 Clerical	 unions	 (one),	 and
5) Miscellaneous unions (two).
	
While the first nine
members of the Central Committee were elected by all the
65
delegates in the conference (with each union having a
maximum of two delegates), the representatives for the
five groups of unions were elected by the delegates
belonging to the respective groups. This election and the
grouping of unions followed the recommendation of the same
Working Committee Just mentioned. The conference elected
MTUC's first Central Committee among whom the most
prominent were P.P.Narayanan (President), M.P.Rajagopal,
and V.H.N.Menon, who were members of the FLC, and three
members of the 1950 Labour Advisory Board, Ujagar Singh,
John Emmanuel, and Tan Tuan Boon.(61
From the very beginning of the formation of the MTUC
Brazier, the TUA, played a leading role. He appeared to
have been involved in most stages of the 1949 and 1950
conferences, including canvassing unions to send in
delegates, the technical preparation for the conferences,
and the proceedings of the conferences.
	 Brazier and 10
other officers from his department were fully at the
disposal of the conference.
	 While Brazier served as the
Adviser to the conference, the other officers served as
•
advisers to	 the Standing
	 Orders Committee and the
Credentials Committee, as the Press Officer of the
conference, stenographer, and interpreters. The Standing
Orders of the conference were prepared by his department
(Gamba, 1962b:403). Brazier also assumed the task of
explaining the recommendations of the Working Committee to
the conference.
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In this MTUC scheme Brazier received the full support
of his top superiors in the colonial government, the High
Commissioner and	 the	 Commissioner	 General
	
(Gamba,
1962b:397-98). The Chief Secretary to the government, in
fact, indicated that the government had authorised unions
of government employees to participate in the scheme (see
Gamba, 1962b:416). As indicated earlier, in his task
Brazier also received full cooperation from the "moderate"
labour leaders especially those in the Legislature (FLC)
and the Labour Advisory Board. Fully aware that it was
important for the trade unionists themselves to be seen
"running the show", Brazier also agreed to get their
involvement from the beginning. In this Brazier provided
a clear indication of his intentions when he stated:
...How to fill the vacuum or gap left by the
disappearance of the Federations was my major
problem. This was a chance we had been waiting
for and yet obviously, as a Government officer,
I could not create an 'artificial' or 'stooge'
administration myself...I got a few friends
together from the trade union representatives on
the Legislative Council and Advisory Board and a
meeting was convened" (cited in Gamba, 1962b:397).
The approach was evident in the first circular informing
the unions about the idea of the (1949) conference which
was signed by V.M.N.Menon, an English-speaking unionist of
the All-Malayan Estate Asiatic Staffs' Association (AMESA)
who was also a nominated Labour Councillor of the FLC. In
it, among others, Menon indicated that the conference was
caMed "to examine the possibility of forming a Malayan
Council of Trade Unions" and that Brazier would be in
attendance to give delegates "the benefit of his advice on
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policy, programme and constitution" (cited in Gamba,
1962b:396-97).
For all this, Brazier had every reason to be
satisfied with the outcome of the conference, particularly
the return of a good number of his close associates. For
instance, Gamba notes that Brazier regarded the
appointment of Narayanan, now the Secretary of the Pan-
Malayan Rubber Workers Union (PMRWU) to the Presidency of
MTUC as being wise because P.P.Narayanan was "acceptable
to the colonial government, to the employers and to the
bulk of labour" (Gamba, 1962b:406). Brazier's efforts to
promote "new" unionism and to help establish the MTUC on a
"strong footing" continued until his retirement from the
TUA portfolio in late 1955.
To most of these "moderate" labour leaders Brazier
was sincerely interested in helping to build what they
termed as "bonafide" trade union movement.(7] Brazier's
own trade union background, and the relatively difficult
task he undertook to convince some sections of the
colonial officials and employers about the "virtues" of
the "responsible" brand of unionism in post-war Malaya,
must have contributed substantially to this impression of
sincerity.(8]
	 It is important to remember that these
developments occurred at the height of the anti-communist
campaign and, as far as these labour leaders were
concerned, it was not necessary to distinguish between
Brazier's keen interest to help the unions and his
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commitment to countering the (communist-led) militant
unions.
The labour leaders were also obliged to support
Brazier and the government in return for the benefits and
advantages of their state sinecures. Indeed, their
appointments to a number of state bodies by the government
(apparently upon the recommendation of Brazier, the police
Special Branch and the RTU) had boosted their image and
extended their influence in the society. It gave them a
sense of confidence and importance for which they must
have been more than grateful. At the same time, the
notion of "responsible" leadership and other such criteria
used in their selection or appointment to the state bodies
meant that they were vulnerable to criticism from other
unionists who had been excluded. Such direct appointments
by the government meant that these labour leaders did not
necessarily carry the mandate of their own unions. This
situation raised doubts and suspicions surrounding the
actual role of these labour leaders. In this instance the
formation of MTUC, and the election to office of a number
of these
	 labour leaders	 helped to
	 legitimise and
consolidate their leadership and labour representative
role.	 This further	 reinforced their positions as
petitioners and dependents of the colonial government.
MTUC Structure 
Here a brief mention should be made about the
structure of the MTUC.
	 Following the recommendations of
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the (1949) Working Committee, it was agreed that the MTUC
would serve as an advisory and coordinating body for the
unions. It would also act as a link between the unions
and the labour representatives on the government bodies.
The supreme authority of the MTUC lay in its Annual
Delegates Conference	 (ADC).	 In	 this	 conference,
affiliated unions were entitled to send their
representatives (delegates) on the following basis: two
delegates for 500 members or less, and one delegate for
every additional 500 delegates. During voting, including
the election ( the Central Committee, each delegate would
be entitled to a vote. At the beginning affiliate unions
were requested to pay affiliation fees at the rate of 20
(Malayan) cents per member per year.
The Central Committee members who were elected at the
ADC were entrusted with the task of managing the day-to-
day affairs of the centre. They were to coordinate the
centre's various activities and to convene the ADC. Apart
from the Central Committee, there was also a proposal to
set up State/Settlement Divisional Committees which would
serve as liaison committees between the unions in the
respective states/settlements and the Central Committee.
The membership of this State/Settlement Committee would be
made up of unionists representing the five groups of
unions in the state/settlement concerned and elected to
office as in the case of the Central Committee.
The Committee and Brazier made it clear that, as a
society, and
	 not a	 trade union or a trade union
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federation, the MTUC would not be in a position to engage
in a trade dispute or to enter into negotiation with
employers. The MTUC was not permitted to affiliate or
take active part in political movement. Further, the MTUC
was not invested with any executive authority over the
affiliates. The MTUC was later registered, in 1951, (as a
society) under the Societies Ordinance, 1949.
Although there was dissatisfaction later with some of
these limitations, particularly regarding the non-union
and non-federation status of the MTUC, such was not the
case with the delegates attending the MTUC inaugural
conference. They seemed well aware that the colonial
government was not prepared to allow the emergence of
another powerful national labour centre which might have
the resemblance of the earlier PMFTU. Josey (1958:49)
also notes that under the circumstances then prevailing in
Malaya it is doubtful if the government would permit a
labour centre in Malaya with any other policy. While the
union leaders may have been concerned about their union
autonomy, vis-a-vis the national centre, at the same time
they saw the advantages and benefits which such a centre
could offer.
Those who were critical of these structural
limitations argued that they formed an obstacle to an
effective MTUC.191 They maintained that with "its hands
tied, the MTVC was just a talking box" without the force
to pursue its demands.
	 Others note that this lack of
trade union rights and powers to represent workers in the
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economic struggle with the employers, suggests that the
significance of the MTUC in the eyes of the unions was
much reduced (interview: K.George, 7.1.87). While these
arguments were (and still are) valid, the fact that the
MTUC was a central body for the unions did provide it with
a basis to take up various labour issues, although the
manner and intensity with which the issues were taken up
remained limited. Indeed, such issues and questions as
labour policy, trade union education, organisation of
workers in new industries, union amalgamation and merger,
and international labour relation, were important subjects
which continued to be the prerogatives of a national
centre like the MTUC, regardless of its trade union
status.
4.. conclusim
It is the argument of this chapter that the MTUC was
a creation from the top, that is by the colonial
government (especially through the efforts of its TUA)
with the support of the "moderate" labour leaders. The
formation of
	 the MTUC
	 was made possible by three
interlinked features of colonial Malaya. First, the
establishment of the "new" unions provided Brazier with a
ready source of compliant and dependent "union" leaders.
These personnel were not the representatives of well-
organised and confident union memberships and the
opportunity to play a part in the colonial administration
served to reinforce their otherwise insecure positions.
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Second, the Fmergency provided the control whereby certain
types of unionism were not possible and not permitted. In
some ways the "new" unionism was all that was permitted
and the opportunity to estab]ish a federal body, whatever
its limits, was likely to be supported by many of these
"responsible" leaders. Third, the proposal to establish
the MTUC did not involve any reference or involvement of
individual
	 union	 memberships	 and	 therefore	 these
"responsible" leaders 	 could give the proposal their
support without restriction. Thus, the MTUC was a product
of a colonial-led proposal to create a compliant and
dependable union structure. In their ambition the
government found willing supporters who were to stamp
their dependency on the future of the MTUC.
Notes
[1] See "The Report of the Working Committee to be
Submitted to the Malayan Trade Union Delegates Conference
on 25 and 26 March 1950", dated 21 February 1950, in RP,
ADC 1950.
[2] For an account of this split see Allen (1957:289-
312).
[3] Interviews with both unionists on 10.10.86 and 7.1.87
respectively. See also Gamba (1962b:352-95) concerning
the poor state of the unions at the time.
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[41 For accounts of this event see Gamba (1962b:396-419);
Zaidi (1975:15-52).
[5] These figures are adjusted based on RP, ADC 1950.
(6)	 The first four leaders also made up the 1949 Working
Committee. The other members of the Central Committee
were Rahmah binti Mohd.Salleh, a Malay woman delegate from
the Telephone Operators Union, Kuala Lumpur, X.E.Nathan
from the Selangor State Press Workers' Union, Abidin Abdul
Rahman, P.M.R.Kurup from Colliery Workers' Trade Union,
K.L.,	 S.R.Perumal	 from	 AMRWU,
	 V.Ramanathan,
	 and
A.Arulnathan from Central Electrical Board Workers' Union.
t	 (7)	 Interviews with veteran unionists. Zaidi (1975:12)
goes further in suggesting that even the colonial
administration (British Military Administration) at the
time only thought that Brazier would "help the unions but
at the same time try and control them", and did not
realize his intention of starting "a bona-fide trade union
movement in the country".
[8] An account on Brazier and his role as the TUA is
given in Gamba (1962b:100-130). Josey (1958:21, 39) also
expresses sympathetic views about Brazier.
74
[9]	 Examples, Tan Heng Fong (1985:101), and interviews
with Jamaluddin	 16*, 11.12.86,	 and	 A.Navakumundan,
28.1.87.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EARLY DEVELOPMENT (1950-57) 
Under the impact of the Emergency and tight
government control, as well as the "responsible" posture
of the "moderate" labour leaders, the early years of the
MTUC saw the development of a weak movement which served
as part of the state machinery to fight communism. This
situation continued despite the heightening of the
political divisions and the revival of union militancy as
the country approached independence in 1957.
This account of the early development of the MTUQ
covers the period between its formation (1949-50)
discussed in Chapter 3 and the independence of Malaya from
British rule in 1957. It takes up further the question of
the "moderate" leaders outlined earlier. In this chapter
I shall suggest that the fear of communists entering the
unions prompted the government to place trade unionists
under surveillance.
	
This tended to curtail union action
including that of the MTUC. I shall suggest that the
overall weakness of the MTUC-led movement was compounded
by government policy of anti-political unionism, by the
communal character of the movement, and by the MTUC
leadership which continued to restrain affiliate unions in
both the economic and especially political struggles.
The chapter is made up of four sections. The first
section addresses the major features of the MTUC-led
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movement duriny its early years. The question of Indian
dominance of MTUC leadership is highlighted. The second
section considers the heightening of union struggle prior
to and around the time of independence from British rule.
It also considers MTUC's position on some labour issues,
and highlights the factors which served to discourage
union militancy at the time. The third section discusses
the question of MTUC and the political potential of the
movement before independence. The final section concludes
the discussion, pointing to the way the MTUC is an
emasculated and divided union confederation which acted to
further government policy rather than represented the
interests and concerns of workers.
4.1. The Early Years (1950-55) 
During its early years the MTUC was weak and unable
to exert itself as an influential and effective leader of
the country's trade union movement. The Emergency
conditions certainly forced most unions to "compromise"
with or to follow the rules of the game set by the state
in order for them to operate legally. Reminders and
warnings were constantly issued to the MTUC and the unions
to fulfill their assigned role and "to be vigilant of
communist infiltration". In a Central Committee meeting
in 1953, for example, the High Commissioner warned the
MT(JC and the unions against this infiltration (Zaidi,
1975:72).	 So persistent was the government in this that
even the avowedly anti-communist MTUC was forced to
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complain about police harassment and intimidation of the
unions.	 The MTUC, for instance, complained about police
detectives being sent into union meetings, police
harassment of trade unionists, police accompanying agents
of employers to visit workers on strike, and requests of
the MTVC to cooperate "with the Special Branch of the
Police to help weed out, what the Police and Government
feared were communist elements within the Trade Union
Movement" (MTUC, AR 1955-56:41-46, 52-55; Zaidi, 1975:72,
75). This situation placed some unionists in a "dilemma".
Having assumed the role of labour leaders, they now found
themselves unable to pursue the rights of workers.
	 As
noted by Gamba (1962b:414), the MTUC leaders were
reluctant even to criticize the poor wage system and
conditions of work faced by the workers for fear that if
their expressions were too militant they might be labelled
as communists.
The Emergency conditions also facilitated the
incorporation of the "moderate" labour leaders and the
movement by the government. In this instance, the
appointment of these leaders to the FLC, the Labour
Advisory Board, and other state-sponsored advisory bodies
mentioned earlier was again of particular significance.
By their role in these state bodies, which by now they
were allowed to nominate their own representatives, the
unionists were further drawn into the government structure
itself.	 Indeed, having participated in these proceedings
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they were more inclined to identify themselves with the
policies and programmes of the government. Participation
In these bodies also brought about and reinforced their
sense of importance as unionists.
	 As members of the
legislature,	 for	 instance, they	 insisted on
	 being
addressed "The
	 Honourable"	 by	 their	 trade	 union
colleagues. This gave rise to a practice whereby these
labour leaders would attempt to justify their role on
government bodies, arguing that they were important for
the trade union movement.11) This sense of importance,
and the limited avenues available for the unionists to
Justify their leadership role, prompted the MTUC to demand
for their further participation in the various advisory
and consultative bodies which further encouraged the
incorporation process. Soon after its formation the MTUC
leaders, enco aged by the government gesture to allow the
MTUC to nominate the four labour representatives on the
L.abotir Advisory Board, the MTUC requested the government
to allow more labour representation in such bodies as the
Town Boards, State and Settlement Councils, Federal
Executive Council, and the Finance Committee (Zaidi, 1975:
45-46).
Government incorporation of the movement also took
the form of supporting the formation (and or the
amalgamation) of certain important "responsible" unions.
For example, in the case of the formation of the National
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Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW) in 1954, support not
only came from the colonial government, but also the
representatives of the International Federation of
Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers (IFPAAW) and
ICFTU, Tom Bavin and Michael Ross respectively. Tom Bavin
was a British trade unionist who served as
	 the
IFPAAW's representative in Singapore (and later made
Honorary Life President of the IFPAAW). He had a close
relationship with P.P.Narayanan, the key leader of the
newly constituted Plantation Workers' Union Malaya (PWUM)
and the MTUC, and was often invited to address the MTUC
conferences. Together with Narayanan and the TUA, he
played a key role in the campaign towards the amalgamation
of plantation unions and in securing a loan from the ICFTU
needed for the purpose.(2) In his report the RTU stated
that Michael Ross, a representative of the ICFTU, visited
Malaya "to give direct assistance to the plantation
workers' union, Malaya in its reorganisation plan as in
the opinion of the ICFTU this union was deemed to be a
stabilising factor to the rubber industry in South East
Asia" (Trade Unions Registry, AR 1954:10). For the
government, apart from trying to control the plantation
from communist influence (during the Emergency), such
support to the plantation union under "moderate"
leadership was also important in view of the union's large
potential membership and hence its "moderating" (if not
determining) role in the MTUC-led movement. Through this
amalgamation in 1954 the NUPW became the largest trade
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union in	 the country. The	 union	 initially
	
had about
80,000 members and by late	 1955,
	 reached 100,000 (Gamba,
1962a:91-92). It was led by	 "moderate" Indian labour
leaders	 such as P.P.Narayanan, H.K.Choudhury,
S.P.S.Nathan, and John Emmanuel, with Indian plantation
workers making up most of its membership.
As for the many small public sector workers, their
relatively better and more secure Jobs tended to
"moderate" their position on many issues affecting labour,
and this provided the government with the more educated
potential "allies" who could well play important and
useful" roles in the movement.
	
An important leader of
the banned radical National Union of Factory and General
Workers (NUFGW),	 V.David (also the current Secretary
General of MTUC and a long-time Secretary General of the
Transport Workers Union or TWU), strongly criticized the
"moderating" role of many public sector unionists on a
number of important labour issues, especially during the
early years of the MTUC.(3) The situation allowed the
task of winning over the unions to be successfully tackled
from the top, that is from the leadership, an organizing
strategy which also characterized the setting up of the
MTUC.
For the "moderate" leaders the situation certainly
provided them with the opportunities to expand their
leadership role within the labour relations parameters set
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by the government and without reference to a membership
base either in the form of affiliate unions or rank-and-
file members. Their positions in government councils/
boards enabled them to consolidate their union positions.
Indeed, a situation whereby the leadership of the MTUC was
effectively controlled by more or less the same trade
unionists who occupied the FLC and the Labour Advisory
Board such as P.P.Narayanan, M.P.RaJagopal, V.M.N.Menon
and Mohd.Yusof Mohd.Noor persisted throughout the early
years.	 From the above account it is clear that the early
MTUC-led movement was characterized by its weak and
compromising leadership. Brazier himself, at the end of
his nine and a half years' service in Malaya, admitted
that the Malayan unions were weak and divided with many
duplications among them.(41
Of course it should be noted that their continued
hold over the movement was also due to the weight of their
combined voting strength in the MTUC. With a voting
system whereby the much bigger unions or groups of unions
such as the NUPW, the railway unions, the National Union
of Teachers (NUT), and the public sector unions group
cou10 easily trade off their votes with, or exert their
patronage upon whoever they preferred, the victory of
their candidates (either their own leaders or those from
the "brotherly" unions) was almost consistently
guaranteed. When reviewing the role played by a number of
big unions in the MTUC, especially in the early days,
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Zainal Rampak, the President of MTUC and the long-time
Deputy Secretary General of the TWU admitted that the big
unions had exercised much influence over the rest of the
unions (Interview: Zainal Rampak, 11.1.87).
Union Response 
In genral, although the membership of the MTUC
continued to rise (see Appendix C), unions had a critical
view of the MTUC during these early years. For example,
among the affiliated unions, attendance at the ADCs,
obviously the major annual event of the centre, was
usually low, with the problem of outstanding affiliation
fees continuing to feature regularly in the reports.
Attendance at the 1951 and 1952 ADCs, for example,
accounted for 35% and 38% of the registered unions
respectively.(51 Attendance was still very low in 1956
even though this was already on the eve of independence,
and the MTUC was calling for a bigger role for the
movement in the country's new political and economic
structures. Only 32 affiliated unions of the total 111
were represented at this conference (MTUC, AR 1956-57).
Likewise, more than half of the 138 unions which were
affiliated to	 the MTUC in 1952 did not pay their
affiliation fees (Josey, 1958:54).
Under the Emergency rule and constant police
surveillance union activities were severely constrained.
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For some sections of the trade union movement the close
connection between the MTUC leaders and the government was
a cause for suspicion and caution. Some of them continued
to regard the MTUC as a "tool" of the colonial government
and were critical of the purpose for its creation and role
within the context of the Emergency rule (Interviews:
V.David, 19.8.87; Narendran, 10.10.86). In addition, as
noted by some authors, the MTUC-led movement also appeared
more as a movement of "labour bosses", lacking the close
rapport with the ordinary union membership (Parmer, 1955;
Gamba, 1962b:407).	 For	 instance,	 correspondence,
meetings, most of the reports, and (later) "Suara Buroh"
(the official organ of the MTUC) were conducted or written
in English thereby alienating the bulk of the non-English-
speaking groups and membership from the national centre.
Regular complaints were made by the delegates at the ADCs
about too much English being used by the MTUC leaders and
officials.
Given their "distance" from an organised and active
trade union membership, many of the leaders had to depend
on government support for their own union positions.
Hence they could not take actions which might be construed
as challenging the very authority which guaranteed them
their leadership positions (and the privileges that went
along with them) in the first place. It was in these
circumstances that their conduct of union affairs were
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viewed sceptically by the union meffibership and which in
turn contributed to the latter's lack of support for the
centre.
Of course this is not to deny the sense of
independence and the desire to pursue a genuine cause for
labour's rights and welfare on the part of certain
sections of the unionists.
	 This was evident throughout
the early	 years, particularly
	 in the	 debates and
resolutions adopted at the ADCs and Central Committee
meetings.
	 Foy instance, demands for the nationalization
of rubber and tin industries, free education for children
and adults, provision of housing for workers,
establishment of basic living wage, and a proposal to
sponsor the formation of a Labour Party were articulated.
Likewise, there were also protests or opposition
registered by the MTUC against the government's decision
to raise the school fees, police intervention in trade
disputes, and
	 the "employer-favoured"
	 labour	 laws,
particularly in respect of the extensive powers vested in
the RTU. But, often the lack of resoluteness and the
limited efforts beyond the meeting walls, and at times,
the softening of the position brought about by the
"moderating" impact of the dominant elements and groups
within the MTUC itself provided the government with the
ready excuse to these demands.
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Communalism and Indian Dominance 
One of the major characteristic features of the MTUC-
led movement was communalism which in the main took the
form of Indian dominance. The question of communalism
raised here also includes the problems which emanated from
this predominance and which continued to affect the role
of the MTUC as such. To put it another way, it is not
only the predominance of any ethnic group in the movement
which is of concern here, but also whether or not there
were concerted efforts by the movement to face and to
overcome communal tendencies which could undermine the
working-class base of the movement.
For various reasons which shall be touched upon in
the discussion, the dominance of Indian unionists within
the MTUC was to persist for a long time and, to a certain
extent, affected the overall posture and effectiveness of
the centre. This feature of the movement will be examined
from	 number of	 inter-related	 perspectives,	 the
incorporation strategy of the government, the interests of
the "moderate" labour leaders, and the perception and
response of the other unionists/unions.
As indicated in the previous chapter, Indian
dominance of the Malayan trade unions started with the
government's suppression of the earlier predominantly
Chinese, PMFTU-led militant unionism, and the support
given to the Indian-based unions, particularly those of
8 6
the plantation and the public sectors. 	 Table 4.1 below
shows this feature of union movement.
Table 4.1	 TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP BY ETHNICITY,
1949-1957 
Year Indians	 Chinese	 Malays Others	 Total union
membership
1949 58%	 24%	 13% 5%	 41,305
1950 58	 26	 12 4	 54,579
1951 72	 14	 11 3	 108,254
1952 69	 15	 13 3	 127,846
1953 72	 12	 14 2	 109,557
1954 65	 15	 18 2	 113,470
1955 62	 16	 20 2	 145,749
1956 62	 16	 21 1	 232,174
1957 58	 21	 20.5 0.5	 222,073
Source : Trade Unions Registry, Annual	 Reports,
1949-1957.
Thus, whereas the Chinese were the dominant group in the
unions before the Emergency was declared, they were among
the minorities throughout the period under discussion. As
shown in the table, except for 1949, 1950 and 1957 their
percentage of the total union membership did not exceed
20%. On the other hand, the Indians continued to
constitute the single largest group of union membership
throughout the period.	 At this stage the Malays were
Still a minority group in the wage-earning sectors of the
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economy, although their number, as reflected in their
share of the total union membership, were rising.
While the TUA and the colonial government were
critical and suspicious of the Chinese unionists, they
unofficially supported communal unions, among the Indian
workers, which tended to exploit the nationalistic and
economic (including the wages paid by the plantation
employers) differences
	 between
	 the	 two.	 Estate
paternalism imposed upon the workers by the plantation
employers was reinforced through state paternalism,
extended to the plantation unions and their "moderate"
leaders. This was used to Justify the so-called "law-
abiding" nature of the Indian workers which in turn
Justified government support for their unions.
For the government, the Indian community as the
smallest of the three broad communal groupings in the
country, did not pose a threat to the colonial interests,
relative to 'he threat perceived from the Chinese and the
Malays. The Indian community's marginal role in the
country's political process (again largely due to their
relatively small size) also served to encourage some
Indians to jealously guard their "special domain" in the
union movement. The situation thus, tended to reproduce
the Indian control of the movement which, in a sense, also
contributed towards postponing the growth of a more
unified non-communal
	 working-class movement
	 in	 the
country.
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As mentioned earlier, the colonial government,
particularly through the TUA, had given special attention
to the unions in the key sectors of the economy or those
which it considered to be "independent" from communist
influence such as the plantations, railways, mining, and
the public sectors. In the case of the plantation sector,
for example, the sheer size of the work force constituted
a potential force which could play a significant role in
the union movement, especially if it could be won over to
the side of the establishment. The possibility of this
happening was not overlooked by the TUA and the colonial
government who had began to develop an incorporationist
approach towards the unions as soon as the British
returned to Malaya after the war. The fact that the mass
of the illiterate Indian plantation workers were already
on the defensive following the various restrictions
imposed on worker organisation, and the return of strict
"managerial paternalism" in the plantations which
accompanied the Emergency, ensured the efficacy of the
scheme.
As the majority communal grouping in the MTVC, the
Indian unionists understandably dominated the MTUC
conferences and made up the bulk of the Central Committee.
Of the 13 main elected officials in the First ADC, for
example, 10 were Indians, 2 Malays and one Chinese (MTUC,
RP, ADC 1950). It is interesting to note that one of the
Malays elected at this conference, as Vice-President, was
a woman delegate, Rahmah Bt Mohd. Salleh of the Telephone
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Operators Union, Kuala Lumpur. Considering, the marginal
role of women unionists at the time, and the fact that the
other prominent candidates, particularly M.P.Rajagopal
also did contest for the same post, Rahmah's election to
office was a sign that the uniformity of leadership, on
sex or communal lines, could be challenged and broken. In
the second and third ADCs, the Indian unionists made up 9
of the 13 elected members of the Central Committee, with 2
Chinese, and 2 Malays (Zaidi, 1975:33, 56, 61). Although
the MTVC leaders repeatedly claimed that the movement was
a multi-racial one, no serious effort was made to organise
or encourage the many non-Indian workers, particularly the
Chinese into the MTUC's fold, and to educate the workers
on the importance of class solidarity, prompting some
union delegates at the conferences to question the so-
called representativeness	 and effectiveness
	 of	 the
centre.[6] The situation was reinforced by the focus of
the Emergency on the Chinese community and the attention
given to Malays in the lead up to independence. In these
two respects a union movement led and dominated by Indians
would appear marginal as far as the government was
concerned.
With the approaching independence, . there was a
tendency for communal divisions among the already small
and divided	 workforce to be reinforced.	 Political	 .
parties, having emerged from, or developed in response to
the constitutional polemics (including that of the pre-
Emergency "Malayan Union"), also took communal form's.
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Since the United Malays National Organisation (WINO), and
to a certain extent, the Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA), the Malay and Chinese-based parties respectively,
were more vocal in expressing the "rights" and interests
of their communities, and whereas the Indian-based Malayan
Indian Congre: ,
	(MIC) was less articulate in voicing the
Indian case,
	 it would	 not be
	 surprising if
	
the
predominantly Indian unionists in the labour movement,
also saw
	 the MTUC
	 as a	 possible mouth-piece for
registering the non-Malay problems and sentiments. Two
prominent unionists from the MTUC, P.P.Narayanan and
M.P.Rajagopal who were the appointed members of the FLC
resigned in	 October 1953	 because of their alleged
involvement in a communal issue (see Gamba, 1954; Parmer,
1955; Zaidi, 1975:72). The MTUC was also vocal on such
issues as citizenship, language, and education (see MTUC,
ARs 1955-56:20, 32-36; 1956-57:14-20). This suggests that
when the Federal Constitution was being discussed and
about to be drawn up, and the position of the communities
considered, the	 less-politically	 organised
	 minority
Indians appeared to look up to the colonial government for
a "fairer"
	 place and	 share in the socio-political
arrangement that was being negotiated.
Apart from above, there were a number of factors
which militated against the non-Indian unionists,
particularly the Chinese workers who constituted a major
wage-earning group in the country at the time, j oining the
fold of the MTUC-led movement.[7]
	 For example, writing
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around the time when the rubber plantation unions were
amalgamating into the NUPW, Parmer (1955) noted that about
100,000 Chinese rubber workers were outside the rubber
unions and that most of the active Chinese in the unions
were clerks. Perhaps, because of their much richer and
militant union experience, the Chinese workers were more
critical of the whole sequence of events which obviously
dated back to the days before the Emergency rule itself,
and led to the creation of the MTUC. The suspicions which
the government still harboured in the Chinese workers for
their past militancy under the PMFTU-led movement also
tended to discourage the Chinese from joining the trade
unions. In any event, the situation prevailed without the
existing unions and the MTUC taking any concrete effort to
alleviate it.
Of course in the broader socio-political context of
the country then, the anti-communist war by the colonial
government also took a communal form. Since the MCP
principally consisted of Chinese, Chinese workers and
peasants, and
	 social activists were, therefore, the
natural suspects of the government, especially its police
Special Branch.(8)	 Given communal politics which was
also evolving during this crucial period, the anti-
communist campaign could easily be interpreted as an
"anti-Chinese" campaign. The whole scenario thus further
forced the Chinese workers to remain in the background,
thereby denying the Malayan trade union movement of one of
its most important potential components.
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4.2. Stirring, s of Independence and Renewed Militancy 
(1956-57) 
The period 1956-1957 saw rising expectations among
the people of Malaya about the prospect of independence.
The spirit of Merdeka ( independence) heightened with the
election trial (for the FLC) held in 1955 which saw the
rise of the Alliance Party, a coalition of three main
communal-parties in the country, the UMNO, the MCA and the
MIC, to political supremacy. The Alliance won 51 out of
the 52 seats contested in the elections and polled 81% of
the total votes cast.	 The election and the improving
political climate contributed to the increased campaigning
with various
	 groups and organisations competing for
recognition and influence.
The climate of independence was accompanied by more
vocal expressions by workers about their rights and
aspirations. Long suppressed and restrained by the
Emergency rule the workers were too anxious to pursue
their long-standing demands. They were also increasingly
frustrated with employers indifference to their demands
for improved pa y
 and conditions despite the rise in rubber
and tin prices. Indeed, for the workers, independence was
meaningless unless it addressed their basic concerns at
work. The workers, as said by the trade unionists then,
needed something more "tangible" than the high-sounding
slogans of "self-rule" or "Merdeka".
93
With the approaching independence, the MTUC leaders
also thought that the movement would be in a position-to
play a dynamic role in a new independent country. Thus in
his May Day speech in 1956, K.V.Thaver, the Secretary
General of MTUC declared that,
"The days of paternalism and pious patronage
of employers are gone. We have a rightful
place in the new Malaya and we must get there...
Oft-repeated declarations by Government of its
progressive labour and trade union policy are
empty. We want realistic implementation"
(MTUC, AR 1955-56:51-56).
The MTUC also appeared to come out more strongly on
some labour issues and grievances. For example, despite
the unresolved minimum wage-fixing machinery and other
obstacles, the leaders of MTUC toured the country and
organised mass rallies to campaign for a basic living wage
of M$8
	 a day for the lowest grade of workers be
established. Other objects of the tour included an
attempt to stimulate interest in trade unionism and to
mobilise support for the movement, to study union problems
at local level, and to publicise the functions and
activities of
	
MTUC (MTUC, AR 1955-56:6-7).
	 MTUC's
criticisms against	 some of	 the government's labour
policies also assumed a sharper tone such that it
denounced the Labour Ministry for what it considered to be
the ministry's "weak-kneed labour and trade union policy
and its pronounced partiality to employers and calls upon
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the Government to assume a more realistic approach to
workers' problems" (MTUC, AR 1956-57: Appendix F). In
another instance, Tan Chong Bee, the then President of
MTUC also said that the workers were tired of hearing the
statement that "Malaya enjoys the best standard of living
in the whole of South East Asia" and that "the income per
head is the highest in the region" (MTUC, AR 1957-58:
Appendix B). He maintained that while the situation was
true for the higher managerial bracket, the ordinary
worker still had to content with the same living standards
he had before the Second World War.
The period saw a dramatic increase in union
membership and the total person-days lost due to strikes.
Union_ membership, for instance, rose from 113,470 in 1954
to 145,749 in 1955 and to 232,174 in 1956, an increase of
nearly 60% between 1955 and 1956.[9] Following this the
membership of MTUC also rose from 76,000 (or 67% of trade
union membership)	 in 1954 to 111,878 (76.8%) in 1955 and
to 185,195 (79.8%) in 1956 (see Appendix C). Industrial
action, particularly strikes, increased with workers on
the mines, in the rubber plantations, factories, transport
industry, and public services involved in a new wave of
unrest.	 The following table shows the trend in strike
actions which reached its peak in 1956.
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Table 4.2	 STRIKES: NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED
AND PERSON-DAYS LOST, 1948-1957 
Year Workers
involved
Person-days
lost
1948 34,037 370,464
'349 2,292 5,390
1950 4,925 37,067
1951 7,454 41,365
1952 12,801 44,489
1953 7,524 38,957
1954 10,011 50,831
1955 15,386 79,931
1956 48,677 562,125
1957 14,067 218,962
Source :	 Ministry of Labour, Annual Reports,
1948-1957.
On the mines, for example, workers (of a leading
British company,	 the Tronoh Mines) belonging to an
affiliated union of MTUC, the Malayan Mining Employees
Union (MMEU) went on strike in March 1956 following the
dismissals of	 two	 of	 their	 colleagues	 and	 the
victimization of their union leader.E101 Efforts by the
MTVC (mainly through one of its Central Committee members
who was a leader of the MMEU and a member of the FLC,
R.A.Abdul Karim	 bin Abdul	 Rahman) and	 the Labour
Department to help resolve the dispute failed. Later,
over 400 workers were dismissed by the company which now
began to recruit new workers for the mines. The strike,
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however, persisted and Police riot squads were summoned in
to disperse the workers.	 The employment Of force by the
police inflicted injuries upon the workers. Following
this 95 workers were also arrested with 71 convicted under
the Penal Code (Section 145) for "being members of an
unlawful assembly".	 Similar action was taken against the
workers in the Kepong Bus strike. 27 workers were
arrested and charged for similar offence under the Penal
Code (MTUC, AR 1955-56:41-46).
The increased industrial actions by the workers and
their unions indicated above prompted the MTUC to be more
vocal in expressing the unions' views and objectives. In
the case of the Tronoh Mines strike, for example, the MTUC
expressed its opposition to police intervention. While
regarding police presence itself as provocative, and
urging the government to caution the use of riot squads in
trade dispute, the MTUC also maintained that being the
instrument of the government the police should be
impartial and only exercise "supervisory and preventive
functions" (MTUC, AR 1955-56:41-46).
Both in the Tronoh Mines and the Kepong Bus strikes
the MTUC also strongly objected to the use of the Penal
Code instead of the Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949, to
prosecute the workers. The MTUC argued that whereas
Section 145 of the Code not only made members of such an
assembly liable to prosecution for an offence, it also
exposed them
	 to more	 severe penalties.
	
The 1949
Ordinance, however, did not make an assembly of five or
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more persons illegal if it was in furtherance of a trade
dispute.(11) The MTUC maintained that even if the
workers did "exceed the bounds of lawful picketting" (a
case which hal not been established in both incidents)
they should be prosecuted under the Ordinance which had
conferred them the right to take that action in the first
place. However, the government did not consider it
necessary to respond to the statement and legal argument
on the matter except reiterating its own legal points and
defending the police statutory duty in the incidents.(12)
At this juncture it should be noted that there were
also some radical or at least more critical tendencies
within the movement itself whose views and inclination
tended to encourage the MTUC to adopt a relatively strong
line with respect to labour issues. Examples of these
were the NUFGW, and certain sections of the public sector
groups, such as the teachers and clerical unions.(].3]
Despite the new mood the MTUC, for the most part,
seemed unable to capitalise on what appeared to be a
"favourable" political and industrial climate at the time
to pursue labour's rights and interests.
	 Instead, the
centre appeared
	 to content	 itself with
	 playing a
mediator" role between the unions/workers on one side,
and the government/employers on the other.
	 The reasons
for this ambivalence were as follows.
	 For one, to all
intents and p7poses, the new labour activism occurred
against the backdrop of the Emergency rule.
	 Indeed,
despite independence, the war against communism, which
-
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entailed a rejection of labour militancy, was not yet
over. While there was evidence of a new upsurge of labour
activism, the political leaders reminded the movement to
be ever vigilant against "subversives" and "anti-national
elements".	 As a result, the MTUC leadership oscillated
between activist rhetoric and caution. The leadership
refused to go "beyond the limit" that would jeopardize its
"responsible" status, and undermine the MTUC's continued
role as the country's labour centre.
While the question of MTUC's relationship with the
country's dominant political group will be dealt with in
another section of the chapter, suffice to mention here
that the MTUk.:. was particularly concerned about this
relationship. What seemed obvious was that, with union
grassroot support still in doubt, it was difficult (if not
Impossible) for the MTUC to continue functioning without
the recognition, or even support, of the government in
power.	 Thus, while it tried to pursue an "independent"
policy from	 the government	 (like	 the	 one	 which
characterized its 1955-56 development), the MTUC was also
under a	 strong obligation to secure the trust and
confidence of the new government.
More importantly, the MTUC was still very much under
the control of the more conservative or generally termed
as the "moderate" elements within the movement. The
influence of the NUPW, for example, still remained intact.
In fact, during the 1955-56 session two of NUPW's leaders,
P.P.Narayanan and H.K.Choudhury were elected to the posts
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of President and Treasurer of the MTUC respectively, while
the other "veterans" from the FLC and Labour Advisory
Board group like Mohd.Yusof bin Mohd.Noor, John Emmanuel,
M.P.Rajagopal,' R.A.Abdul Karim, and K.V.Thaver still made
up the Central Committee. The picture changed slightly in
the 1956-57 session when two leaders from NUT, Tan Chong
Bee and K.V.Thaver, were elected as President and
Secretary General respectively, while three other NUT
leaders were returned as members of the Central Committee.
This however, did not mean much difference in term of
policy as the "veterans" and their allies still made up , a
large part of the (now bigger) 22-member Central
Committee. Moreover even such changes would not have been
possible in the first place without the consent or support
of the "P.P.Narayanan group" which still controlled the
votes at the ADC. Of a total 109 delegates at this
conference, for example, 41 were from (Narayanan's) NUPW
alone (see MTUC, AR 1956-57: Appendix E).
An example provided by Narayanan's NUPW also brings
to light the kind of attitude and thinking prevailing in
the main tendency within the movement at the time. When
negotiations with the employers were difficult, such as in
the case of the NUPW versus the Malayan Planting Industry
Employers' Association in 1956, the most that union
leaders were prepared to be commited to was a "go-slow".
The union leadership refused to consider a strike action
for fear of "political implications", despite the fact
that the rubber workers had already suffered a series of
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cut-backs, and that the union was supposedly the most
powerful in the country.[14] These "moderate" leaders
were not prepared to gamble with what they had attained to
date. To abandon what seemed to be MTUC's established
role as a mediator or broker (between labour and the
unions on one side, and the government and employers on
the other) for a "purely" industrial matter would probably
risk the MTUC's position, and the leaders' relationship
with the new Alliance government. A union delegate in the
1957 ADC summed up this view clearly when he reportedly
said that "some labour leaders were afraid to criticize
the government' and were concerned about scholarship and
finding favour with the government than promoting the
interests of workers".[15]
The MTUC's position on a number of other major issues
of the day indicate further features of this situation.
In the case of the 54-day strike by 600 workers of the
Eastern Smelting Company, Penang beginning on 26 November
1957, for	 example, following	 a break-down	 in te
negotiations, and	 the dismissal	 of workers by the
management, the MTUC's position was one of extreme
caution. When addressing these workers a recent (1956-57)
member of the MTUC's Central Committee, Ooi Thiam Slew,
who was also an important leader of the Malayan Mining
Employees Union (MMEU), "counselled moderation" and warned
the workers of "the dangers of going on strike" and "the
hardships that strike action would occasion to themselves
and their families" (see MTUC, AR 1957-58:39-41). While
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its attempt to bring the two sides to the dispute together
failed, the MTUC seemed to concur with the report of the
Court of Inquiry that the blame for the dismissal of 248
workers by the company should rest with the union itself
for resorting to strike action and undertaking a "work to
rule" in the first place. In fact, the statement by the
MTUC that "the union has since gone out of existence" at
the end of its report seemed to confirm the MTUC's own
view on the matter, a somewhat strange position to take
since the union was an affiliate of the MTUC.
With reference to the compulsory recognition of trade
unions by employers, the MTUC also appeared to be in a
contradictory position. While the problem of union
recognition had long been a major obstacle to organising
workers, the MTUC, in a dispatch to the government
regarded statutory compulsory recognition by employers as
"not an appropriate measure for the present" (MTUC, AR
1955-56:19-20). Instead, it insisted on "voluntary
agreement in the matter of recognition" between the
employers and trade unions through the mediation of the
Ministry of Labour. The evidence suggests that it was the
weak organisational base of the union leadership that
prompted this stance. There was always a danger that the
workforces, long sceptical of the MTUC leadership, would
organise alternative unions if they did not have to rely
on the MTUC to facilitate voluntary agreements.
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4.3. MTUC and Politics 
Although there were opportunities for the movement to
play an active part in the political process of the
country prior to independence, these were not taken up by
the leading "moderate" unionists who wielded considerable
influence in the MTUC. They also enjoyed a near-monopoly
leadership role within the existing trade union and
industrial relations structures. As a result they denied
industrial labour's potentiality for any meaningful
contribution to the development of the country's body
politic. The unionists' cautious approach to and even
rejection of "politics" was much informed by their desire
to potray a "responsible unionism" image for the movement
and thus secure the support of the new government in
reproducing their	 colonial role, in a post-colonial
_
situation.
As seen in the previous chapters the MTUC-led
movement was	 encouraged and
	 developed against
	 the
background of	 the PMFTU-led
	 militant and political
unionism of the immediate post-war years. While the
colonial government eventually allowed the growth of trade
unionism after the war, both the government and employers
would not tolerate a movement whose demands and forms of
struggle were industrially militant and political. It was
not, however, political unionism that the colonial
government was opposed to, rather it was the "political
unionism" of the PMFTU tyPe, that is, a trade union
movement led by communists, with a link to the communist
-	 .
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party.	 Indeed, the union ledership were committed to
social democratic politics and had advocated the
development of such political forms. In his account, for
example, Vasil points out that as early as 1948 some trade
union leaders	 had already contemplated the idea of
establi ghing a Labour Party in Malaya.(16)
	 This was
followed in
	 October 1950
	 by a
	 statement from by
P.P.Narayanan, a government-nominated member FLC,
announcing the intention of the "Labour Group" in the FLC
to form a Labour Party. As this did not evoke a hostile
response from the colonial government it suggests that the
colonial government at the time had no serious objection
to union or labour involvement in politics, otherwise
Narayanan and the other "moderate" labour leaders at the
time would not have come out so openly on the subject. In
fact, as Parmer (1955) indicates, the idea of a labour
party adopting "democratic socialism" as its philosophy
was considered to be "an attractive alternative" to
Communism (of he MCP). However, this early enthusiasm was
beset by controversy about the ideals of the MTUC, with
some of the "moderate" labour leaders decided to go ahead
with the idea, while the others either Switched their
allegiance to another party, or completely withdrew
themselves from the scene. Some leaders like Osman Siru,
Yeoh Cheng Kung, Ooi Thiam Siew, Lee Moke Sang, John
Emmanuel, Abdul Karim, Tan Tuan Boon, V.David, Tan Chong
-
Bee, S.J.H.Zaidi and S.S.Nayagam were involved in setting
up and leading the state-based Labour Parties such as
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those in Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and
Melaka. These parties were first inaugurated in Penang in
May 1951, followed by Selangor in December 1951, and later
Negeri Sembilan, Melaka and Perak (see Vasil, 1971:93-
166). Others, particularly under the leadership of
Narayanan, who were much closer to the establishment
decided to support the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP)
which was being sponsored by some local leaders who were
trusted by the British like Onn Jaafar (UMNO President),
Tan Cheng Lock, R.Ramani, as well as Narayanan.(17)
Still in his capacity as the President of MTUC Narayanan
convened a meeting of trade union leaders in July 1951 to
consider their position with respect to the Labour Party
and the new IMP. The matter was again discussed at the
MTUC's 1951 conference in August the same year. Opinion
was divtded and no definite resolution was adopted. It
was then, according to Zaidi (1975:58), left to the
members to pursue the matter "in their own individual
capacities".
The tussle between the pro-IMP and the pro-Labour
Party factions within the MTUC did not last long. The
IMP, with little Malay as well as Chinese support, soon
proved a failure. The debate about elected politics then
shifted to the Alliance and the Labour Party, with the
main tendency in the leadership wanting to maintain a
close rapport with the Alliance while others, arguing the
similar "aims and aspirations" of the MTUC and the Labour
Party, insisted on the centre developing a closer link
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with the Labour Party.
	 The Alliance was originally
founded from an election marriage between the local
branches of Malay-based UMNO and the Chinese-based MCA in
Kuala Lumpur in 1952 for the purpose of contesting the IMP
in the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election, by end of 1954, it
had become an important political combination of the three
major communal-based parties of Malaya -- the UMNO, MCA
and MIC -- to contest in the 1955 General Election.
In any case, Narayanan's earlier inclination towards
a Labour Party, and later the IMP, is significant. He was
a prominent leader of the MTUC, and led the biggest and
most influential union grouping within the movement, the
rubber unions.	 His	 views must	 have	 contributed
significantly to MTUC's own stance on politics. As a
"moderate" labour leader who had a close relationship with
the government, Narayanan must have been aware of the
attitude of the colonial administration with respect to
political parties.	 His early interest in the idea of a
labour party must have owed something to the tacit support
of the colonial government for such a party. However,
Narayanan changed his position and supported the IMP
instead, perhaps because he genuinely believed that the
non-communal IMP (at least as originally advocated by its
sponsors) was a more promising political force for the
people as a whole and therefore worth supported by the
union _movement. At the same time, considering Onn
Jaafar's (and his associates) close rapport with the
British, Narayanan perhaps also thought that the IMP stood
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a much better chance of securing government confidence and
becoming an i:.fluential political party compared to a
labour party. The fact that the state-based Labour
Parties (already formed around the time) were led by some
of his trade union colleagues did not seem to mean very
much to Narayanan possibly because he knew too well the
sort of	 influence these labour leaders had on the
government, and	 hence the likely prospect of their
political venture.
Narayanan's reasoning later that a Labour Party was
divisive to the movement since most of the organised
labour were non-Malays (see Vasil, 1971:97) is hardly
sustainable. For one, certainly Narayanan and his fellow
Labour Councillors must have thought of such a "divisive"
or integrative potentials of the party when they first
discussed the idea in 1948 and before tabling it for
discussion in the MTUC. Also, while it is true that most
of the organised labour and also the workforce at the time
were non-Malays, it is certainly not necessarily true to
say that a party (most of whose membership were persumably
non-Malays) would not strive for worker (and national)
unity as it claimed, especially if the party, as envisaged
earlier, embraced some idea of democratic socialism as
opposed to a clear-cut communal party.
From this it would appear that it was not the
"divisive" nature of the Labour Party which Narayanan was
really opposed to, as other considerations, such as the
nature of relationship between the MTUC and the Alliance
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(that is, the party which was moving into the centre stage
of Malayan politics), and some consideration was probably
given to the position of the "moderate" leaders and their
movement within the country's labour relations structures
in the post-colonial situation.
In the first case, even though there was a tendency
within the union movement to pursue an independent line
such as indicated in the previous section, this was
rendered difficult	 by the	 anti-"political unionism"
attitude of the Alliance, and the compromising and
"responsible" conduct of the movement's leadership itself.
As a force which was assuming a major political role in
the country, the Alliance was especially sensitive to a
possible challenge from other quarters. After its victory
in the -first Federal elections (to the FLC) of July 1955,
the leader of the WINO and Alliance, Tengku Abdul Rahman,
a member of royal family from Kedah, was allowed to form a
"transitional" government.	 Pending independence, the
British still retained some key portfolios such as
defence, economic affairs, public finance and the civil
service. In this situation the Alliance could be expected
to be more keen to prove to the British, and capital
generally, that it was capable of managing the country and
guaranteeing a "proper" climate for economic growth. The
rise of labour militancy (discussed in the previous
section) was thus a cause for concern to the Alliance, and
the support given by some sections of the MTUC for the
Labour Party .iee Zaidi, 	 1975:78-79), the only credible
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political opponent at the time, was probably seen by the
Alliance as a threat to its overall political position.
Unlike the British, who appeared keen to see a
"responsible" nautical unionism in Malaya in relation to
what they considered to be a greater threat (to their
economic and political interests), the MCP, the Alliance
was apparently opposed to such idea. As a future
government of a would-be independent Malaya, the Alliance.
seemed unwilling to tolerate any form of "political"
unionism.	 The Alliance advocated a distinction between a
"responsible" trade union movement whose only concern was
with "industrial relations" matters as opposed to one
whose concern covered both "industrial relations" and
"political" matters.
With Emergency rule, the anti-political unionism
stance held by the Alliance could be popularised by
linking trade union "politics" to the PMFTU political
unionism, and hence the idea of communist subversion.
Thus in his first inaugural speech at the MTUC conference
after the Alliance victory, the Alliance Minister for
Labour reaffirmed the government support for "the further
development of a free and independent trade union
movement" and, at the same time, pledged to do all in
their power "to prevent the spread of subversion" within
the movement (MTUC, AR 1956-57: Appendix A). A similar
view was expressed at the next conference in June 1957
although this time, the concern was not only with those
elements from outside the movement, but also with those
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"who masquerade under the name of trade unionists, as
champions of the workers, but who really are the tools of
party overlords..." (MTUC, AR 1957-58: Appendix A). For
the Alliance it was important to have the duties of the
movement "clear" and "well-defined", and "to gear the
workers of the country to the task of greater production"
and "industrial cooperation in all fields" (MTUC, AR 1957-
58: Appendix A).
The MTUC, dominated by a "moderate" leadership .
responded by avoiding "political" involvement with any
group other than the Alliance Party as government. In one
case this took a semi-independent stance, as illustrated
by the NUPW. The NUPW leaders who were influential on the
policies of the MTUC believed that they need not support
any particular political group although they should "keep
the political parties on their toes and agitate for
economic merdeka" (cited in Ngeow Slew Yong, 1974:18).
Thus notwithstanding the persistent pressure from the pro-
Labour Party elements for the MTUC to support the Labour
Party, the more influential "moderate" leaders continued
to reassure the Alliance of the centre's "neutral" stance
on politics.	 That there was a "feeling of mutual
distrust" between the Alliance and the MTUC-led movement
and the latter's attempts to win the Alliance confidence
is mentioned In Zaidi (1975:79).	 Those in the FLC, at
times, threatened to resign if they were compelled to
support the 'Labour Party,
	 again emphasizing	 their
neutral" position with respect to the political parties.
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In fact, even long before the Alliance warnings, some
important "moderate" leaders in the MTUC had made clear
their disapproval of union political involvement.(18)
In relation to this, the MTUC's position on politics
should also be seen in the light of the intermediary role
which the MTUC and particularly some of its important and
influential labour leaders were playing between labour on
one side, and the government and employers on the other.
As indicated in the previous discussions a number of the
"moderate" labour leaders, particularly those representing
the large and influential unions in the movement (for
example, the rubber plantation unions, railway unions, and
teachers union), had already enjoyed the confidence and
support of the government. They were more or less assured
of some seats in the legislature and other state labour
machineries which, as intended by the government, already
provided them with the opportunities to express their
views and those of the MTUC on any issues of national
importance. For the MTUC leaders this was the best of all
worlds. They could champion the cause of labour and the
unions from the government positions without necessarily
affecting their trade union work. 	 More importantly
perhaps, as far as these leaders were concerned, given the
small size of the wage earning population and the
movement's lack of support even from among the workers
themselves, there was no certainty that labour could
secure such a political role (through a political party).
It was, therefore, better to concentrate on building upon
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the confidence and support of whatever government was in
power which, hopefully, would still enable them and the
movement as a whole to continue having access to the state
positions just mentioned.	 Moreover, in view of their
"moderate" positions it would not be unexpected if some of
these leaders were also worried that a Labour Party,
however "mild" its brand of socialism was originally
intended to be, might become a fertile ground for the
growth and development of yet another militant movement,
which they might not be in the position to control. This
might in turn lead to a repeat of the pre-Emergency labour
scenario and probably the end of what they have "achieved"
in establishing thus far.
The cautious attitude and position of the MTUC
leaders with ,gard to politics also underlined their
desire to potray a "responsible unionism" image to the
government, an image which they believed would help
sustain the viability of the movement itself. It prompted
them to "play safe" which explains the switch-over from
the labour party idea to the IMP, and later to "political
neutrality", when the Alliance appeared to dominate the
political scene.	 Indeed, for most MTUC leaders, whose
apparent concern was with the question of government
recognition and the "partnership" role with government and
employers, such an approach was also in line with their
philosophy of "responsible unionism".
Nonetheless, as evident in the previous discussion
(on the revival of union militancy), this is not to
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suggest that no attempts were made to pursue a more
independent policy for the movement, especially with the
rising merdeka spirit at the time. This is evident from.a
number of resolutions adopted at the MTUC conferences,
such as the opposition to the stringent labour laws, and
also calls for a possible nationalization of tin and
rubber industries. In fact, in his address at the 1957
ADC conference, although as the outgoing rather than the
Incoming President of MTUC, Tan Chong Bee of NUT went
slightly further. Apart from urging the unions to start a
strike fund he also called for the setting up of a
political fund to enable the movement to put up its own
candidates for the 1959 General Elections, or support the
party or parties "which will work for the good of the
common man" (MTUC, AR 1957-58: Appendix B). However, this
turned out to be more of a rhetoric as the government was
uncompromising, the MTUC divided about its approach, and
labour too weak to implement the idea.
It may be thought that an indication of the MTVC
attempting to establish an independent political stance is
the "apparent" MTUC contribution to the 1955 legislative
amendment which permitted the establishment of union
political funds (Parmer, 1955;
	 MTUC, AR 1955-56:17-18).
While a resolution to that effect was passed at the 1953
MTUC conference, the amendment itself, which was
introduced with a number of others most of which were by
no means raised at the MTUC conferences, could hardly be
attributed solely	 to that	 resolution.	 The other
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amendments included the lowering of the minimum age for
trade union membership from 18 to 16, permission for
unions to expand its funds to assist another registered
trade unions in the furtherance of trade disputes, and an
allowance for unions to own landed property exceeding one
acre in extent.[19] The colonial government's
encouragement for union political involvement mainly as a
means to divert the attention of workers from the banned
MCP mentioned above was perhaps a more important factor
which prompted the amendment. Besides, the costly and
difficult war against the persistent MCP guerillas [20]
served to reinforce the view that the battle against
communism had to be fought on all fronts, particularly
political and ideological, hence the encouragement for the
"moderate" movement to go into politics. At any rate, the
_
fact that practically no union ever set up the political
fund later was possibly because of a fear that in due
course they might clash with the government if they
pursued an independent line, with their own political
funds.
Nonetheless, it may be suggested that despite the
Alliance opposition, the country's political scenario
might have been different had the MTUC-led movement
decided to throw its support behind a Labour Party. The
tacit British support for a non-communal party with
" social-democratic" orientation,	 and	 the	 enthusiasm
already shown	 by a good number of trade unionists
themselves in the Labour Parties which emerged at the
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time, all seemed to suggest that something could be in the
offing.	 However, the various factors outlined above,
particularly the attitude and position of the main
tendency within the MTUC appeared to militate against
such a possibility.
4.4. Conclusion 
In its early period the MTUC was led by a weak and
compromising leadership who owed their positions more to
govenment support than worker and union organisation.
This leadership, stamped with the communal divisions that
had	 been	 underwritten	 by	 successive	 colonial
administrations, was incapable of breaking from the
culture of dependency, even when independence was imminent
and the colonial administration was replaced with the
Alliance (transitional) government.	 Nevertheless, the
dominance of the moderate leadership was challenged from
Iwo sources.	 First, as independence approached a number
of union groups began to stir and a period of industrial.
unrest ensued. The strike incidence increased as union
after union challenged the prevailing economic policies.
This, paradoxically, reaffirmed the MTUC role as a link
between the unions and the employer-government. It acted
to dampen down the unrest and define a role for itself as
a mediator, often on behalf of the government. Second, as
independence approached the leadership, or sections of it,
looked forward to breaking the previous dependency on
government patronage.	 For some there was the possibility
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of independent unionism or the development of labour
politics. In the event, the dominance of the Alliance
Party stifled these stirrings and reaffirmed dependent
relationship between the MTUC and the govenment.
The reason for the persistence of the MTUC as a
dependent organisation can partly be explained by the
communal divisions that marked the MTUC. It was
principally led by Indian trade unionists and for a long
time was unable to extend its appeal to include Chinese
workers or the increasing Malay working class. This was
despite the non-communal stances adopted by the MTUC. It
was also, in part, because of the continued Emergency and
definition of opponents as subversive and communist. This
continued mode of rule made the MTUC cautious and hesitant
to challenge the government. It was as a clependent and
moderate union confederation that the MTUC began to work
with the Alliance Government, as will be explained in the
next chapter.
Notes
Reports tabled at the MTUC conferences, for example,
also tried to convince the delegates about the "effective"
role played by these labour leaders in the FIX debates
although not all delegates took such reports seriously
enough. See, for instance, Report of the Proceedings of
the 5th ADC, 29 Apr-1 May, 1956, in MTUC, AR 1955-56.
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[2] For details see Gamba (1962a). A brief account of
the estate unions and the NUPW (1946-1970) from the NUPW's
perspective is given in Kumaran (1970).
[3] Interview: V.David,	 18.8.87.	 See also David
(c1984?:iv-vii).
[4] See Brazier's text of speech at the 1955 ADC in MTUC,
AR 1955-56: Appendix B.
[5] Figures adjusted and adapted from Zaidi (1975:53, 60)
and Gamba (1962b:403, 405).
[6] See, for instance, Report of the Proceedings of the
5th. ADC, 29 April - 1 May 1956, in MTUC, AR 1955-56.
[7)	 According to the population census the Chinese were
the single largest group of wage earners in 1947 and 1957.
There were 397,856 Chinese categorised as "employees" in
1947, followed by Indians, 268,525, and Malays, 231,415.
In the 1957 census there were 510,790 Chinese under the
same category, followed by Malays, 370,331, and Indians,
274,727. Department of Statistics, Population Census of
Malaya (1947), and Population Census of Federation of
Malaya (1957), in Jomo (1986:322-23, Appendix 2).
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[8] There were of course Malay and Indian MCP members and
guerillas, but the colonial authorities were careful not
to highlight this lest it backfired against their strategy
of trying to isolate the communists from the especially
rural (peasant) Malays.
(9]	 This is for the paid-up membership of trade unions
based on the Trade Unions Registry's annual reports for
the years mentioned. Here it should be noted that, apart
from the political climate, the increase must also be
attributed to the reduction in the minimum age of union
membership brought about by an amendment of the Trade
Union Enactment in 1955.
[10] For information on the Tronoh Mines strike see MTUC,
AR 1955-56:41-46, 52-55.
[11] Under Section 145 of the Penal Code, a penalty for
offence of unlawful assembly was a maximum of two years'
imprisonment or fine or both, while the penalty for
similar offence considered to "exceed the bounds of lawful
picketting" was a maximum of three months' imprisonment or
fine or both.
[12] A reply letter from the Minister of Labour is
published in MTUC, AR 1956-57:21-22.
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(13)	 See for instance, the position adopted by these
tendencies in the MTUC Annual Reports.
(14] For a detailed account of this dispute see Gamba
(1962a:131-86).
(15] See Report of the Proceedings of the 7th ADC, 28-30
June, 1957, in MTUC, AR 1957-58.
(16] For some notes on the role of trade unionists in
politics, especially in relation to Labour Parties, see
Vasil (1971:93-166).
(17] See Vasil (1971:37-82). Onn Jaafar, a Malay of
aristocratic background was the son of a former Menteri
Besar (Chief Minister) of Johor state. He served as an
officer in the Civil Service and in 1946 successfully led
the Malays against the "Malayan Union" proposal by the
British. Onn played an important role in the formation of
the UMNO the same year and was elected as its first
President. After failing to open the membership of UMNO
to the non-Malays in late 1950 Onn decided to leave the
party, and by mid-1951, spearheaded the formation of the
IMP. For an account of the IMP see also Khong Kim Hoong
(1984:156-89).
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[18] For instance,	 as noted	 by Todd	 and Jomo
(forthcoming), M.P.Rajagopal, 	 who earlier	 opposed a
resolution on union "political fund" which had been
adopted by the MTUC conference of 1953 openly pledged to
contest any attempt at legalising union political fund in
the FLCI-
[19] See a summary of the of the 1955 provisions in MTUC,
AR 1955-56:2-14.
[20] As noted by Caldwell (1977c), the Emergency was
costing the country some $300 million a year apart from
other aspects of the war which showed the lack of success
of the British.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE MTUC AND LABOUR DISPUTES UNDER THE ALLIANCE (1957-69) 
At a time when it seemed possible for the MTUC to
represent trade unions in a more forceful manner the
leaders maintained	 their commitment
	
to	 responsible
unionism", compromising itself on industrial disputes, and
attempting to maintain cooperative relations with the
government and the employers.
	
This is evident in the
Railway Dispute of 1962/63 and the events following it.
Throughout this period the MTUC leadership emphasized the
need for industrial peace, even when there was continued
labour unrest
	
involving union affiliates during the
first half of the 1960s.
There was a paradoxical aspect to the role and
conduct of MTUC leaders with respect to the dispute and
the labour unrest following it. Instead of utilizing the
organisational potential generated by the dispute and the
unrest, thereby contributed to a heightened worker and
trade union solidarity, the MTUC leaders emphasized the
orderly conduct of industrial relations, a quick ending of
the dispute,	 and encouraged the unions to exercise
restraint. Rather than capitalize on the active strength'S
of affiliated unions the MTUC remained committed to the
philosophy of "responsible unionism".
The government throughout this period attempted to
develop strategies and mechanisms to incorporate the MTUC-
led trade union movement.	 This involved the use of
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tripartite consultative/advisory machinery to secure a
union commitment to industrial peace and, when this
failed, the introduction of restrictive legislation in
1965 and 1967 to secure labour compliance. The enthusiasm
with which	 Lhe MTUC participated in the tripartite
machinery suggests that, as far as the centre was
concerned, the way to defend the working-class was by
working closely with the government of the day, and the
way to work with the government was by discouraging or
stopping union militancy. One consequence of this posture
was that unions, including affiliated unions, increasingly
looked at the MTUC leadership with scepticism and caution.
This chapter begins a two-part discussion on the
development of the movement during the "first phase" of
the post-colonial era, that is, at the time when the
Alliance was under the leadership of Tengku Abdul Rahman.
The focus of the chapter is on industrial policy and
activity, namely the approach of the MTUC toward
industrial disputes by affiliated unions. It centres on a
study of a major dispute, involving the railway unions.
By focussing on this dispute and the legislative events
around it a window will be opened up that will allow the
strands of the commitment by the MTUC leadership to
"responsible unionism" to be disentangled.
With reference to Railway Dispute, the signing of the
Code of Conduct for Industrial Peace between the MTUC and
the Malayan Council of Employers' Organisation (MCEO), and
the legislation of 1965 and 1967, I shall argue that the
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resort to "responsible unionism" by the MTUC was largely
due to the government policy on labour discipline and the
compromising attitude of the labour leaders.	 I shall
argue that the MTUC leadership policies were much informed
by a desire to secure acceptance and recognition from the
government, which in turn would guarantee their personal
as well as institutional importance within the labour
relations framework. On its part, the imposition of legal
restrictions and	 other discipline	 measures by
	 the
government was, in the main, informed by its need to
secure industrial	 peace in order to secure capital
investment.
The chapter, first, outlines the background to the
Alliance-MTUC relationship	 and identifies some major
developments which contributed to the revival of union
militancy in the first half of the 1960s.
	 This is
followed by a section on the Railway Strike, which
provides the	 basis for	 my thesis	 on	 responsible
unionism".	 The chapter then proceeds to deal with the
theme of industrial peace, and following this, the laws of
1965 and 1967, which together underscore my view of the
tension between the incorporation of and the government's
opposition to unions. Finally, I shall briefly summarise
the argument developed so far.
5.1. The Background 
Malaya achieved her Independence on 31 August 1957,
with the Alliance Party in government.	 Tengku Abdul
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Rahman, the President of UMNO who was made the Chief
Minister after the 1955 elections now assumed the post of
the Prime Minister.	 The Alliance position was further
secured by its victory in the 1959 General Elections
although the victory was not as impressive as compared
with the previous elections.(1) The new political climate
of independence gave the opposition parties an opportunity
to organise and mobilize electoral support within the
context of an extended franchise (now that the elections
were also held for the State Legislative Assemblies in the
11 states of the Federation of Malaya). 	 In these
elections the opposition made gains at the expense of
the Alliance Party.
The Alliance was keen to prove to British capital and
the public at large that it was capable of guaranteeing a
stable political and economic climate in the country.
This position was welcomed by the British-led western
capital which, at the time of Independence, controlled 70%
of Malaya's rubber plantations, 60% of tin output and
almost the e, ire tin-smelting industry, and between 60%
and 70% of the important import-export trade. European.
interests played	 a leading	 role in	 manufacturing,
shipping, insurance	 and banking (cited in Caldwell,
1977c).
With the military offensive against the communist •
guerillas apparently won, the Alliance government decided
to lift the 12-year state of Emergency in July 1960,
thereby bringing about a temporary sense of relief and
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political liberalism in the country. It should be noted,
however, that this did not hide the Alliance's anxiety
over what it considered to be the potential threats posed
by Communism and other militant Left tendencies to the
country. In place of the Emergency rule, a new piece of
restrictive legislation, the Internal Security Act (ISA),
1960 was introduced which provided wide powers for the
government to	 detain anyone suspected of being involved
in "subversiv	 activities" for as long as it deemed
necessary.
Much of the Alliance's attitude towards labour and
trade unionism was informed by its concern with overseas
and particularly British investment. A series of measures
were taken to encourage union cooperation as well as to
discipline and to control any militant tendencies within
unions.	 For example, to encourage union cooperation a
•.
tripartite National Joint Labour Advisory Council (NJLAC)
was set up in 1957 which, unlike its predecessor, the
colonial Federal Labour Advisory Board, provided for a
much wider representation of unions.	 The membership of
the NJLAC was drawn from employers and trade unions
representing 12	 industrial	 sectors/services	 namely,
Plantation, Mining, Docks, Railways, Government and
Municipalities, Electricity, Transport, Petroleum, Finance
and Commerce, Engineering, Timber and the civilian section
of the Military, with the Minister of Labour as the
Chairman (MTUQ, AR 1956-57:30-31). For the public sector
unions the
	 government allowed	 the formation of an
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important trade union federation, the Congress of Unions
in the Public and Civil Services or CUEPACS in 1957 whose
representatives sat with the government's representativ,es
in the National Whitley Council to negotiate wages, terms
of service, and conditions of work. Further, as part of
an understanding between the government and the "moderate"
leaders of the MTUC one seat was granted to a
representative of the movement in the Senate, while the
MTUC agreed to abstain from political involvement, such as
by not	 supporting the Socialist Front in the 1959
elections. (2]
At the same time, to maintain the distinction between
the type of unions which the government tolerated, and
that which it did not, as well as to ensure that trade
unionism did not slip out of its control, the Alliance
government introduced a number punitive and disciplinary
measures aimed at trade unionists and their unions.
Between 1958 and 1960, for example, trade unionists who
were suspected of involvement in "subversive activities"
were arrested and detained by the authorities. For
example, in October 1957 four top-level officials of the
radical NUFGW	 were arrested and detained under the
-
Emergency regulations (MTUC, AR 1957-58:35-36). 	 In May
and October 1958 over 100 persons connected with trade
union work were detained by the authorities under similar
regulations, including V.pavid, the General Secretary of
the NUFGW (see MTUC, AR 1958-59:72-75). In 1960 further
arrests were made, including Chan Chee and Soo Peng Choon
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who were the Treasurer of the TWU and Secretary of the
Pineapple Industry Workers Union respectively (Zaidi,
1975:112, 136-37). The government also deregistered the
NUFGW (in 1959) which had been involved in a number of
strikes since its emergence in 1955.	 The ostensible
reason for deregistration was that the union's
constitution was considered unlawful and that the union
was said to have been used "for purposes inconsistent with
its objects and rules" (Trade Unions Registry, AR 1958;
David, c1984?:vii).	 Also	 of importance,	 was the
introduction of	 new legislation,	 the Trade	 Unions
Ordinance, 1959 which restricted trade union membership to
persons of similar trade, occupation or industry;
empowered the Registrar of Trade Unions to summon and
examine any person regarding the existence or operation of
any trade union, and also empowered him to refuse
registeration of a union if such union failed to comply
with the full requirements of the ordinance or if he
suspected that the union would be used for unlawful
purposes.	 It also only permitted Federal citizens to
serve as officers and employees of a trade union.
Following this legislation all unions were required to
reregister themselves.
It is against the background of this set of
legislation and government decrees that the MTUC attempted
to forge a post-colonial role for itself. For the MTUC
Independence brought new hopes and confidence that things
were ready for change.	 Long subjected to the state
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restrictions and surveillance the MTUC looked to the
future with "full of hopes". In particular, as the leader
of the Malayan labour movement, the MTUC was eager to
influence the shape of industrial relations which in turn
would help to further legitimise and reinforce its own
leadership role. In addition to that the MTUC as a
"responsible" body repeatedly called for the government to
attract more capital into the country (Zaidi, 1975:113,
116-17). Fr ther, it urged employers (including the
government) to set up joint councils/committees in various
establishments to enable labour grievances to be resolved
peacefully. These proposals were in harmony with the
Alliance's emphasis on industrial peace and efforts to WOO
foreign investments into Malaya.
Although "with certain reservations" the MTUC, in a
gesture to secure the trust and confidence of the new
government, supported the government when the latter
introduced laws which either aimed at restricting the
potential growth and strengthening of the unions. This
was highlighted in the centre's endorsement of the Trade
Union Ordinance, 1959 on the ground that the restrictions
were necessary "to ensure the protection of the workers'
Interests" (David, c19847:105). According to the RTU, the
"smooth passage through the Legislative Council was in no
small measure due to the support it received from vigilant
trade union interests" (Trade Unions Registry, AR 1958).
Thus despite later opposition of the MTUC to the
ordinance, the initial response was positive. Likewise,
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so confident was the MTUC in the assurances given by the
Alliance leaders that the Internal Security Act would not
be used against the trade unionists to the extent that no
serious objection to it was raised by the MTUC.
This reflects the kind of relationship then
developing between the MTUC and the Alliance government.
It underlines the extent of which the dominant MTUC group
was prepared to go along with the government in order to
win the latter's confidence, and in turn, it indicates the
MTUC's confidence in the government. According to V.David
the unionists who were anticipating reform of the labour
laws were "bitterly disappointed" when the Alliance
government introduced the 1959 Ordinance, implying the
confidence shared by the unionists in the "goodwill" of
the Alliance government towards labour at the time (David,
c1980:-nriii-ix).
In any case, the cooperative posture of the MTUC
could not check the changes that were already taking place
in the unions at the time. As indicated above, the
lifting of the Emergency rule which appeared to promise a
liberal political climate in the country contributed to a
revival of union militancy in the 1960s. Signs of
liberality were indicated by the formation of CUEPACS
which served to strengthen the public sector unions, the
workers' expectation for improved living conditions in the
now independent
	
Malaya, the
	 possible resolution of
workers' lc:mg-standing	 grievances about	 wage	 cuts,
especially in the plantation sector. When the government
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imposed a wage freeze on the public sector (following a
recession in 1958), this was seen as an opportunity to
organise and protest.
These developments prompted the MTUC to show some
support to union activity and initiatives, albeit
cautious. Indeed, as the formal leader of the trade union
movement, and aware that its viability as a central
organisation also depended on its willingness to respond
to important moods and tempos within its own ranks, the
--
MTUC apparently could not remain indifferent to labour
activity during	 this period.	 However, in view of
government policy and determination to secure a
disciplined labour force as a condition for its economic
and political programmes, the MTUC was unwilling to
jeopardise its role in labour relations structures, as
will become evident in the examination of the railway
disputes.
5.2. The Railway Dispute 
One of the major events which reflected the mood of
the union movement in the early 1960s was the Railway
Dispute of 1962/63 involving the Railwaymen's Union of
Malaya (RUM), an affiliate of the MTUC, on one side, and
the Malayan Railway Administration and the government on
the other. The dispute was especially important for the
MTUC as it challenged the official position of the
leadership.	 Throughout the dispute the MTUC emphasised
the indus trial relations machinery for labour grievances,
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and sought a quick settlement of the dispute. It ignored
the educational and organisational potential of the
dispute, and thereby passed up an opportunity to transform
its role as the organisational centre of Malayan unions.
Officially registered on 30 June 1961, RUM was the
result of merger and amalgamation of six railway unions,
the National Union of Railwaymen, the Locomotive
Enginemen's Union, the Malayan Railway Junior Officers
Union, the	 Signalmen's Union,	 the Malayan
	 Railway
Engineering and Health Workers' Union, and the Malayan
Railway Employees Trade Union (RUM, 1972). The main
concern of the railway workers was their status as
government ser.ants and the benefits that should go along
with it.[3]
	
This was a concern that had its roots in
government policy towards the separate unions that made up
the RUM.	 It also reflected a more general concern with
the government's approach to public sector employment.
The dispute dated back to 1959 when RUM was not yet
constituted and the railway workers were organised under a
number of separate unions. On 19 November 1959 4e
members of the Locomotive Enginemen's Union brought the
Railway to a standstill following the administration's
unilateral imposition of longer working hours, but this
was called off when the Prime Minister intervened (Rudner,
1973). The matter was then referred to a Royal Commission
which criticized the Railway Administration for refusing
to negotiate with the unions, and also suggested the
setting up of a * Joint Industrial Council in the Malayan
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Railway. (4]	 Despite the	 Commission's warning that
negotiation through a Joint Council was "a matter of
urgency", there was a long delay (about 16 months) before
the Joint Council was finally established on 28 July 1962, •
but not	 before a "work-to-rule" was staged by the
Shunters' section of RUM between 18 and 24 July 1962.
On 14 September 1962 the Staff Side (employees) of
the Joint Council submitted a memorandum setting out
claims for improvements in wages and benefits for the
monthly-rated employees, the abolition of the daily-rated
and casual employment, and the government recognition of
all Malayan Railways employees as government employees
(Federation of Malaya, 1963:7). It should be noted that
on the question of "government status", the government was
clearly reluctant to concede the issue, despite the fact
that the Federal Constitution of 1957 (Article 132[1]) had
acknowledged the railway service as a public service. In
what appeared to be an attempt to delay negotiation on the
union's claims the Administration requested the union to
provide detailed accounts for every claim made. When this
failed the Administration made a fresh offer but was
rejected by the union. The Administration also refused to
entertain the revised reduced claims by the union. With
no more avenues available to pursue its case RUM then
decided to call a strike to back its demands.
-
The strike by the 14,000 workers of the Malayan
Railway commenced on 23 December 1962 bringing the entire
railway service to a standstill.
	
This was despite
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attempts by the Administration to prevent it, by issuing a
lengthy press statement to all the workers explaining the
Administration's willingness "to continue discussions and
negotiations" while suggesting a reluctance to negotiate
on the part of the union. The General Manager of the
Malayan Railway also appealed to the Railway workers "to
show their loyalty and patriotism" by abstaining from any
strike or other such actions. With reference to a
statement from the Railway Administration it also noted
that "the government, in the case of an Emergency, can use
special powers" to avert the strike.[5]
The strike which went on for 23 days ended on 15
January 1963 after a settlement was reached between the
disputing parties, through the mediation of Ungku Abdul
Aziz, an economist from Universiti Malaya. The settlement
enabled RUM to gain some improvements in its wages claims,
as well as the abolition of the daily-rated system. The
latter item set the precedent for the abolition of the
daily-rated system in the government sector. The other
major claim, the status of the Railway workers, however,
met with a setback because the government decided to
transform the Railway into a corporation as from January
1964, thus temporarily denying the Railway workers their
claim to government employee status.	 RUM pursued the
government status case in the High Court and finally won
It in August 1964.	 The legal trial was won by RUM on 19
August 1964 when Abdul Kadir Yusof, the Attorney General
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finally conceded that workers of the Malayan Railway were
government servants and therefore entitled to all the
benefits normally accorded to the same (MTUC, GCR 1963-
64:21).	 In any	 case, the	 government's delay in
implementing the court's award and the Administration's
persistent refusal to honour certain clauses of the
Industrial Agreement reached between the two parties in
1963 meant further frustration for the workers, forcing
RUM, on a number of occasions, to threaten further
industrial actions (MTUC, GCRs 1964-65: 29-32; 1965-
66:23-25).
A numbur of unions, trade union centres, and
confederations of	 trade unions,
	 both	 locally
	 and
internationally, expressed their support for RUM.[6]
Veteran trade unionists interviewed also spoke of the high
spirit of solidarity with the railway workers shared by
many trade unionists at the time both in the public and
private sectors.(7) For them RUM was successful and
enjoyed the full support of the trade union movement
because 1) the monthly-rated issue concerned many public
sector workers at the time, 2) where workers found it
difficult to strike, although affected by the same
problem, gave their support to RUM, and 3) RUM had an
effective leadership capable of gaining broadly-based
support.
	 A few of the local unions either launched
sympathy strikes or were preparing to organise such
strikes
	 (interview: V.David,
	
18.8.87; Todd and Jomo,
1988).
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It is 'mportant to note that RUM was an affiliate
union of both the MTUC and CUEPACS, the latter (as
indicated earlier) established soon after Independence as
a federation of the country's public service unions.
CUEPACS was an offshoot of the Government Services Staff
Council, a	 coordinating body	 which represented the .
Interests of the monthly paid public employees (Staff
side) on	 the National Whitley Council.[8] 	 At its
.•
Inauguration in September 1958 CUEPACS had 28 affiliates,
and by 1963 this had increased to 66, with a total
membership of 38,969 (Trade Unions Registry, ARs 1959;
1963). Although CUEPACS was a trade union federation in
its own right, most of its affiliated unions, particularly
the bigger ones like the National Union of Telecoms
Employees (NUTE), National Union of Teachers (NUT), and
Malayan Technical
	 Services Union	 (MTSU) were	 also
affiliated to the MTUC.
	 In fact, a good number of trade
unionists from
	 the public
	 service unions, such as
V.E.Jesudoss (MTSU), K.Duraiappah (NUTE), T.Narendran
(Inland Revenue Officers Union or IROU), and K.V.Thaver
(NUT) had served either as the leaders of the MTUC, or as
the leaders of both the MTUC and CUEPACS at the same time.
This, and as one of their major affiliates, RUM naturally
received the official backing of both the labour centres.
The leaders of both the MTUC and CUEPACS, P.P.Narayanan
and T.Narendran respectively played a key role in the
negotiations.
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For the MTUC this dispute involved one of its biggest
affiliates. In 1962 RUM had 7,499 members, making it the
fourth biggest affiliated union of the MTUC after the NUPW
(124,061 members), National Mining Workers Union (8,503),
and National Union of Commercial Workers (7801) (Trade
Unions Registry, AR 1962). At the outset of the dispute,
the MTVC expressed its support for RUM. This followed an
emergency resolution to that effect which was tabled and
adopted at the MTUC's 1962 ADC held a week before the
strike began (MTVC, RP, ADC 1962). In line with the
resolution, an Action Committee was formed by the MTUC to
render assistance to RUM and with the unions' support, a
sum of about M$31,000 was raised for RUM (Zaidi, 1975:
175).
	
As indicated above, the MTUC was also involved in
-
the negotiations with the Railway Administration and the
government.
An examination of the MTUC (or rather MTUC leaders)
during the Railway Dispute/Strike allows some of the basic
tenets of "responsible unionism" to be identified. It
also points to the very contradictory position that the
MTUC found itself in during the strike. For the MTUC
leadership the dilemma was how to support the strike and
at the same time serve the government.
During the course of the dispute it became apparent
that the MTUC was more concerned with a "proper" framework
of industrial	 relations rather	 than the successful
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prosecution of the dispute.	 The centre's disappointment
at the way the negotiations between RUM and the Railway
Administration clearly points to this sentiment (see
Zaidi, 1975:165, 167). There was a belief that strikes or
any other forms of industrial action and militancy should
not happen if the negotiating machinery or other channels
for dealing with labour grievances (as provided for by the
industrial relations machinery) was "properly" utilized by
the parties concerned. In fact, as shall be seen in the
following section, the MTUC saw success of its policy of
encouraging "voluntary	 industrial relations"
	 in the
increasing number	 of unions	 participating in joint
councils and in the downward trend in strike figures
(Zaidi, 1975: .3).
	
From this perspective, strike action
by the workers was not seen as a healthy sign for
industrial relations. To support a striking union, if
such support was at all crucial for the national centre,
therefore, must also entail an obligation on the part of
the union to rely on negotiations, not strike action, and
to compromise with the management.
The preoccupation with industrial relations and the
lack of commitment to an active and militant unionism is
also evident from the MTUC's unwillingness to exploit the
educational and	 or organisational
	 potential of the
dispute.	 Despite the praise and tribute from some local
unionists as well as the "admiration and respect" which
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the MTUC claimed to have been accorded it by some
international organisations (such as the ILO and the
ICFTV) for "the good work done" (MTUC, GCR 1963-64:54;
Zaidi, 1975:168) there was no effort on the part of the
MTUQ to see and to utilize the dispute as an occasion to
raise the level of working-class or . trade union
consciousness among the workers. The dispute/strike seems,
to have been viewed by the MTUC as an industrial relations
matter, devoid of any educational and organisational
significance. Indeed, even though the dispute was
described by Zaidi (1975:175) as symbolising "a great del
of workers solidarity in the country" whose spirit, he
maintains, the MTUC helped foster, there was no attempt by
the centre to sanction any action, other than moral
support.
As indicated above the part played by the MTUC in the
dispute appeared
	 to be	 restricted to
	 facilitating
negotiations and
	
financial assistance
	 to RUM.	 In
practice, negotiations meant actions towards a speedy
settlement of the dispute.
	 Indeed, one veteran unionist
and former long-time leader of the MTUC revealed that
while "in the open we showed our support for RUM, inwardly
we tried to resolve the dispute quickly" (interview: the
unionist, 1988).
	 The same unionist also said that those
who were involved in the negotiations, including Narayanan
from the MTUC, tried hard to persuade RUM's leaders,
particularly RUM President, Donald U'ren to agree to a
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settlement, as U'ren wanted the strike to go on in order
to secure all the demands made by the union. He went on
to say that "U'ren obviously did not have much choice"
when one of the negotiators suggested to him that the
Malays and other sections of the workforce might return to
work if insisted on continuing with the strike. As a
national centre which had thus far enjoyed the confidence
of the government the MTUC was not prepared to see a
prolonged strike or the unions' support for RUM assumed an
"unmanageable" magnitude which would affect its position
as a "responsible" labour centre. It, therefore, sought a
quick negotiated end of the dispute. In this context, the
claim by Zaidi (1975:175) that the MTUC had mobilised "its
entire resources" in support of the strikers was an empty
claim apart from the token donation mentioned above.
The Railway Dispute thus underlined the "responsible"
posture of the "moderate" MTUC leaders. They were
apparently worried about the strike and the militant
tendency of the railway workers. Their desire to secure a
good relationship with, and hence the recognition and
confidence of the government, meant that they had to
maintain the support of the unions, but, at the same time,
avoid antagonizing the government.	 According to V.David
(by 1960 as Secretary General of the TWU) who moved the
above-mentioned emergency resolution in support of RUM,
the "moderate" MTUC leaders "did not want to be isolated
from among their own ranks" despite their reluctance to
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support the	 strike (interview:	 V.David, 18.8.87).	 When
the circumstances forced them to show support to the
unions, they did so within the "acceptable" parameters
available to them.
Apart from the consideration of the MTUC, the manner
in which the strike was conducted and terminated by RUM
also raises	 question	 regarding	 the	 approach	 and
orientation of RUM, particularly the leadership.
	 Apart
from canvassing support (both moral and material) from the
other unions and organisations, and despite the
overwhelming pro-RUM spirit among the unions indicated
earlier, no serious attempts appeared to have been made by
RUM to get other unions and workers to "down their tools"
which would at least have given some meaning to the notion
of "worker solidarity". The relatively quick termination
of the strike when some unions were preparing to launch
sympathy actions in support of RUM, irrespective of the
concessions made by the Railway Administration to railway
workers, also suggests that the RUM leadership was
particularly concerned with the economic aspects of union
struggle, specifically as it affected the railway industry
and not the public and private sectors more generally. At
the same time, the RUM's apparent reluctance to call for
other forms of support (other than those mentioned above)
may be explained, in part, by the fear of the government
resorting to the emergency laws and proscribing the union.
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Notwithstanding the attitude and conduct of the MTUC
leaders, the dispute was significant to the MTUC-led
movement as a whole in a number of ways. For instance, as
indicated above, it contributed to forging a morally-based
worker solidarity, which had long been absent from the
country's industrial scene.(91 In fact, to a certain
extent, this moral and rhetorical solidarity, or pro-RUM
sentiment, was also registered in the election of RUM's
President, Dor, id Wren as the new President of MTUC at
the 1963 ADQ.(10] This further indicated the way the
MTUC was caught in an unresoluble dilemma by the dispute.
As a major dispute/strike in one of the state
sectors, the action by the railway workers also
contributed to heightening the combativeness of the public
sector unions, a development which, as shall be seen in
the following sections, prompted the government to tighten
..•
its control over the movement.
	
Here, with the wages
freeze imposed by the government, and the negotiating
councils suspended following the 1958/59 recession, the
public sector employees were first forced to withold their
demands. They were still unable to make any satisfactory
gain when the suspension was lifted in mid-1959 (that is,
just before the General Election) as the Alliance
government decided to tighten control over public service
wages in part to serve its "national economic strategy".
The Railway Strike, and the concessions secured by RUM
from the Railway Administration and the government served
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to radicalise these public sector unions. 	 The various
forms of industrial action taken by a number of them, such
as the	 Union of	 Clerical and Allied Workers, the
Laboratory Assistants' Union, the Union of Post Office
Workers, the Federation of X-Ray Staff Union, the National
Union of Hospital Assistants, the Municipal Fire Services
-
Union, and the Malay Forest Employees' Union [10] after
the Railway Strike point to this development, as indicated
below.
5.3.  A Campaign  for Industrial Peace
The continued labour militancy after the Railway
Dispute worried the MTUC, prompting it to call for union
restraint as well as to campaign for industrial peace both
of which further underlined its "responsible" leadership.
This situation is highlighted by the events after the
Railway Dispute which saw the MTUC calling for union
restraint when faced with continued labour unrest, and
shortly afterwards, through a joint committee with the
employers and the government, issuing a code of conduct
for industrial peace.
As shown in the table below, labour unrest began in
1962 continued through 1964 with a record number of
workers involved in strike action and, when compared with
Table 9.2 of the previous chapter, also recorded the
Year
	 Workers	 Person-days
involved lost
1958	 9,467 59,211
1961	 9,045 59,730
1962	 232,912 449,856
1963	 17,232 305,168
1964	 226,427 508,439
1965	 14,684 152,666
1967	 9,452 157,984
1968	 31,062 280,417
1969	 8,740 76,779
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highest total person-days lost due to strikes since 1948.
Table 5.3
	 STRIKES: NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED AND 
PERSON-DAYS LOST, 1958-69 
Source :	 Ministry of Labour, Annual
Reports (selected years).
Apart from the background factors outlined in Section
1, and the growing resentment of workers, especially in
-
the public sector, the Railway Strike served as an example
for this new union militancy. The strike pattern in these
years also reflected the workers' increased concern for
non-economic issues such as protests against the sacking
of workers and sympathy actions (see Kamaruddin Said,
1978:162-74)). This situation, especially in early 1964,
alarmed the MTUC General Council (MTUC, GCR 1963-64:16).
Much the same way as in the earlier Railway Strike, the
MTUC seemed worried that an "unmanageable" situation might
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result in government retaliation which could undermine the
centre's "responsible" role (and image) itself.	 Appeals
were thus made to the affiliated unions to exhaust all
avenues before deciding on strike action and to consult
the centre before resorting to strike action.
In September 1963, the Federation of Malaysia,
consisting of Malaya, Singapore (in 1965 ceased to be part
of the federation), and the former British colonies of
Sabah and Sarawak of North Borneo, was formed amidst
strong opposition from neighbouring Indonesia which viewed
the new federation as another British ploy to control the
territories	 and	 suppress	 anti-colonialist	 forces.
Indonesia's President Sukarno also launched a policy of
"Confrontation" against the new federation prompting the
Alliance government to first place the country on "a state
of preparedness", and later, in September 1964, a state of
Emergency.	 For the government, labour unrest was a cause
for serious concern and,	 in the context of regional
politics and economic policies, development that had to be
suppressed.
Although expressing a "shock" over the new state of
Emergency the MTUC was also quick to declare that it
"unanimously endorsed" the government's decision which it
considered necessary in the "national interest" (MTUC, GCR
1963-64:41-42,.	 In the same statement the MTUC urged its
affiliates to refrain from taking strike action and to
settle disputes through negotiation to ensure that "during
the Emergency period the government services and other
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employers are not prevented in any way and certainly not
on account of the labour problems, from doing their utmost
in the National interests".	 The MTUC also proposed an
audience with the Prime Minister to demonstrate its
loyalty to the government and to seek the assurance of the
Prime Minister	 that its "voluntary and self-imposed
restrictions on the traditional rights of the workers"
would not be abused by employers.
For the government such "responsible" posture of the
national cent .	 could not have come at a better time.
Steps were taken to reactivate the tripartite advisory
bodies such as the National Joint Labour Advisory Council
(NJLAC), and other joint committees. Working under this
tripartite framework, a Joint Committee made up of the
MTUC and the Malayan Council of Employers' Organisation •
(MCEO) representatives and chaired by the Minister of
Labour was immediately set up to try to come up with some
proposals for	 promoting industrial peace.	 In this
Committee the	 MTUC was	 represented by	 its Acting
President, V.E.Jesudoss	 (from the	 MTSU),	 Secretary
General,
	 S.J.H.Zaidi	 (War Department	 Civilian Staff
Association or WDCSA), P.P.Narayanan (NUPW), M.Arokiasamy
(National Mining	 Workers'	 Union,	 NMWU),	 A.B.Gomez
(National Union of Commercial Workers, NUCW), T.P.D.Nair
(All-Malayan Estates Staff Union, AMESU), and Ibrahim Musa
(Amalgamated
	 National
	
Union	 of	 Local	 Authorities
Employees, ANULAE).
	 It is interesting to note that, in
the meeting called by the Minister of Labour to form the
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Joint Committee	 it was	 maintained that	 the	 many
difficulties which arose in relation to recognition of
unions and delays in dealing with their claims, were due
to "the fact that a substantial number of employers still
remain unorganised"	 (MTUC, GCR	 1963-64:73-75).	 As
envisaged by the government, after a series of meetings
the Joint Committee finally came up with a "Code of
Conduct for	 Industrial Peace	 During the Period of
Emergency" that would serve as a guideline for all
employers and workers to work towards industrial peace,
discipline, and maximum levels of production during the
period of Emergency (MTUC, GCR 1963-64:225).
In the code issued on 23 November 1964, the MTUC and
the MCEO agreed to do their best to avoid industrial
actions, to	 settle disputes	 and grievances through
peaceful means, to encourage mutually agreed bases of
grievance and dismissal procedures, to maintain communal
harmony, to treat each other with courtesy, to give ample
notice before resorting to industrial action, and to
impress upon their members and officials the need to
comply with the spirit of the Code (MTUC, GCR 1963-64:226-
29).	 While the employers also agreed to take prompt
action to	 settle labour	 grievances,	 to	 implement
agreements without delay, to notify the workers as early
as possible of circumstances of likely redundancy, and not
to engage in any form of unfair labour practices, the MTUC
agreed to maintain discipline in the workplace, and to
prevent the use of violence or coercion in connection with
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industrial disputes.
	
While the pledges and ethics of
employer-employee relations in the code seem to suggest a
certain degree of equilibrium (or balance) of interest
between the two sides of the industry, the very premiss or
objective of the code itself -- industrial peace, worker
discipline, and maximum levels of production -- clearly
favoured the employers, including the government. At the
moment when labour was more active and was beginning to
push for reforms through industrial action, a Joint
agreement aimed at diffusing these actions could not be in
the interests of labour. Likewise, an understanding or
agreement with the MTUC was in itself a measure of (at
least) the moral success of both government and the
employers over labour.
Despite the apparent success of the joint machinery
in bringing about cooperation between the signatories of
the code, the aims were by no means readily attainable.
Indeed, it was soon obvious that the pledges a'nd
assurances of the bureaucrats and professionals of both
sides of industry could not contain the long-standing
discontent of the unions.	 Labour unrest in both the
public and private sectors persisted, prompting the
government, as shall be discussed in the next section, to
introduce new restrictive legislation to force lab6ur
compliance.	 Nonetheless, the fall in strike figures in
1965 should be attributed to the government's articulation
of the	 "Confrontation" issue, 	 rather than to that
generated by the Code of Conduct. Indeed, with a campaign
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against the "Confrontation" being launched by the
government to rally the people to its policies and linking
loyalty and pltriotism to support for the government, it
became increasingly difficult for the unions to make much
progress in their demands, although the grounds for
grievance remained evident.
The events also demonstrate the dominance of the
"responsible unionism" wing of the MTVC leadership. Its
unilateral and "voluntary" call for union restraint before
and upon the government's declaration of a state of
Emergency not only served as a manifestation of i'ts
support for the government, but also as a show of its
disapproval with or even opposition to active and militant
union action. However, as the leader of a trade union
movement over which it could not exercise much influence,
the MTUC also realized that it had to be more cautious in
orchestrating the "industrial peace" theme. If it
exhibited too strong a managerial or even a "broker" role
(between labour on one side, and the government and
employers on the other) it ran the risk of losing whatever
formal confidence it had from workers and unions. After
all, there was already much dissatisfaction within the
movement over the role the MTUC had played, with some
unionists accusing the centre of being a "stooge" of the
government and criticizing some of the MTUC leaders
(Zaidi, 1975:160). In this context, the idea of a code of
conduct during the Emergency was a welcome relief to these
MTUC leaders. The state of Emergency served to legitimize
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any call for industrial and political restraint as well as
the MTLIC's ready response to the government-sponsored
joint-committee scheme. As a major party to the mechanics
of the code the MTUC might be able to boost its leadership
role in the eyes of the unions and the general public.
The events which highlight the role of the bipartite
and tripartite machinery also served to confirm the MTUC's
notion of "responsible unionism". Even without the code
of conduct mentioned above, it was common knowledge that
the basic purpose of the consultative/advisory bodies
formed by the authorities was to encourage cooperation
between trade	 unions, employers and the government.
Cooperation entailed compromise or a give-and-take
attitude between the various parties to the agreement,
without which the very idea of bipartism and tripartism
itself would not have been articulated and put into
operation. In that sense, the enthusiasm with which the
MTUC participated in and also pursued for the expansion of
the consultative/advisory machinery, especially at a time
of continuing labour unrest, reflected the centre's ever-
preparedness to work for industrial peace and cooperation
with the government, hence underlining its compromising
and "responsible" posture.
According to Zaidi, "The NJLAC which is supposed to
give advice to the Minister of Labour on all matters
affecting the workers in this country has been by-passed
almost in all cases. •.. The NJLAC's sole purpose seems to .
provide the Government and its labour minister with an
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easy reference for convenient and liberal use at various
national and international forums" (Zaidi, 1975:200).
Despite this, the MTUC and the "moderate" labour leaders
were keen to be part of this consultative machinery
because it appeared to provide them with the opportunity
to reinforce	 and reproduce	 their labour leadership
position and status.
	
Even so, this was not without
debate, and
	
union delegates	 at the ADCs regularly
expressed their views and criticisms concerning the
appointment of labour representatives to the various
boards/committees and also called for increased labour
participation in other boards/committees (MTUC, GCRs 1963-
64:34-35; 1964-65:54).
	 For	 the	 government,
	 the
consultative/advisory machinery served to facilitate the
incorporation of	 the MTUC leadership for government
policies. The whole exercise by the government was made
easier by the Emergency situation which , served as a
powerful legitimating force to gain copliance with the
demands of "national interest".
This is not to suggest that the MTUC was unaware of
the government's instrumentalist view of its role within
the tripartite (NJLAC) framework. As noted above, the
MTUC was particularly unhappy with the poor functioning of
the NJLAC, and the fact that the NJLAC was ignored on a
number of important matters which deserved its attention.
Criticism that the government was using the Indonesian
Confrontation issue as an excuse to set aside labour's
demands was noted by the MTUC (Zaidi, 1975:185, 187).
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Participation in the tripartite machinery was seen by the
unionists as one of the few means to pursue labour
interests, although this still proved to be a difficult
task. This, to a certain extent, prompted the MTUC
leaders to be critical of the government although, as
shall be seen this was a limited critique.
The Laws of 1965 and 1967. 
When the joint machinery and the Code of Conduct for
Industrial Peace failed to contain labour unrest in the
year after the Railway Strike the government was willing
to discipline and force union compliance through the use
of restrictive legislation. This resulted in
dissatisfaction and resentment among the unions, thus
prompting the MTUC to launch protest campaigns against the
legislation. However, the lack of a positive government
response to these campaigns reflected both the weakness of
the MTUC-led movement, and the increasingly tough policy
of the government towards labour and the unions.
As indicated in Table 5.3 above, the labour unrest
persisted despite the code of conduct and the appeals for
restraint by the MTUC. Upon the advice of the MTUC, the
Union of Post Office Workers which had called a nation-
wide strike in May 1964 over its long-standing claim for
improved wages for the postal clerks, agreed to call off
the strike and to refer the matter to arbitration.
However, when the government later refused to honour the
award of its own Arbitration Tribunal, a "work-to-rule"
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was later called by the union. Most of the other unions,
however, went ahead with their various forms of industrial
action although the country was already placed on "full
alert" by the government following the "Confrontation"
(Todd and Jomo, 1988). The unrest continued into 1965.
In the public sector, the Union of Post Office Workers
(UPOW) resorted to a "work-to-rule" in January 1965,
whilst the National Union of Hospital Assistants, the
Municipal Fire Services Union, the Federation X-Ray Staff
Union, the CUEPACS, and the Union of Fire Brigade Workers,
all either resorted to "work-to-rule" or threatened strike
actions in	 pursuit of	 their long-standing demands.
_
Likewise, in the private sector, the NUPW branches in
various parts of the country, the Transport Workers Union
(TWV), and the National Mining Workers Union (NMWV), for
example, also resorted to strike actions to pursue their
claims.
The situation proved unacceptable to the government
when the Union of Fire Brigade Workers served a strike
notice in May 1965, whilst at the same time there was
speculation that a general strike by the public sector
unions was imminent. According to MTUC's source the
dissatisfaction and resentment, particularly in the public
sector reached "such a state that the possibility for
general strike by the government unions became imminent"
(MTUC, OCR 19 , 4-65:35-36). Todd and Jomo (1988) however,
note that such a general strike seemed unlikely because of
a lack of consensus within CUEPACS as regard the action.
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In the event on 14 May 1965, with the Emergency powers at
its disposal, the government decreed the Essential
(Prohibition of $trikes and Proscribed Industrial Actions)
Regulations, and the Essential (Arbitration in the
Essential Services) Regulations aimed at containing the
unrest and bringing the unions under control.
The first regulations prohibited strikes and related
activities in the "public service".(121 The term "public
service" here followed the definition as provided for by
the Malaysian Constitution section 132(1), covering the
public services of the Federation and the states under the
Federation,	 armed services, the judicial and legal
service, the police force and the railway service.
The aim of the second regulations was to restrict
strike actions and lock-outs in "essential services". It
should be noted here that the "essential services" under
the regulations were widely defined, with the Minister of
Labour was also empowered to amend or add accordingly to
the original list of these services. The original list of
"essential services" were printing presses and
newspapers; generation and supply of electricity and gas;
municipal undertakings; local authorities; ferry service;
passenger and goods transport; storage, transport, supply,
and refining of petroleum products; banks; port services
and undertaking; mining and smelting; rubber; coconut 4nd
palm oil industry; timber; pineapple; rice mills and rice
depots.	 The regulations also constituted an Industrial
Arbitration Tribunal for the compulsory arbitration of
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trade disputes in these services.
	 The members of the
Tribunal -- a chairperson and four other members -- were
all appointed by the Minister of Labour. The Minister was
also invested with powers to refer any dispute in an
essential service to the Tribunal for an award to be made
and this award to be binding on the parties involved. In
making its
	 awards the	 Tribunal was	 to take into
consideration "the public interest, the financial
Implications and the effects of its decisions or award on
the economy of the country, and on the industry concerned,
and also on the probable repercussions in related or
similar industries".
Apparently, in response to the resentment among
especially the public sector unions, whose increasing
militancy seemed to be the main immediate target of the
regulations, and following protest from leading trade
unions, the MTUC expressed its strong disapproval of the
regulations. Perhaps, equally important, the MTUC had not
been consulted on the regulations by the government. The
MTUC Executive Committee denounced the government's decree
which it said had brought disgrace to the concept of
democracy to which the government claimed a commitment
(see MTUC, GCR 1964-65:38-40). The MTUC also protested
the ban on strikes which it maintained deprived the unions
of "their last constitutional weapon which they could have
raised in
	 defence of
	
their legitimate	 rights and
previleges".	 Asserting its commitment to the concept of
" voluntary industrial relations" the MTUC also criticized
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the government for introducing compulsory arbitration
through the regulations.
Forced by the government action to justify their role
as national union leaders, the "moderate" leadership via
the Executive Committee called upon all unions to set
aside their differences and rally around the national
centre. Apart from statements of protest, an
international campaign was also mounted to bear pressure
on the government. The delegates at the MTUC's Special
Delegates Conference on 23 May expressed their strong
oppositron to the regulations (MTUC, GCR 1966-67:428-30).
Their proposed counter-measures, included the withdrawal
of the MTUC as a signatory to the Code of Conduct, a
boycott of the NJLAC, a request to all workers' nominees
to withdraw from the various boards/committees, a campaign
for national and international support for the struggle
against the regulations, and an acceptance, in principle,
of the suggestion that the MTUC go into "politics" and for
the General Council to conduct a feasibility study, to see
whether this would be possible.
The protest gained some response from the government.
Realizing that there was popular opposition to the
regulations, the Minister of Labour indicated that the
government wa: prepared to examine the "no strike" clause
and that they were ready to consider suggestions on the
other clauses (MTUC, GCR 1964-65:44). For this purpose
another Joint (referred to as) Working Par ty to study the
Essential Regulations promulgated in May 1965 "with a view
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to making suggestions for such amendments as were
necessary and feasible" was set up by the government
(MTUQ, OCR 1964-65:49-51). It comprised officials of the
Ministry, the Treasury, the Federal Establishment Office,
and representatives of both the MTUC and MCEO. The fact
that only a limited concession was needed to secure MTUCis
approval for the regulations suggests that the "moderate"
leadership was looking for face-saving concessions. 	 At
the same time it underlined the government's commitment to
-
implement its new policy and marginalise the unions even
further.
The two sets of regulations were repealed and
replaced by a single set of regulations, the Essential
(Trade Disputes in the Essential Services) Regulations
1965. In the new regulations introduced in September 1965
a few amendments as proposed by the MTUC were accepted
(MTUC, GCR 1964-65:45-47). The MTUC's suggestions
regarding penalties for continuing offences, and the
composition of the Tribunal were accepted.	 The new
regulations reconstituted the Industrial Arbitration
Tribunal (IAT) to be made up of a Chairman, an independent
member, and two other members each representing the
workers and the employers, all of whom appointed by the
Minister.	 The j urisdiction of the IAT was extended to
employees of the Federal and State governments. Its
awards were to be final and conclusive. In the case of
disputes involving public employees, the consent of the
Agung (King), the State Ruler or Governor was needed
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before referrel could be made to the Tribunal. The new
regulations, in effect, reenacted earlier ones, although
with some minor amendments, for example, the workers in
"essential services" were allowed to take industrial
action but only in cases where the disputes had not been
reported to the Minister, or in which the Minister had not
intervened or not referred them to the IAT for settlement.
The list of "essential services" was revised to comprise
passenger and goods transport, including railway, ferry
and air services; banking; port, dock and harbour
services; rubber planting and processing; mining and
smelting; timber, logging and sawmilling; rice mills and
rice depots; postal, telegraph and telephone services;
generation of supply of gas, electricity or water; medical
and health services; fire services; refining, storage,
transport and supply of petroleum products; Departments of
Information, Sroadcasting
	 and Television,	 and Civil
Defence.
Notwithstanding the above restrictive clauses the
MTUC leadership viewed the revised regulations favourably.
According to the MTUC Secretary General the new
regulattons met the "fundamental principles" of the MTUC
position, namely, the regulations restored the "workers
right of strikes, without discrimination and at the same
time provide opportunity for the settlement of unions
claims through	 mediation" (MTUC, GCR 1964-65:47-51).
Encouraging the
	 movement to accept the new set of
regulations in H a spirit of goodwill and understanding"
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the Secretary General also disclosed that the MTUC had all
along accepted "the right of interventign" of the
government in the interest of the country, the right which
he maintained was also provided for by the regulations.
He also said that the regulations compared favourably with
"those introduced elsewhere under similar circumstances"
In which case they even became "the permanent feature of
such countries" (MTUQ, GCR 1964-65:47-51). Following the
assprance by the government that the regulations were
temporary in nature, and which had validity only during
the Emergency, the MTUC was confident that the regulations
"would be withdrawn with the ending of the Emergency"
(MTUC, GCR 1965-66:68-69; Zaidi, 1975:245, 248).
In his account Zaidi (1975:213) also regards the new
regulations as winning the movement some major
concessions from the government", and maintains that
"though they were not the best that could be done, they,
were nevertheless favourable in view of the continuing
Emergency". In this regard Raza (1969) also suggests that
the movement agreed to live temporarily with the law in
view of the Indonesian Confrontation at the time. Beth
these commentories underwrite a view that the MTUC had no
choice but to agree to the regulations. Opposition would
have threatened the continued existence of the MTUC.
Nevertheless, to claim, as Zaidi does that major
concessions were won by the MTUC is to lose sight of the
weak and dependent character of the MTUC leadership. They
had no
	 independent base outside the government and
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continued opposition would have exposed this in a wholly
public way.
It should be noted that according to MTVC's repor,t,
the General Council never willingly accepted the
regulations and that "it agreed to do so with greatest of
reluctance" and on the understanding that they were a
temporary measure (MTUC, GCR 1965-66:68-69). From the
limited amendments which emerged in the form of the new
set of regulations, for Instance, it is questionable
whether or not the movement achieved any "major
concessions" from the government as claimed by Zaidi. The
major features of the earlier (May) regulations remained
intact, namely, the restrictions on the right to take
industrial action in "essential services", a system of
Compulsory arbitration, and the wide powers invested in
the Minister (for example, to form an Industrial
Arbitration Tribunal, and to refer a dispute to the
Tribunal, except in the public service in which case the
consent of the Agung, the State Ruler or Governor was
needed before referral could be made). The MTVC leaders
might have found some satisfaction in the amendment which
now permitted the employees in the "essential services" in
the public sector to take industrial action. At any rate,
the changes to the regulations did not alter the original
aims or intention of the government in introducing the
regulations.
The rationale given by the MTVC for its acceptance of
the September regulations appears to have contradicted its
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position with respect to the restrictive features of the
earlier regulations.
	 With most of the major features of
the earlier regulations practically unchanged, the
government's reference to the consultative framework of
labour relations seemed to have cast a spell on the MTUC
leaders to the extent that minor concessions were seen as
as a major breakthrough for the movement. It was as if
the "wisdom" of the labour statesmen had eventually
triumphed over a brief, "premature" outburst, or, to put
it another way, this was the centre's accomodation and
"responsible" response to an impervious government.
Even if the MTUC believed the government statement.
regarding the "temporary nature of the law" the illusion
was soon dispelled. On 22 June 1967, a year after the
Emergency was lifted, and amidst protest from the MTUC-led
movement, the Industrial Relations Act, 1967 (IRA) was
gazetted by the Alliance government. 	 The IRA in turn
repealed and replaced the 1965 regulations. The act in
fact consolidated all previous laws governing industrial
disputes, namely, the Industrial Court Ordinance, 1948,
and the Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949. It further
restricted the workers from taking strike action with the
definition of "strike" extended to cover "go slow" and
refusal to work overtime. Wide powers were accorded to
the Minister of Labour such as referring a dispute to
arbitration if the opinion was that the dispute affected
the economy of the country or the public interest. The
Minister was
	 also	 permitted
	 to	 appoint	 workers'
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representatives to the new Industrial Court although there
might be consultation with such organisations if it was
thought to be appropriate. Further, the Minister was in a
position to add to, vary or alter the schedule of
essential services". An amendment was made shortly
afterwards to place all statutory bodies under the same
"government service" category, to the effect that no
referral to Me Industrial Court could be made of trade
disputes in this sector, except with the consent of the
Agung.
The MTUC's position was one of frustration and
bitterness. Even when the proposed bill was first
introduced at the NJLAC meeting on 15 May 1967 the MTUC
Secretary General strongly criticized the government for
not keeping their promises and by making the "temporary"
(1965) regulations into a "permanent bill".(13] The MTUC
was marginalised and deemed irrelevant when the bill was
incorporated in the new law, despite the Minister's
promise that comments and counter proposals from the MTUC
would be seriously considered.
	 The MTUC's opposition to
the Act centred around the broad definition of "strike",
the	 provisions
	 which	 denied	 certain	 workers
	 in
confidential employment the right to organise, the
enormous powers invested in the Minister, the ban on
strikes over union recognition claims, the heavy penalties
Imposed on illegal strikes, and the system of compulsory
arbitration.	 In its campaign against the 1967 Act the
MTUC resorted to such measures including a series of
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meetings with the Minister of Labour and the Ministry's
officials, informing the Members of Parliament about its
position on the law, writing to the ICFTU and a number of
International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) for their views
••
and support, and urging the unions to press the government
to withdraw or to amend the Act (MTUC, GCR 1966-67:131).
The idea of trade unions participating in the electoral
process also resurfaced. At the 17th ADC in December 1967
the President of MTUC, Yeoh Teck Chye (of the National
Union of Bank Employees or NUBE) said that the MTUC wanted
to keep its options open on the question of participating
in electoral politics. A Political Committee was also
formed by the conference to review the situation and to
make recommendations 	 to the next conference (Zaidi,
1975:256, 262). The MTUC also considered issuing a
three-month notice to the government to amend the act
failing which it would "whip up support for a general
strike" (MTVC, GCR 1967-6$:55).
The campaign by the MTUC came to little.
	 The
government
	 gave	 no	 concessions	 and	 none	 seemed
forthcoming. The most the Minister of Labour was willing
to say was that "the Government is always ready to
consider any proposal to amend any section of the act if
it is found necessary after the act was given a trial for
a certain period" (MTUC, GCR 1967-68:106-107). In the
face of the intransigence the public opposition of the
MTUC withered away. The government position on the events
and developments surrounding the 1965 regulations and the
162
IRA 1967	 demonstrate the readiness of the Alliance
government to discipline and control the unions when the
latter's demands	 and actions were considered to be
militating against the "national interest". They also
show that in trying to secure labour and union compliance,
the government had resorted to the two methods which had
proved useful during the colonial days, the tripartite
NJLAC and other similar consultative/advisory machinery,
underwritten by coercive and restrictive legislation.
On the question of tripartite or consultative/
advisory machinery, it should also be noted that this
machinery was only summoned into operation when it
appeared neces ary for the government to gain some support
as well as compliance from the MTUC. This suggests that
apart from the need to incorporate the movement (discussed
in the previous section) the importance of this tripartite
and consultative/advisory machinery to the government was
only for instrumental purposes, to secure the smooth
implementation of government labour policy. 	 On the
question of legislation, while the substantive details
were clearly intended to bring the unions into line, the
very act of resorting to legislation itself suggests the
tougher line with which the government now intended to
deal with industrial relations and labour matters. In
this situation legislative intervention, the method which
proved handy during the colonial days, and which would
help convince capital of the government's determination to
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safeguard its
	 interest	 was,	 therefore,	 considered
necessary.
The ab( /e attitude of the government was clearly in
contrast with that of the MTUC which, as seen in the
previous section, was almost obsessed with the tripartite
or consultative/advisory framework. Indeed, as indicated
above, despite	 its earlier	 frustration and
	 strong
opposition to what it termed as the unilateral action of
the government in decreeing the first two sets of
essential regulations (in May 1965), the MTUC, after being
consulted was soon supportive of the government.
	 This
shift in position underlines the MTUC's quest for a
partnership role within the framework of the
consultative/advisory machinery if only to reinforce its
sense of importance in relations to unions and the
government.
For the MTUC, the campaigns against the 1965 and 1967
laws also reflected its preoccupation with tripartism. As
the leader of the unions the MTUC tended to regard this
policy issue as its special prerogative. While not
denying that there were some educational, ideological, and
organisational gains that could be derived from active
struggle against the legislation, the fact that the MTUC
appeared to focus on the legislative question reinforced
the "moderate" and "responsible" leadership of the
national centre. Such an emphasis served to reinforce the
notion that change and salvation for labour could only
come from the top, that is, through legislative reform.
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The extent and vigour with which the legislation matter
was pursued by the MTUC, while neglecting the question of
the causes of labour unrest which gave rise to the
legislation itself in the first place showed how such a
"view from the top" had the effect of undermining the
labour question and struggle at the base.
The campaigns against the legislation also underlined
the incapacity of the MTUC-led movement to influence
government labour policy. As shall be considered in the
following chapter the movement was still plagued by
internal problems such as frictions between the unions and
communalism which tended to make such campaigns
problematic if not merely rhetorical. Of course, the lack
of government response to the campaigns made the unions
more disillusioned and divided. There was some in the
MTUC who began to press for a more active organisation.
These sections began to look to the institutional aspects
of the	 movement, to enhance its organisational and
bargaining capacity. Towards this end the "MTUC's Three
Years' Plan" was adopted at the 17th ADC in 1967. The
Plan outlined a series of projects to be undertaken by the
MTUC such as reorganising the divisions, establishing
departments of	 Research	 and	 Industrial	 Relations,
expanding trade union educational facilities, stepping up
publication work,	 trying to	 secure	 greater	 union
participation	 in	 social,	 economic	 and	 political
activities, and establishing a better international trade
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union network (MTVC, GCR 1967-68:52-54). But this was
still a minority position and "moderation" continued to
prevail.
5.5. Conclusion 
From the above discussion it is clear that the MTUC
was tied to a notion of "responsible unionism" at all
important moments in its history to date. This was
evidenced in its reluctant support for the railway union,
its anxiety over the continued labour unrest in the mid-
1960s and calls for union restraint, and its celebration
of the theme of industrial peace. 	 It was most clearly
evident in its commitment to the use of consultative/
advisory machinery. It was also apparent that this
posture was due to the compromising attitude of the
leaders, as well as to the impact of the government's
coercive measures against labour and the unions.
While suggesting that this posture served to
demobilise the movement, the discussion also pointed out
how it	 also	 served	 the	 Alliance's	 strategy	 of
incorporating the movement. In any case, as during the
colonial times when incorporation needed to be accompanied
by some forms of labour disciplinary measures, these
measures were maintained in the post-colonial period under
the Alliance. The lack of effectiveness of the
consultative/advisory machinery to check labour militancy
saw the government resorting to a series of new labour
legislation as its major instrument to further control and
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discipline labour and the unions. Despite its campaigns
against this legislation, the lack of government response
to the campaigns underlined the overall weakness of the
mTuc -10 movement.
Notes 
[1] Whereas the Alliance won 51 of the total 52 seats in
Parliament in 1955, it won 74 out of a total 104 seats in
1959 (Vasil, 1972:85).
(2] For a brief account of the Alliance-MTUC relationship
which points to this tacit understanding see Rudner
(1973). -
[3]	 Interview with Yahaya Mohd.Ali (12.12.86).
	 See also
Persatuan Pegawai Kanan Keretapi Tanah Melayu (1964).
(4] A Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Justice
R.D.R.Hill was established on 6 February 1960 whose report
on the causes and circumstances of the dispute was tabled
in Parliament a year later. See Federation of Malaya
(1963).
(5] See the general Manager's personal letter in Ahmad
Perang (1962).
	 See also MTUQ, RP, ADC 1962; and Zaidi
(1975:165).
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(61 See for example, a circular issued by the General
Secretary of RUM entitled "Extracts of Statements Made by
Organisations in Support of Claims by the Railwaymen's
Union of Malaya" (undated). 	 International organisations
like the International Transport Workers' Federation and
the ICFTU also supported the action by RUM.	 See RUM,
Biennial Report, 1962-64: Appendix B.
(7) Interviews with K.George (18.12.88), K.Duraiappah,
G.Perumal (16.12.88), V.E.Jesudoss, V.David (18.8.87), and
Yahaya Mohd.Ali.
[8] WEPACS (c1977?). A brief account of the functioning
of the Whitley Councils and other related Joint Councils
is found in Gamba (1957).
-
(9] Todd and Jomo (1988), for instance, note that "the
union movement displayed a degree of solidarity not seen
since the forties".
(10] Donald Wren served as MTUC President for about 14
months. U'ren tendered his resignation, with effect from
1 July 1964, to take up a new post as Asian Representative
of the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF)
(MTUC, GCR 1963-64:85-86).
(11)	 See CUEPACS, Annual Reports, 1963-64:54-55; 1964-
65:62-63.
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(12)	 A brief note of the major sections of the 1965
regulations can be found in Mills (1971:39-47).
(131	 For details of MTUC's position regarding the bill
and the 1967 Act, and various forms of response to the Act
see MTUC, GCRs 1966-67:126-33, 	 355-65;	 1967-68:54-55;
Zaidi (1975:245, 248-49). MTUC's more comprehensive
comments and proposed amendments to the act are outlined
in MTUC, GCR 1967-68:133-46.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE MTUC AND POLITICS UNDER THE ALLIANCE  (1957-69). 
Attempts by some sections of the MTUC to pursue a
more independent line failed because of the dominant
influence of the "responsible unionism" tendency within
the movement. This situation was evident in the
controversy surrounding MTUC's stance on "politics". By
"politics" I	 refer to	 those issues	 pertaining to
parliamentary political process, campaigning for electoral
support, standing for elections and acting as a
representative in the Parliament and related assemblies.
Accompanying this and related to the narrow definition of
"politics" was the "moderate" leaders' persistent
opposition to any potentially radical tendencies. Other
features will be pointed to as the argument is developed.
It should be noted that by looking at the MTUC during
the Alliance era from two perspectives, namely "labour
disputes" (Chapter 5) and "politics" (the present
chapter), there may appear to be a danger of introducing
an artificial distinction. In developing this distinction
I am looking at the way the MTVC defined "responsible
unionism" to cover both industrial action and political
engagement. These views were developed over a long period
of time and came to characterize the MTUC.
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In this chapter I shall suggest that the "moderate"
leaders in the MTUC were critical of union involvement in
"politics" because they feared that this might antagonize
the government which was generally opposed to such union
venture. The attitude of these leaders who for the most
part still exercised strong influence on the MTUC served
to confirm the predominance of the "responsible unionism"
tendency within the MTUC-led movement. For the Alliance,
its strong opposition to union involvement in "politics"
was informed by its fear of a possible strengthening of
class politics which might pose a threat to its communal,
elitist and pro-capitalist policies.	 It was also this
same fear which underlined the government's sensitivity
towards labour militancy (discussed in the previous
chapter), hence its restrictive legislation and other
disciplinary measures against the unions.
With reference to communalism I shall argue that the
MTLJC constituted a major obstacle to worker mobilization
along specifically labour or social democratic electoral
lines. I shall also suggest that the MTUC-led movement,
being Indian dominated, and operating in an ethnically
conscious socio-political environment, could hardly exert
much influence on the labour policies of the Malay-
dominated government, unless it developed a visibly non-
communal commitment to social democratic politics.
The chapter first addresses some of the political
issues and controversies within the movement and which led
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to the issuing of the "Workers' Charter" by the MTUC as
the movement's political manifesto in the 1969 General
Election. This section also considers the significance
and implications of the charter for the movement as a
whole.	 The next section deals with the communal factor
within the MTUC and shows how this affected the role of
the MTUC. It also briefly considers the third state of
Emergency declared by the government following the post-
election racial riots of (May) 1969, and the introduction
of new legislation which further stifled the MTUC and its
affiliated pnions.	 Finally,	 I shall conclude the
discussion on the MTUC during the Alliance era pointing to
the way a rejection of "political" involvement affirmed
the stance of "responsible unionism".
6.1. Politics and the Workers' Charter
As seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the "moderate" labour
leaders and their unions who continued to wield a dominant
influence over the MTUC, were opposed to union involvement
in electoral "politics". Apparently this opposition was
on the grounds that the communal character of Malaya's
political structure created divisions, or splits along
communal/ethnic lines, within the trade union movement
which meant that a unified programme was unlikely to be
agreed.
	
With the "moderate" leaders and or their unions
still exerting decisive influence over the MTUC-led
movement after the Independence, this "no politics" stance
persisted, despite calls from some sections of the unions
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for the MTUC to play an active part in the country's
political process.
With independence which meant a break between the
MTUC and its patron, the colonial government, there was a
view among some sections that the MTUC should assume an
independent and more active role in the country's body
politic.	 This role was envisaged both in terms of the
MTUC aligning	 itself with	 the existing	 pro-labour
political parties, as well as preparing to put up its own
candidates for the 1959 General Election. A resolution
was adopted at the MTUC conference in June 1957 (two
months before the declaration of Independence), urging for
the consolidation of trade unions and asking the workers
"to support political parties which have pronounced
socialist platforms" (RP 1957, in MTUC, AR 1957-58). The
outgoing President, Tan Chong Bee (from the National Union
of Teachers) also called upon the unions to set up
political funds so that they could put up their "own
candidates for the 1959 General Election, or support the
Party or Parties which will work for the good of the
common man" (MTUC, AR 1957/58: Appendix B).
Such a position, however, was difficult to sustain.
The more influential "moderate" leaders, and the strong
voting power of their unions would usually ensure that the
"no politics" stance of the movement prevailed. Thus, at
the next conference, in late 1958 just prior to the 1959
General Election, another "pro-politics" resolution was
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rejected by the delegates. As in the early years, the
delegates from the powerful NUPW and some important unions
from the public sector reasserted the view that "politics"
would divide the movement along communal lines (RP, ADC
1958, in MTUC, 1958-58). 	 When the resolution was put to
the vote	 only 3	 delegates	 supported	 the	 MTUC's
participation in electoral politics while 74 opposed and 9
abstained.	 Bearing in mind that votes were normally cast
on a block basis, the NUPW alone made up about 40 percent-
of the total votes at the conference.	 Apart from this
there were also suggestions that an involvement in
electoral politics would destroy government's confidence
in the MTUC and may cause unions to disaffiliate from the
centre.
As I had mentioned in Chapter 4 the communal question
was not the main reason for the rejection of electoral
"politics". The union leaders were aware that the
Socialist Front, a coalition of Labour Party and Partai
Raayat (People's Party), was not only a non-communal
party, but one which advocated a united multi-racial
Malaya as well, which meant that participating in politics
along such li es would be in the interest of labour as a
whole. At this time, apart from the Malay-based Pan
Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) or PAS which was another
communal party, the Socialist Front was the only major
political organisation which was in contention with the
ruling Alliance Party.	 This suggests that the labour
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leaders were either uneasy with the radical tendency of
the Socialist Front or did not want to be seen associating
with the Front in opposition to the Alliance Party. The
"moderate" labour leaders were aware of the Alliance's
disapproval of union participation in politics. The
active engagement within non-Alliance parties may have
adversely affected the tenuous and dependent links that
"moderate" lea6ers had with the Alliance. Further, they
were worried that such action would provoke the Alliance
government into taking repressive measures against the
unions, as members of the political opposition.
The question of union participation in electoral
politics became increasingly important to the Alliance
government, particularly as the country approached its
first post-independence General Election in 1959. Having
assumed the role of government of independent Malaya, and
with the question of political and economic stability very
high on its agenda, the Alliance was sensitive to any
political challenge to its position. While it had to
contend with the opposition from political parties in
order to give an air of political stability which also
implied its own political dominance, the Alliance
certainly could not allow the trade union movement which
may have been in a position to mobilise popular support
against the government. The fact that the views of
certain trade unionists and their unions were similar to
that of the Socialist Front was thus a cause for concern
to the Alliance (see Rudner, 1973). 	 There is also
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evidence to suggest that with the banning of the radical
NUFGW in April 1958, some of the former members of this
union were Joining the Socialist Front parties (Vasil,
1971:175), a situation which also worried the Alliance.
Th is tended to confirm the view that any lessening of the
opposition to union involvement in politics may strengthen
the opposition parties.
In the same context, various measures were adopted by
the Alliance to discourage the MTUC from resorting to such
political ventures. Apart from warnings and threats,
described above, appeals and promises to persuade the MTUC
leadership away from that course of action were also made.
For example, at the above 1958 conference the Minister of
Labour and Social Welfare again reaffirmed that "one of
the fundamental policies of this Government is to foster
and encourage the growth and development of a strong,
free, democratic and responsible trade union movement"
(MTUC, AR 1958-59: Appendix A). 	 The Minister also
announced the government's intention to send trade
unionists abroad (example, United Kingdom, Australia,
Canada, United States, Philippines and Japan) for a series
of educational programmes and tours, through funds made
available by such sources as the Colombo Plan, United
Nations Economic and Social Commission (UNESCO) and the
Asia Foundation. In this way the government furthered the
impression that there was much to gain by avoiding and
indeed rejecting	 a link between trade unionism and
electoral politics.
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The message was apparently well taken by the MTUC
"moderate" leaders. The weak position of the movement in
relation to the government and capital, as well as the
belief shared by the "moderate" and reformist unionists,
that the movement would have its proper place in the new
era prompted them to go along with the Alliance. Indeed,
as pointed out by Rudner (1973), such readiness to support
the Alliance was reflected in the MTUC leaders adopting a
"no politics" or "neutral" stand, denouncing the political
posture of certain of its affiliated unions, and refusing
to associate	 itself with the Socialist Front. 	 By
attaching this "no politics" view to the idea of "free,
Independent and democratic" trade union movement,
S.P.S.Nathan, the President of MTUC (1958-59) from the
NUPW was able to note:
"We the workers have taken a definite stand.
We will not be involved in politics, nor will
we tolerate interference from political parties
and politicians. The Malayan Trade Union
Movement is a free, independent and democratic
movement and we the workers intend to keep it
this way" (MTUC, AR 1958-59: Appendix II,
Part II)
This "no politics" posture persisted after the
elections and also through the 1960s, although calls for
union participation in politics continued to resurface
from time to time. As a token of appreciation, the
Alliance granted a seat in the Senate to the MTUC
President, S.P.S.Nathan in 1959, apparently the last seat
reserved for the MTUC in the legislature. The fact that
even during the colonial time there were at least four
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seats usually reserved for unions did not seem to bother
the MTUC.
Likewise, as indicated in the previous chapter, so
dependent was the MTUC on the Alliance that it did not
seriously obj p rt to some of the restrictive clauses of the
Trade Union Ordinance introduced in 1959. Rhetorically,
MTUC leaders proclaimed that they were necessary in the
Interests of the workers.
	
Similarly, no 'objection was
registered by the MTUC when the Alliance later (in 1960)
decided to scrap the whole of Section 52 of the Ordinance
pertaining to union political funds.
However, in the 1960s, with the "liberalizing"
political atmosphere following the lifting of the
Emergency Rule there was a renewed interest in some
sections of the MTUC with electoral politics. This
sentiment was furthered with the rise in labour militancy
which saw the public sector unions increasingly coming
into open confrontation with the state. At the same time,
the government's repeated use of legislation to discipline
and curb labour and the unions, and the failure of the
movement to secure any satisfactory redress to these laws
made	 through	 the	 consultative/advisory	 machinery
Underwrote for some the importance of a "political"
presence. In particular, the introduction of the new
labour laws in 1965 and 1967 was significant in reviving
this interest in electoral politics. With these laws, the
overall perception of government by a numbr of MTUC
leaders underwent an important change. The government now
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was seen less and less as a "fair" mediator between
capital and labour, and a government which was
increasingly anti-labour. Thus, for instance, although in
early 1964, prior to the 1964 General Election, the MTUC
reiterated its long-standing "no politics" stance, its
Special Delegates Conference held in May 1965 after the
pronouncement of the Essential Regulations, 1965 reversed
this position, and "accepted in principle the suggestion
that MTUC adopt a "pro-politics" stance. The conference
also directed the General Council "to appoint a high level
Committee to study and report to the next Conference of
the MTUC the feasibility, scope and prospects of political
action by the centre consistent with and to further
promote its aims and objectives" (MTUC, OCR 1966-67:430).
The introduction of the IRA 1967 which consolidated
most of the regulations of 1965 as well as the other
previous related laws, despite the promises by the
government to take into account of the complaints and
proposals made by the MTUC left many unionists feeling
ignored and betrayed by the government. This indicated
the marginality of the MTUC, that for all their restraint,
and the MTUC's "responsible" posture, which also meant
keeping the movement out of electoral politics, they were
ignored by t e Alliance government. This situation
prompted MTUC President, Yeoh Tech Chye to request the
unions to seriously consider the movement's position with
respect to politics (MTUC, RP, ADC 1967: Appendix B), and
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following that, to serve notice of the movement's
"determined offensive within constitutional means" in 1969
(MTUC, RP, ADC 1968: Appendix B).
As faras the MTUC leadership was concerned, a change
in policy of such importance, especially with the ever
presence and influence of advocates of "no politics" line
in the movement, was by no means easy. As seen in the
previous chapter, the dominant leadership grouping was
committed to the idea of "voluntary" industrial relations
and tripartite cooperation, and hence was cautious of any
political inclination on the part of the movement. The
"moderate" leaders in the MTUC continued their campaign
for the rights of workers and trade unionism through
memoranda and verbal protests. Despite the growing
tendency towards an engagement in electoral politics, the
leadership was reluctant to abandon their long-standing
"no politics" position.	 In fact,	 in a paper entitled
"What Ails the Workers in the States of Malaysia"
distributed in May 1965, Zaidi, the Secretary General of
MTUC maintained that, by and large, the Movement still
wanted to keep itself "aloof from party politics" (MTUC,
GCR 1964-65:159). In what amounts to an appeal to the
government to support this "no politics" position of the
MTUC, the Secretary General also said that the government
"can still save the trade union movement from falling into
the fold of political parties by its imaginative and
prompt action".	 He also cited the absence of any
political fund by the unions, despite their leaders being
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active in political parties, as a proof of this overall
commitment to "no politics" position.
The leadership's reluctance to come up with any
"political action" is also evident from their long delay
in tabling the report on the matter as requested by the
1965 conference. Indeed, it was only two years later,
that is, afte- the introduction of the IRA 1967, and
following
 renewed pressure from some elements within the
movement, that a conference paper on the subject was
tabled for discussion and adopted by the delegates.
However, even in this case the General Council only
requested the conference to adopt the paper, and "did not
call for any clear-cut mandate" (MTUC, GCR 1969-70:96).
Indeed, even at this stage, the MTUC leadership was still
considering what it termed as "the political immaturities"
of the masses at large. From this, and statements and
memoranda, it would a ppear that the mandate "to take
political action to restore labour rights" was used more
as a bargaining tool by the MTUC leaders in their many
attempts to negotiate with, or to try to secure some
concession from
	 the government.	 All	 the	 same,
developments after	 1965, particularly
	 the continued
ineffectiveness of the NJLAC, the lack of government
response to MTUC's campaign against the (May) 1965
regulations, and the promulgation of the IRA 1967, finally
forced them to consider the idea of "political action".
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Meanwhile, the report submitted to the 1967
conference recommended the setting up of a Political
Education Committee to educate the workers about their
democratic rights; the establishment of a Political
Lobbying Committee; the development of a non-alignment
policy with respect to existing political parties; the
need to evolve MTUC's own political manifesto and to
cooperate with those politicians who were willing to
support the cause of workers or to adopt the manifesto;
and active consideration of the question of fielding
MTVC's own candidates in the General Election (MTUC, GCR
1967-68:72-73). In addition the delegates also called for
the setting up of political funds by unions (MTUC, RP, ADC
1967).	 They also requested the MTUC to organise campaign
to register workers as voters. Finally, and
significantly, in view of communal divisions within the
society, there was agreement that the MTUC ensure that all
the candidates
	 it supported conduct their political
agitation and activities "in a strictly multi-racial, non-
communal approach" (MTUC, RP, ADC 1967).
These recommendations were approved by a large
majority of delegates. In the following conference, even
those dele gates from the otherwise "responsible" and
"anti-politics" NUPW also spoke in favour of some
"political" action by the movement, indicating the strong
" pro-politics" mood of the unions at the time (MTUC, RP,
ADC 1968). Their adoption, to a certain extent, signified
the protest by the MTUC-led movement against the recent
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advice made by the Deputy Prime Minister that preoccupa-
tion with politics would not only blunt the unionists'
ability "to deal with matters directly affecting the
we
	
of	 labour",	 but	 more	 importantly,	 would
"contribute to economic and political instability" (cited
in Ngeow Slew Yong , 1974:19-20).
As mentioned in the early part of this chapter, apart
from the growing dissatisfaction within the movement with
the labour policy and uncompromising attitude of the
government, the possibility of such a policy shift in the
MTUC must also be seen in the context of the various
political developments takin g place in the country. Of
particular importance were the crucial changes taking
place in the Labour Party and their implications for trade
unions, as well as the hei ghtening of the country's
political temperature with the approaching 1969 General
Election.
The inclination of some unionists to support the
Socialist Front parties has already been noted. By late
1965 the Front collapsed following some policy
disagreements between the leaders of the two parties. By
then the Labour Party which had been under the control of
more moderate English-educated leaders came under the
dominance of a hard-line Chinese-educated group. It has
been suggested that the party's more radical orientation
"eroded the moderate trade union movement's support for
the party" (Todd and Jomo, 1988). 	 This development and
the detention of a number of the Labour Party's leaders,
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the resignation of other prominent figures from the party,
and later, the decision to boycott the (1969) elections,
not only deprived the MTUC and its affiliates of the
service of their long-standing and credible allies, but
also placed them in a much weaker position with regard to
the employers and the government.
Against such background, the formation of a social-
democratic and multi-racial Gerakan Party (Malaysian
People's Movement Party) by a combined elements of the
former moderate leaders of the Labour Party, academicians,
trade unionists, professionals and other politicians in
early 1968, served to boost the morale of some section of
the union movement. The involvement of three prominent
leaders of MTUC, Yeoh Tech Chye (President), K.George (ore
of the MTUC Vice-Presidents from the Federation of Armed
Forces Civilian Staff Union), and V.David	 (Secretary
General of the Transport Workers Union and a member of
MTUC's General Council) in this party also increased the
interest in politics among some sections within the MTUC
at the time.
The political scenario preceding the 1969 elections
was another	 important factor influencing the MTUC's
inclination	 towards	 "politics".	 With
	 electoral
campaigning in	 the earlier
	 (1964) General Election
constrained by the "state of preparedness" in the face of
Indonesian	
"Confrontation",
	 the	 pre-1969	 electoral
preparation	 saw
	 the
	 political
	
parties	 vigorously
campaigining for support.
	 This political activism also
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coincided with the growing competition between the elites
of the major ethnic groups for greater shares of the
country's economic resources (in the case of the Malays)
and electoral power (in the case of the Chinese) which
took the form of communal campaigning.
Against the backdrop of this development, the MTUC
could not remain unconcerned and above "politics", with
the government increasingly showing no sign of compromise.
If anythin g , the failure of the tripartite consultative/
advisory machinery to deal with some of the movement's
main grievances, and the further legal restrictions
imposed on the unions, served to encourage support for the
idea of "political action". Although still conscious of
the earlier warnings by the government of the "minus side"
of politics for the movement, the mood within the MTUC-led
movement at the time was clearly and increasingly for some
form of political engagement. For the "moderate" tendency
within the MTUC, such a policy shift did not contradict
with the "no politics" and "neutral" stance which they had
previously defended. The "non-alignment policy" and the
Idea of cooperatin g with any politician who was willing to
support the cause of labour or to adopt the MTUC's
manifesto, underlined the movement's cautious approach.
If anything, the MTUC's present concern with the stance of
the individual candidates/politicians rather than with the
contending parties was acceptable to the "moderates". In
this respect it could be questioned whether the interests
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of labour and the movement was better served by the
individual candidate/politician or by the party which he/
she represented. Would the (MTUC-) su pported candidate/
politician who won the elections, for instance, take a
Pro-labour stance in the le g islature without the consent
of his/her party or when this stance contravened his/her
party's line? The fact that this question was not
considered important by the HTUC reflects both its lack of
an ideological perspective in favour of labour or social
democratic politics and the cautious manner with which the
MTUC pursued it-s "political" option.
In the event the MTUC decided not to field its own
official candidates, despite the participation of its two
leaders in the elections, Yeoh Tech Chye (*President) and
V.David (General Council member). Further, it did not
make any concerted effort to re g ister voters among the
workers as recommended by the earlier conference. Most of
the unionists of the 1960s interviewed by this writer
indicated that "nothing much" was really undertaken by the
HTUC and the unions to register the voters from among the
workers and their families. If anything, this reflected
the continued lack of consensus among the leaders of MTUC
and/or their cautious approach to this whole exercise.
The 140.Tke.X5C.hate.r
The "pro-politics" sentiment within the MTUC
culminated in the Workers' Charter, drawn up and adopted
by the MTUC General Council a few months before the 1969
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elections.(11 Issued as the MTUC's political manifesto
in conjunction with the General Election of 1969, the
charter was also the first of its kind in the history of
the MTUC.	 It expressed what appeared to be a combination
of the MTUC's goals and objectives over the independent
years.(21	 The four-page charter set out MTUC's aims and
aspirations relating to the following:
1. "living wage"
2. security of employment
3. workers' rights to organise and to participate in the
4. control and management of public services and
industries
5. workers' representation on all relevant boards and
authorities
6. social security
7. minimum free education as well as adequate
opportunities for higher education
8. emancipation of women
9. nationalization of vital industries
10. "rational" industrialization programme
11. agricultural reform
12. equality of opportunities to all citizens based on
merit, need, and economic conditions
13. non-alignment foreign policy and international
relations.
It declared MTVC's support for political candidates who,
in its opinion, were committed to the attainment of the
outlined aims and aspirations of the movement. It also
187
spelt out the MTUC's commitment as a "responsible
or ganisation of workers", which would maintain economic
stability, and promote better relationships between labour
and capital, and between labour and the state.
The charter was obviously a testament of the
movement's hopes and aspiration and, upon endorsement by
candidates served as the basis for the MTUC's support for
these candidates. While the charter expressed clearly the
position of the movement with respect to the various
social, political and economic issues facing the nation,
it also reasserted the MTUC's commitment to "responsible
unionism". Although it mentioned the MTUC's determination
to "press the government to accept and recognise the
workers' unhindered rights to organise, to meet, to
discuss and tn propagate their views without fear of
victimization and reprisals", it was conspicuously silent
on the question of restrictive labour laws which was
certainly of special significance to the movement's
political interest in the first place.(3) It would seem
that the charter was represented in such a way that the
ruling Alliance Party did not seriously object to it,
although it should be noted that in its report the MTUC
mentions an attack a gainst the charter by the ruling
party's paper, "Alliance" (MTUC, GCR 1969-70:100-101).
The fact that there were six candidates from the ruling
Alliance Party who endorsed the charter, the single
largest political group to have done this (even compared
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to the Gerakan Party with only five candidates including
Yeoh Tech Chye and V.David of the MTUC) only goes to
suggest that the Alliance did not find the charter
objectionable. Altogether, 13 candidates were endorsed by
the MTUC, both at the Federal and state levels. Apart
from the six and five candidates from the Alliance and
Gerakan respectively, there were two other candidates who
endorsed the charter; one each from the Democratic Action
Party and the left-wing Partai Raayat (MTUC, GCR 1969-
70:101-102).
Even the return of 9 of these 13 candidates could not
be said to have been due to the support rendered by the
MTUC or a success of MTUC's "politics" policy although the
support of the urban-based workers for some of these
successful car lidates is not to be discounted. Of these
nine, five were from the Gerakan Party, 3 from the
Alliance, and one from the DAP. What was obvious at the
time was that most of the successful candidates, would
have been returned anyway, even without the endorsement of
the MTUC.	 The Malay candidates of the Alliance whom the
MTUC supported,	 for example, because of the UMNO's
Ideological and structural dominance in their respective
rural-based Malay constituencies, were expected to win,
while the non-Malay candidates of the Gerakan Party and
the DAP were in a better position to benefit from the
growing dissatisfaction of the urban and other rural non-
Malay voters towards the Malay-dominated government.
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In any case, the move towards "politics", and
certainly	 the	 charter
	
itself	 were	 certainly
	 a
manifestation of the unions' increasing interest in the
"political" process of the country. It was, despite the
apparent reluctance and opposition from within the MTUC to
these developments, an indication of a growing feeling
that political participation, however limited, was
necessary. Although, as evident in the following section,
any further commitment to politics had to wait until
another state of Emer gency was declared by the Alliance
Government, with the Parliament suspended and a new
restrictive labour law decreed. 	 This followed the post-
election racial riots on 13 May 1969.
6.2.  Communalism and the  Third _Emergency.
Although the threats of communalism to the country's
multi-racial society and to workers solidarity (hence
workers mobilization) had long been recognised by the
MTUC, there was no serious attempt on the part of the
centre to address the problem. This state of affairs was
in part due to the leadership's lack of working-class
ideological commmitment, and in part because the communal
character of the movement seemed to provide the ground for
certain unionists to maintain control over the MTUC.
As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, communalism had, by
the 1960s become an acute social and political problem in
Malaysia.	 It had its root in the earlier colonial
economy, particularly	 through the earlier import of
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foreign labour by the mining and plantation interests, the
segregation of the people along employment and racial
lines, and the immigration and labour policy of the
British during the later part of last century and the
_
earlier part of this century.
	
For different reasons,
these divisions were maintained and reaffirmed by the
Japanese when they occupied the country during the Second
World War.
	 The return of the British after the war saw
the institutionalisation of communal politics,
particularly via the formation and conduct of communal
parties such as the UMNO, MCA, and MIC whose leaders,
mainly the elites of their respective communities, enjoyed
a close rapport with and support of the British colonial
administration.
After independence, communal politics became a
feature of the polity and in the 1960s took a dramatic
turn. During the 1960s the intra-class rivalry between
the Malay elit who dominated the state political apparati
and the mainly Chinese elite who constituted the single
largest and most powerful local economic force in the
country became sharper as each side began to demand an
Increased share of the other's sphere of domination.(41
These demands were expressed through the existing communal
parties. With the rise of a number of opposition parties
prior to the 1969 elections whose basis of support was the
largely ethnic-based electorates, communal politics became
191
more vigorous and intense. This culminated in the racial
riots of 13 May 1969 mainly between the Malays and the
Chinese in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur.[51 In short,
party leaders had ready access to communal politics, and
that communal politics was the channel through which they
continued to secure and consolidate their positions.(5)
The MTVC and Communalism
As part of the larger society the trade union
movement was also stamped with communalism. At the very
least, some of the communal tensions and under-currents in
the larger society found their way into the union movement
and indeed was institutionalised in a variety of ways.
The problem for the MTUC and its affiliate unions was that
communalism tended to undermine the position of the MTUC
In relation to capital and government. The achievement of
unity and solidarity across different economic sectors
become difficult when the MTUC was divided along communal
lines and the leadership was stamped by communalism.
As seen in Chapter 4, one of the major features of
the MTUC was the predominance of Indian unionists. As the
following table shows, this feature of the movement
persisted throughout the period under discussion, although
a steady change in the (ethnic) composition of trade union
membership (to the effect that the Indian dominance had
progressively reduced) was also noticeable.
Indians Chinese Malays Others Total union
membership
60.1% 16.7% 22.4% 0.8% 211,628
61.38 16.34 21.34 0.94 169,180
55.03 18.07 25.79 1.11 214,287
47.84 20.64 30.64 1.00 275,812
Year
1958
1960
1962
1964
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Table 6,2	 TRADE VNION_MEMBERSHIP_BY ETHNICITY,
1958-6A
Soprce : Trade Unions Registry, Annual Reports (selected
years). After 1964 the ethnic background of
trade union membership was discontinued.
Although there was a steady fall in the percentage of
Indian membership in the unions, this was not reflected in
the composition of the MTUC leadership. Throughout most
of the 1960s, for instance, Indian unionists made up about
72% of the General Council members and about 80% of the
Executive Committee.(6) This suggests two possibilities,
either the increasing number of non-Indian (especially
Malay) union members were not part of the MTUC-led
movement, or that if they did join, the MTVC's voting
system failed to reflect the corresponding increase in the
MTUC.	 It should be noted that Zaidi (1975:178) attempts
to "rationalise" the under-representation of the Chinese
workers in	 the movement	 by attributing it to the
"Individualistic",	 "economically-minded",	 and
"unwillingness to be led by other races" on the part of
the Chinese.
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Whatever the reasons, such a situation had obvious
implications for the movement. For one, in the context of
the polarised socio-political context of Malaysia, the
question of multi-racial image of the MTUC was also the
question of MTUC's credibility as the leader and
representative of the country's unions. This question of
credibility of the movement was implied in the debates and
comments within the MTUC. A multi-racial image which
Implied cohesiveness and strength of the movement would
complement the leadership role the MTUC was playing with
reference to the government and the employers. In this
sense, the under-representation of the Malay and Chinese
components in the MTUC leadership had the tendency to
undermine the credibility of the "moderate" leadership of
-
the MTUC, sug gesting that it did not speak on behalf of
the trade union movement as a whole.
In the same context, and given the communal character
of Malaysian politics, it was unavoidable for an Indian-
dominated MTUC to appear, in the eyes of some sections of
the Malay-dominated government, as another Indian or non-
Malay political front. This had the effect of the
government viewing the MTUC with "natural" suspicion or
taking the centre's views lightly, besides making it more
difficult for the MTUC itself to exert much influence over
the government. Indeed, if anything, the lack of
government response to or even its utter disregard for the
statements and memoranda submitted by the MTUC could be
the unrepresentativeness of the MTUC. The same government
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was likely to realize the political potential of a truly
multi-racial force, however "moderate" and "responsible"
that body might be.
The persistent "no politics" stance of the MTUC,
particularly in its attempts to convince the government of
its "responsible" inclination by dissociating from and
denouncing the Socialist Front, could also be seen as-a
failure of the MTUC to forge a united and broader working-
class movement.
	 Such a movement, which drew support and
stren gth from the workers and the broad population
irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds, and premissed
upon class politics could provide an important challenge
to the mainstream communal politics of the country. The
fact that the Alliance government was highly critical of
some views
	
shared by some trade unionists and the
Socialist Front suggests that such a working-class
movement could pose a threat to a power structure which
appeared to thrive on communalism.
The communal character of Malaysian politics also
tended to encourage the Indian unionists to "perpetuate"
the communal character of the movement. In this case, the
marginal role of Indians in the country's mainstream
politics, acted to encourage the Indian dominance of the
MTVC. Within the Alliance, the Indian MIC was small and
subordinate to the UMNO and, to a certain extent, the MCA.
Indian _unionists in the movement could be expected to
re gard their role in the movement as an important leverage
in the broader context of the socio-political bargaining
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of the country's minority Indians with government and the
other political communal/ethnic groups.
Over the years, the MTUC addressed a number of
communal issues or was confronted by communal problems.
This was evident, for example, when an Internal Security
Act (Amendment) Bill was introduced by the government in
1964 requirin g students to get a certificate of
suitability from the State Chief Education Officers to
gain admission to the institutions of higher learning.
This bill was seen by many as a measure to control the
entry of non-Malay students into the institutions. The
MTUC denounced the bill as "ill-conceived, obnoxious and
sinister in its motives and implications" (see MTUC, GCR
1963-64:28-29).	 In a protest meeting organised by the
MTUC to oppose the bill on 11 July 1964, P.P.Narayanan
even referred	 to the bill as H a fascist piece of
legislation" (MTUC, GCR 1963-64:29). Clearly the language
used by the MTVC to oppose the bill contrasted markedly
with the complacent way the centre responded to government
introduction of the ISA, 1960 (mentioned in the previous
chapter). Likewise, the MTUC was vigorous in its
opposition to the government requirement for work permits
for non-citizens (see MTUC, GCR 1969-70:68-78; 224-29)
which largely affected the Indian workers. 	 The MTUC's
posture in	 these two instances contrasted with its
relatively mild position with respect to, or even lack of
interest in other non-communal problems, such as poverty,
unemployment, and lack of educational facilities.
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The MTUC's position with respect to communal
composition both within the union movement and the MTUC
was not regarded as a major problem. Despite the
potential threats of communalism the MTUC did not appear
to see the problem with any sense of urgency. Apart from
routine official statements and responses to the
criticisms by some union delegates concerning the under-
representation of non-Indians both at the membership and
leadership levels in the MTUC, there was practically no
serious, systematic attempt on the part of the centre to
address the problem. As far as the unionists were
concerned, communalism and the communal wranglings seemed
to have been perceived more as a social and political norm
outside the realm of the MTUC.
A number of MTUC leaders (who were active in the
1960s) interviewed by this writer suggested that the lack
of complaints or criticisms from the few Malay and Chinese
unionists about this question of under-representation of
non-Indians in the movement proved that the matter was not
regarded as a problem for the MTUC then. They in fact
took pride in claimin g that the trade union movement was
the only major movement in the country which was "above
communal bickering".	 For these veteran unionists, the
communal feature of the movement itself was not a problem
as such. It only became a problem when there were
deliberate attempts by some people to exploit the feature
for their own interests. This "unproblematic" view of the
-
communal feature of the movement among the unionists
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arguably had the effect of justifyin g the status quo in
the MTUC and which in turn might result in the unionists
not taking any concrete action to challenge communalism.
In this case, what these unionists failed. to realize is
the fact that communal problems as such are not
necessarily expressed through open complaints, criticisms,
"communal bickering" and the like. While the few Malay or
Chinese unionists who shared the leadership role with and
were "well-treated" by their Indian colleagues might nbt
be inclined to argue, at least publicly, for more Malay or
Chinese leaders among their ranks. In these circumstan-
ces, the recruitment of unionists from their ethnic groups
may threaten their otherwise secure positions. This did
not mean that there was no necessity for a serious and
concerted programme to deal with the issue. In fact, In
the context of a polarised society where the dangers posed
by communalism were being increasingly felt by the people,
including the workers, to be contented with the existing
state of the MTUC did not appear to be very different from
tacitly encouraging communalism.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that a number of
trade unionists were also actively involved in the various
political parties, including the communal ones or, who by
their campaigning for electoral support, appealed to
communal sentiments.	 These trade unionists themselves
were well aware of the limited capability of the MTUC to
defend even the limited interests of the workers, and
hence the
	
need to make their skills, and whatever
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influence they had, accessible to the parties which they
believed would work in their interest as well as the
members of their ethnic groups.
	 Such courses of action
also tended to perpetuate communal politics. 	 In this
sense these unionists were neither above "communal
bickering" nor altogether "free" from the communal build-
up which culminated in the 13 May racial riots.
As mentioned above, the riots which broke out after
the 1969 elections prompted the government to declare
another state of Emergency throughout the country,
apparently to defuse the tensions and "to restore law and
order".	 As in the previous cases the Emergency brought
about new constraints on union activities. However, a
more crucial aspect of the Emergency, as far as the MTUC
and the unions were concerned, was the introduction of
another series of restrictive amendments to the existing
labour laws by the Alliance government.
The , Third Emergenov and Another Latour LecOslation 
As with the previous Emergencies, the third Emergency
(following the post-election racial riots of May 1969) was
also an occasion to decree new laws to control and
discipline labour and the unions to create the necessary
climate to secure and expand capital investment. This not
only further weakened the movement, but, at first,
effectively denied the MTUC its role as the national
centre of the unions.
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After the intense communal campaigning, and the riots
both the Emergency and the legislation were crucial, as
far as the government was concerned, to enable it to
restore the confidence of capital. As stated by Abdul
Razak bin Hussein, the Director of the National Operations
Council (which had assumed the role of government during
the Emergency) before the introduction of the legislation,
"Investors will not want to invest in this
country unless there is a healthy investment
climate. If the country is beset with labour
troubles or if no assurance that factories
will not be affected by unnecessary work
stoppages, then I can say that our aim of
bringing about rapid industrialization will
not be realised" (cited in MTUC, GCR 1969-70:
72-75).
Thus, in accordance with the Emergency (Essential Powers)
Ordinance No.1 of 1969 the NOC Director later signed a
decree amending the country's three major labour laws, the
Employment Ordinance, 1955, the Trade Union Ordinance,
1959, and the Industrial Relations Act, 1967.(8) These
major amendments were considered necessary to "maintain a
manageable labour force, attract new investments, create
employment opportunities and to make possible a more rapid
pace of industrialization".(9)	 ••
The new laws which came into force on 9 October 1969,
prohibited unions of the public or quasi-public sector
from affiliating themselves with an organisation whose
membership embraced workers of non-public sector; required
that a person who wanted to hold office in a union to have
served for a period of at least three years in the trade,
occupation, or industry with which the union was concerned
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(except with the exemption of the Minister in charge);
barred officials of political parties from holding office
in trade unions; and also prevented the unions from
negotiating with	 the employers	 matters relating to
employment, transfer, termination of service due to
redundancy or reorganization, assignment of duties, job
specification, and promotion. The amendments also further
increased the powers of the RTU allowing the suspension of
any branch of a union (if such an action was deemed
necessary) and to freeze union fund (if the registrar was
satisfied that	 the fund may be used for political .
parties). (10)
Clearly here, not only was the unions' ability to
enga ge in collective bargainin g , and their potential eor
collective action further restricted, but even the
elementary right to defend and pursue collective interests
through one national trade union centre was denied them.
This latest legislative exercise in effect imprinted upon
the movement the readiness of the government to nullify
many years of cooperation by the MTUC and many unions with
the government with a stroke of the pen.
These new amendments in the laws pushed the MTUC
further onto the defensive against the government. At the
same time, the forced withdrawal of 56 public sector
unions (or about 30% of the total membership) from its
ranks (to gether with the loss of substantial income from
their affiliation
	
fees) by virtue of the amendment In the
law, meant that even its very status as a national labour
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centre was now in Jeopardy. The centre was now (in 1969)
left with only 132,328 or 38.8% of the total union
membership as compared to 219,097 and 61.4% respectively
in 1968 (MTVC, 1979:Table 2) (see Appendix C). The 56
unions had a combined membership of about 60,000. With
this forced split of the movement, the MTUC was left with
44 affiliates of the private sector unions.
The MTUC did try to fight back by resorting to the
usual verbal protest and the dispatch of memoranda and
statements, as well as meetings with government leaders
and officials. It also made attempts to secure some
international support which could bring pressure on the
government.	 For the most part, this action showed the
inability of the MTUC to affect the government's labour
policy in any decisive way. Under the force of the
Fmergency rule, and the threats of other coercive measures
by the government the movement seemed powerless.
Conscious of their own incapacity to effect any
change in the laws, and at the same time wanting to
emphasize that they were essentially 11 responsible"
unionists whom the government could always count on, the
MTVC leaders appeared to have continued in their usual way
to try and win the confidence of the government. Thus,
while critici7 : ng the legislation and its implications,
the MTUC seldom failed to reassert its readiness to
contribute to the success of the economy.	 The MTUC
promised to organise seminars and classes to teach the
workers how they could cooperate with management "to
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increase efficiency, safety, productivity as well as to
improve standard and quality of goods".[11] It also
called upon the government to include trade unionists in
the trade delegations overseas which it believed would
create a sense of confidence among overseas investors and
enhance the image of Malaysia in their eyes" now that
triparttsm was at work and the investors, as envisaged by
the MTUC, "are assured of industrial peace" in the country
(MTUC, GCR 1969-70:203).
This stance of the MTUC was highlighted with its
strong support for the candidacy of Malaysia's Minister of
Labour, V.Manickavasagam, to the post of ILO President for
1970/71 session even though at the time the centre was
still engaged in what its leaders described as the "most
against	 ti-intensive"	 struggle	 government	 an	 labour
legislation in which case which the Minister was their
nearest target.	 In his speech at the ILO after the
election of V.Manickavasagam as the new ILO President,
Zaidi, the Secretary General of MTUC, tried to justify the
centre's stronn support for the Minister by saying that
"in matters which concern Malaysia as a whole, we are all
together, to work in her interests despite the unhappiness
which we feel over her labour policies" (MTUC, GCR 1969-
70:258-62).
The arguments put forward by the MTUC, and the manner
with which it campaigned against the legislation also
served to underline its "responsible unionism" tendency.
The restrictive legislation was not only opposed by the
203
centre because it was seen as an infringement on the
democratic rights of labour and the unions, but also
because such legislation was seen as creating the ground
for a possible revival of the "militant unionism" tendency
among some sections of the MTUC. This, the "responsible"
section of the MTVC considered a threat both to its
leadership and the "national
	
interest".	 In criticizing
the amendment which restricted the scope of union
bargainin g , for instance, the MTUC maintained that such
restrictions would weaken the unions' position and would
In turn result in the loss of confidence of the membership
in the unions. This it claimed would also open the doors
to "subversive activities by underground elements and only
a strong, independent and resourceful trade union movement
can successfully defeat such menace" (MTUC, GCR 1969-
70:48). Similarly, the MTVC's opposition to the initial
three-year ban on union in new industries appeared to have
been more informed by its concern to keep the new
Industries free from what it termed as the "other elements
who do not have to bother about the law", rather than by
the principle to defend and protect the rights and
interests of labour and the unions (MTUC, GCR 1969-
70:191). According to the MTUC, it was necessary for the
government to allow what it termed as "a responsible and
democratically or ganised trade union" to organise the
workers in these new industries because only this sort of
union could produce "a healthy atmosphere which may be of
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profit and benefit for both the capitalist and labour"
(MTUC, GCR 1969-70:191).
Likewise, the campaign against the legislation also
reinforced the
	 "moderate" and "responsible unionism"
inclination of the MTUC leaders. Worried that such a
legislative onslaught upon labour would continue and thus
would further weaken the movement the MTUC leaders were
also forced to "moderate" their views and position even
further. In his letter seeking an appointment with the
Prime Minister to discuss the issue, the President of MTUC
said that
"We are of course prepared to be very open-minded
and flexible on any reasonable safeguards which
you may consider essential to protect capital
interests and it is our hope that during our
discussions on the new labour laws with you, a Just
and suitable compromise would be found" (MTUC, GCR
1969-70:29).
They were also apparently worried that a continued
disillusionment of the workers (with the legislation)
might lead them to resort to actions which would in turn
provoke the government into taking tougher measures
a gainst the union movement. For example, in his statement
released at the ICFTU Executive Board meeting held on 11
March 1970, the Secretary General of MTUC expressed the
fear that the "no progress" state of the campaign against
the legislation might force the unions to press for
"action and suggest steps which perhaps can only create
further difficulties and provoke the government into
adopting more severe measures" (MTUC, GCR 1969-70:207).
The fear of government action and reprisal (also seen in
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the case of the Railway Strike earlier) seemed to have
become part of the psyche of the MTUC leaders to the
extent that it tended to limit the range of options which
they could consider in pursuing their campaign against the
legislation. It also essentially meant that any action by
the MTUC and its affiliates would have to be within an
"acceptable" boundry which must therefore implied a
limited "achievement".
As indicated, the events also showed that despite its
opposition to the new laws, the MTUC was fully in support
of the government's economic and development programmes
which had provided the occasion for the laws in the first
place.	 Far from being a threat to the status quo, the
MTUC had	 consistently showed	 that despite all its
misgivings towards	 the government	 for the latter's
Increasingly tough labour policy, it was always keen to be
a partner of capital and the government. Indeed, its
strong rhetoric, however unpleasant to the government at
times, was mainly for the purpose of securing union
confidence in its leadership role and in turn government
recognition of this role. When the Emergency was lifted
in early 1971 the clause which banned the public sector
unions from joining the MTUC was also removed from the
statute book, thereby restoring the MTUC's earlier status
as the country's primary national labour centre, although
the other major restrictions of the 1969 legislation
remained.	 In this it could be argued that the government
was not that keen to split the movement into public and
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private sector union groups. The fact that the clause was
withdrawn, despite its more serious implications to the
movement, relative to the other clauses, seems to suggest
that the government might have used it only as a
bargaining tool so that its withdrawal resulted in a
considerable "relief" for the MTUC, to the extent that the
MTUC was prepared to tolerate the other clauses without
much complaint.
6a.f_g_9.ack).5_1an
This chapter indicates that during the post-
independence Alliance era there were serious suggestions
from some sections of the movement for the MTUC to
consider assuming a "political" role in the country's
political process. This idea proved difficult as the main
tendency within the movement, which wanted to continue its
collaborative relationship with the government, was not in
favour of the MTUC becoming involved in "politics".
However, despite the persistent reluctance on the part of
this main tendency, the government's successive
legislative onslaughts on labour and the unions in the
1960s, and the obvious failure of the consultative/
advisory machinery to deal with the movement's grievances
prompted the unions, and hence the MTUC, to reconsider
some kind of "political action" as a possible means to
pursue the cause of labour and the unions. The "political
action" later emerged in the forms of the issuing of a
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Workers' Charter and the centre's support for multi-party
candidates for the 1969 General Election.
The chapter also shows that one of the major problems
faced by the MITC-led movement, which also served to
undermine its position (as a multi-racial force) in
relation to the government and capital, was its incapacity
and unwillingness to address communalism.	 The MTUC
_
leaders' generally sanguine view of communalism within
their organisation tended to perpetuate a problem which
had the effect of further weakening the movement. The
discussion suggests that the third state of Emergency
imposed by the government following the outbreak of the
post-election racial riots in (May) 1969 not only brought
into focus the limited attempts by the MTUC to confront
communalism,	 but	 also	 marked	 another	 government
legislative offensive against labour in which the MTUC
again proved incapable of securing redress.
As for the Alliance, the chapter reasserts the view
that its disapproval and even opposition to union
involvement in politics was in part due to its concern to
maintain its position as the government of an independent
Malaya, and in part due to its perceived need to attract
foreign	 capital	 into	 the	 country	 for	 " economic
development". For these reasons it was concerned to
discipline and to control labour and the unions. Apart
from the legislation already dealt with in the previous
chapter, the period also saw the Alliance using the
Emergency conditions (beginning in May 1969) to further
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tighten its labour policy through yet another series of
restrictive labour legislation. The limited response by
the MTUC to these developments further continued its
dependent and client status with regard to the Alliance.
Notes 
Ill	 See the full text of the Charter in MTUC, GCR 1969-
1970:246-49. For a background information about MTUC's
involvement in politics prior to and around the 1969
elections, including a brief note on the Charter, see a
report entitled "MTUC's Involvement in Politics" in the
same report Just cited, pp.90-103.
(2) Herz, it should be noted that the Gerakan Party which
enjoyed the support of some unionists at the time had
earlier issued its own Workers' Charter in late November
1968 for the purpose of the election. The full text of
the Gerakan's charter is reproduced in Vasil (1972:64-65).
(31 It should be noted that this legislative issue
features prominently in the Gerakan Party's Workers'
Charter noted above.
[43 For an extended discussions on this see for instance,
Lim M.H. and Canak (1981); Brennan (1982); Cham (1975).
(51	 For detailed accounts but different perspectives of
the riots pee, for instance, National Operations Council
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(1969); Tpnku Abdul Rahman (1969); Comber 1983); and Goh
Cheng Teik (1971).
[6] For an elaborate account of "politics of communalism"
in Malaysia see Hpa W.Y.(1983).
[7] These are the annual average figures for most of the
1960s based on the General Council's Reports (1962-63 to
1967-68, 1969-70) and Zaidi (1975).
[8] The new legislation were the Essential (Trade Unions)
Regulations, the Essential (Modifications of the Trade
Unions (Exemption of Public Officer) Order 1967)
Regulations, the Essential (Employment) Regulations, and
the Essential (Industrial Relations) Regulations.
[91	 Straits Times, 10.10.69, cited in Todd and Jomo
(1988).
[10] For details of MTUC's comments and views regarding
the amendment see "Memorandum on Trade Union Rights" in
MTVC, GCR 1969-70:185-205, Appendix B.
[11] "Memorandum on Trade Union Rights" cited above. For
details of the areas and mode of cooperation recommended
by the MTVC see "Co-operation between Government,
Employers and Trade Unions", in MTVC, GCR 1969-70:240-45.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
TH IpEor„. opY  OF COMPROMISE UNDER BARISAN NASIONAL 
(1970-81) 
The impact of the third Emergency (following the
-
racial riots of 13 May 1969), and the government's New
Economic Policy (NEP), which aimed at securing national
unity through	 economic parity between the country's
ethnic groups, encouraged the main tendency within the
MTUC-led movement to adopt a compromising and
collaborative posture towards the government and capital
in general. This was evident from the various economic or
business ventures undertaken by the MTUC and the unions in
the 1970s, as well as from MTUC's enthusiastic efforts to
boost tripartism and to maintain industrial peace.
Having dealt with the development of the MTUC under
the Alliance in the previous two chapters, the present and
the following chapters will consider further developments
of the MTUC in the era of Barisan Nasional or the National
Front government.	 As the discussion continues it should
become clear that, while the Alliance era proved to be a
period of political "turmoil" characterized by the
Emergencies and the racial riots of May 1969, the Barisan
era was dominated by the issue of the NEP.
In this chapter I shall suggest that a resort to
economic or business ventures and "industrial peace" by
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the main tendency within the MTUC-led movement at the time
underlined the	 compromising attitude 	 of	 the	 MTUC
leadership. I shall also suggest that this new
compromising posture of the MTUC continued to undermine
labour's position in relation to government and capital,
particularly when the question of organising of workers
and struggling for the restoration of labour and trade
union rights was still on the agenda of issues for the
MTUC to consider.
The chapter, first, discusses the "New Frontiers of
Trade Unionism" policy of the MTUC-led movement in
conjunction with the government's recently launched NEP.
While outlining the backgrounds and rationale of the
policy (as	 suggested and	 implied by
	 its	 leading
proponents) the section also considers some of the general
implications of the policy for the movement. The next
section deals with the notion of tripartite cooperation
and industrial peace between the three parties concerned,
the MTLIC, the government, and the employers group. This
section includes a brief consideration of the MTUC's
"Blueprint for	 Industrial Peace"	 and also the new
tripartite "Code of Conduct for Industrial Harmony". The
final section concludes the discussion on the MTUC under
the Barisan, pointing to the continued weakness of MTUC
leadership politics.
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7.1. New Economic Policy and MTUC's "New Frontiers of 
Trade Vnionism"
Low morale and the weakened position of the MTUC in
relation to government and capital, and the desire of the
"moderate" unionists to benefit from various opportunities
created by the government's New Economic Policy, prompted
the MTUC to campaign for active union involvement in
economic ventures. While this campaign helped to boost
the position of the MTUC, particularly in relation to the
government, it also brought about new dilemmas and raised
serious questions	 as regard	 the role	 and overall
aspiration of the centre.
The 13 May racial riots (1969), mentioned in the
previous chapter, had a major impact on the course of
social and political development of the country. The
solution to communalism adopted by the government was the
NEP.	 Announced in 1971, the NEP aimed at 1) eradicating
poverty irrespective of race, and 2) restructuring society
in order	 to remove	 the identification of economic
functions with race within a 20-year period ending in 1990
(Malaysia, 1971:1). To secure the long-term goal of
ethnic harmony, the NEP, in particular, sought to boost
the position of the Malays who were the single largest
economically-backward ethnic group in the country. Such a
strategy was	 considered necessary by the especially
Alliance leaders	 so as	 to strike a socio-economic
"balance" considered crucial for guaranteeing a lasting
peace.	 To achieve these objectives the NEP represents an
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attempt to boost the Malay ownership and control of share
capital (from 1.9% of the share capital of limited
companies in 1970 to 30% by 1990), produce a relatively
large pool of Malay managers and other professionals (also
with 30% target), and to create employment opportunities
for the growing population, such that employment in the
various sectors of the economy as well as by occupational
levels will reflect the racial composition of the
population (Malaysia, 1973:62, 81-88). Under the plan the
same shares of the local non-Malays were to be increased
from 24.4% (of which 22.5% belonged to the Chinese) to 40%
within the same period. Needless to say, active
participation of Malays in various economic ventures was
also to be encouraged by the government.
Two important points should be noted with reference
to the NEP. Firstly, the NEP was a communal strategy.
Such a strategy was understandable since communalism
proved to be an effective mechanism whereby the elites
could continue to reproduce their relative hegemony over
the rest of society. Secondly, due to the limited
capacity of local capital to enable a rapid expansion of
the economy to take place, heavy reliance was again placed
on the role of foreign capital.
	 This would place the
government in an ever more dependent relationship with
foreign capital. As a condition for the success of the
NEP the government proposed restrictive union action.
When Parliament reconvened in 1971, most of the amendments
to the labour laws (1969) (decreed under the Emergency
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powers) were incorporated into a new comprehensive
legislation, sending a clear signal to labour and the
unions of the government's determination to see its
economic plans succeed.
The other strategy adopted by the government which
also appeared to complement the NEP concerned the post-
1969 political arrangements. In the 1969 elections the
opposition parties won a substantial number of seats in
both the State Legislative Assemblies and Parliament at
the expense of the Alliance candidates. The DAP which for
the first time participated in the elections secured 13
parliamentary seats or 13.73% of the total votes and 31
state seats or 11.76% of the total votes. The Gerakan
Party in fact managed to take over the state government of
Penang winning 16 out of the total 24 seats there. The
Gerakan also won 8 parliamentary seats and a total of 26
state seats. The PMIP also managed to retain its overall
control of the Kelantan state and secured 12 parliamentary
seats compared with the previous (1964 elections) 9 seats.
Altogether the opposition parties in peninsular Malaysia
had increased their seats in Parliament from 15 in 1964 to
37 in 1969, while the Alliance had its share reduced from
89 parliamentary seats or 58.37% of the total votes in
1964 to 66 and 48.41% respectively in 1969.(1)
Faced with this result, the Alliance began by
rebuilding its powerful base. This was undertaken, first,
by imposing a state of Emergency and using the Emergency
powers to
	 suspend Parliament
	 and to	 suppress the
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opposition (for	 example, by
	 banning all
	 political
activities) during the 21-month Emergency rule beginning
In May 1969. Secondly, the government embarked upon the
task of winni ,.g over the "moderate" and essentially right-
wing opposition parties to its side. The second task was
accomplished with the entry of the Sarawak United People's
Party (1970),	 Gerakan Party	 (1972),	 the	 People's
Progressive Party (1972), and the PMIP (1973) into the
broader Alliance-led coalition, the Barisan Nasional. It
should be noted that the left-wing Partai Raayat and the
right-wing pAP were the only two important opposition
-
parties which were outside the Barisan. The early 1970s
thus saw the Alliance government, now under the leadership
of Abdul Razak Hussein, regaining its political dominance
and set to implement the NEP.
MTUC and the NEP 
For the MTUC, the failure to secure any substantial
concessions from the government with respect to the
especially 1967 and 1969 laws (except of course its own
right to continue serving as a national labour centre),
there appeared to be an urgent need to reevaluate its role
and policy orientation and to find ways and means to check
the progressive erosion of its public image and
credibility as the country's major labour centre. As part
of this the MTUC faced the problem of attempting to regain
the confidence of the unions in its role as mediator
with the government.
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This situation prompted the MTUC to consider a new
set of policies which might allow it to reconstitute
itself as an effective spokesperson for the union
movement. The option was "discovered" through the idea of
the government's NEP. The NEP's objective of "eradicating
poverty" (irrespective of race) was seen to be in line
with the MTK's own campaign to improve the socio-economic
position of the workets, while the idea of job creation
through rapid industrialisation programme embodied in the
policy was seen as boosting labour's own position in the
economy, and was especially appealing to the "moderate"
reformist wing of the MTUC. At the MTUC's 20th ADC in
April 1971 the delegates passed a resolution endorsing the
NEP (MTUC, RP, ADC 1971). This resolution called upon the
MTLIC General Council to establish "an industrial and trade
training centre for unemployed persons" and to form a
multi-purpose cooperative society to uplift the economic
position of workers. Following the above resolution, and
in an effort to convince the government of its keen
support for the country's development plan, mainly through
the NEP, the MTUC also submitted "A Blueprint for
Industrial Peace" to the Deputy Prime Minister which
outlined the centre's proposals to the government and the
employers, as well as its own undertakings to secure
industrial peace and the success of the government's
plan.(2]
In line with the spirit of the NEP, the MTVC leaders,
who were also the leaders of their own unions, began to
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articulate the	 idea of active union involvement in
economic or business ventures, also known as the "New
Frontiers of Trade Unionism". The underlying themes of
the New Frontiers policy appeared to be the idea of
employment creation, and the overall strengthening of the
movement through union economic ventures.(3) The MTUC
leaders believed that by engaging in various economic or
business ventures, as well as providing educational and
vocational training facilities to the youth, there would
be "greater financial resources to help finance the
expansion and improvement of programmes of the movement as
a whole", and to help complement the government's plans to
provide employment to the population.
packground of theNew Frontiers Policy 
At this juncture it is important to place in
perspective some major developments prior to, and
following the 13 May tragedy and the Emergency, which help
to explain the movement's inclination towards the NEP, and
Its embrace of the New Frontiers policy. First, an
awareness of various union economic activities of other
countries, such as workers cooperatives, travel bureaus,
and workers banks, especially in Europe (and to a certain
extent Singapore) had proved increasingly attractive to
some leading Malaysian unionists.(4)
	 Some suggestions
pointing in this direction could be found in some
speeches, as well as the MTUC's earlier resolutions. The
notion that trade union economic strength could serve as a
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leverage in the bargaining process with the employers and
even the state, seemed plausible. In addition, there was
a belief- that involvement in such enterprises would earn
unions respect and recognition from the government. After
all, in an inaugural speech at the MTUC's ADC as early as
1965 Abdul Razak Hussein (then the Deputy Prime Minister)
had already redefined "responsible unionism" in terms of
increased development and trade, "increased productivity",
training programmes, organising cooperatives, and workers'
discipline. (]
$econd, there is evidence to suggest that the MTUC's
Interest in these economic programmes was inspired by the
activities of its biggest affiliate, the NUPW, which had
started its own economic activities in the late 1960s.
The union's early economic activities were mainly
concerned with purchasing a few rubber estates to save
jobs for a tiny fraction of its members who had fallen
victim to the fragmentation of estates . The buying of
rubber estates and other economic ativities to be cited
shortly were carried out through the union's business arm,
the Great Alonioners Trading Corporation Berhad (GATCO)
and the Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society formed in 1967
and 1968 respectively.(6) Although these estate projects
••
were of limited economic significance, they were held in
high esteem lpy the NUPW leaders.
In view of the influence of the NUPW in the MTUC,
particularly through its long-serving Secretary General,
P.P.Narayanan, who was also one of the most important and
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longest-serving leaders of the MTUC, it is not surprising
if similar ideas about union economic activities also
seemed "reasonable" to the other MTUC leaders (see Suara
Buroh, January 1969). The important role of the NUPW and
P.P.Narayanan in the movement for most of the 1950s and
1960s has already been pointed out earlier. This situation
still persisted in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the
New Frontiers idea was evolving. P.P.Narayanan who had
earlier served 4s the first and fourth President of MTUC
was reelected to the same post in 1973 at the time when
the MTUC was about to commemorate its 25th year
anniversary. His reelection to presidency which was to be
repeated through the rest of the 1970s indicated the
influence he	 commanded in his union and the MTUC.
Narayanan, in fact, was regarded to be the main architect
of the New Frontiers policy although the role of Zaidi,
Yeoh Tech Chye, and T.Narendran who were the Secretary
General, President (until 1973) and Vice-President of MTUC
respectively at the time should not be under-estimated.
In this P.P.Narayanan was also said to have wanted to
emulate Singapore's Devan Nair's "The New Horizon" which
saw the docile, pro-government (or rather government-
controlled) National Trades Union Congress in that
neighbouring country undertaking a number of business
projects.(7) Of course, under the new climate of NEP,
such activities were not only "safe" (compared with the
"crusading" type of activities), but may also be favoured
by the government.
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Third, the government's determination to push through
the NEP also influenced the mood of the unions, forcing
many to refrain from taking actions that might be
construed as undermining the policy. The 1971 legislation
further convinced the MTUC that the government was in no
mood for any compromise other than on its own terms. In
fact, the Emergency situation following the May tragedy
served to strengthen the government's position and further
legitimized its policies on labour discipline to the
extent that any hope of the MTUC gaining legislative
concession seemed increasingly unlikely. Thus it was also
claimed that the MTUC supported the NEP out of fear that
an indifferent attitude towards such a highly celeberated
national policy might result in the government's
unfavourable attitude towards the MTUC and implementing
policies accordingly (interview: A.V.Kathaiah, 5.4.86).
Finally, the MTVC's "political option", signified by
Its active endorsement of candidates in the 1969
elections, also proved ineffective when the government
suspended Parliament upon the declaration of the Emergency
in 1969. Even after the suspension was lifted in February
1971, it was obvious to the centre that the "pro-labour"
politicians could hardly be effective in a Parliament
still dominated by the MPs of the ruling party. According
to MTVC Secretary General, some of the politicians whom
the MTUC supported in the 1969 elections "not only have
done nothing to help workers' cause but in some cases they
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have even supported Government's anti-labour measures"
(MTW, OCR 1971-72:7).
Together, the above events and developments suggest
that the New Frontiers policy was an important turning
point in the it cntelopment of the MTUC-led movement. While
the "moderate", "responsible", and collaborative attitude
of the MTUC (in relation to the government and capital)
was already too clear by now, the New Frontiers policy saw
the movement further committing itself to being the active
and "pragmatic" partner to capital and the state.
The period between 1971 and 1976, for the most part,
corresponded with the government's Second Malaysia Plan
••
(which also constituted the first phase of the NP).
During this period a number of major unions and their
centres took up various economic ventures. The WNW, for
example, apart from the estate projects cited earlier, was
also involved in a multi-million dollar textile
manufacturing project through a joint-venture (originally
with the Lakshmi Textiles of India, and the Negeri
Sembilan State Development Corporation) with a firm from
India.
	
Through its companies, the union invested in
shares, containers, edible oils, truck assembly, bank,
insurance	 company,	 and	 in	 a	 number	 of	 other
enterprises.(8) CUEPACS, the national centre for the
public sector unions (under the leadership of T.Narendran,
Yahaya Mohd.Ali, and Jamaluddin I5a), had undertaken
housing projects through its multi-purpose cooperative
society in Kuala Lumpur, Johor Baharu, and Seremban. The
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National Union of Teaching Profession (NUTP) introduced
loan schemes to its members for purposes of purchasing
consumer goods. The Transport Workers Union (TWU) under
V.David had a housing cooperative, retail shops, a travel
agency, a charter service, and investment services, whije
Zaidi's base union, the commonwealth Services Employees
Union or CSEU (until 1971 known as WDCSA), was involved in
projects like housing, buildings, palm oil mill, and
investments in granite quarries and a cattle farm (Rao,
1976; David, 1984:161-63; Morais, c1985?:158-69). The
MTIJC itself, mainly through the efforts of its,affiliate,
the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) under Yeoh
Tech Chye, also launched the highly celeberated Workers
Bank (Bank Buruh) in 1975, with P.P.Narayanan as the
Chairman.
The Implications of the New Frontiers on the Movement 
The New Frontiers policy raised a number of questions
for trade unionists. For one, a focus on business or
economic ventures would certainly consume much time and
energy of the unionists, thus possibly resulting in a
neglect of such traditionally and fundamentally important
spheres of
	 trade union	 work as the education and
organisation of workers. This is not to mention that the
task of
	 keeping a business enterprise viable in a
competitive market is certainly more than a demand of the
unionists' attention.
	 In any case, even if the New
Frontiers jobs were delegated to the trained business
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executives hired lpy the unions, there was still a problem
of accountability. For, as union leaders who had to be
accountable to the general membership, the unionists
concerned were
	
still responsible	 for	 the	 overall
administration and output of the enterprises.
The New Frontiers policy also raised a question about
the conflict of interests. 	 By committing themselves to
business activities, and in the process, subjecting
themselves to the dictate of the market forces, the
unionists and the MTUC were aligning themselves ever more
closely with capital, while at the same time undermining
their own proclaimed role as the champions of the cause of
labour. The emergence of a new breed of company directors
and managers from among the unionists, including those who
had been the main advocates of the policy, brought into
focus this question of a conflict of interests. The
positions they occupied, and the functions they had to
perform for their respective union business concerns were
certainly not much different from those of the corporate
functionaries and directors, particularly in respect of
assessing and making decisions about investments, the
performance of the enterprise, and the generation of
profits.
	 Needless to say, operating in a competitive
market (which they had yet to establish their foothold in)
these business unionists had to resort to various cost-
cutting measures, including those which militated against
the very workers in whose interests the business projects
were (supposedly) undertaken in the first place.
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The position of these business unionists certainly
became more contradictory when faced with a dispute with
their own workers. To illustrate, an important leader of
the MTUC was said to be sitting on the board of directors
of an insurance company when the company was having a
dispute with	 its workers	 (interview:	 A.V.Kathaiah,
5.4.86). Likewise, it was difficult for a business-owning
union to even rationalise its position with respect to the
struggle by the workers (including its own) to organise
when such
	 a tivities could affect its own business
interests. An interesting example in this case was the
NUPW itself which, through its joint-venture textile mill
mentioned earlier, had assumed the role of employer of
textile workers at a time when there were attempts by the
country's textile workers (with the apparent assistance of
the MTUC) to form their own national industry-based union,
although this had been refused registration by the RTU.
-
In this situation, despite MTUC's own protracted campaign
for the amalgamation or merger of unions in line with its
belief that "big means strong and effective" (apparently
inspired by the NUPW and other similar unions), it is
certainly doubtful whether the NUPW leaders were keen to
lend their support to the struggle of the textile workers.
As far as the advocates of the New Frontiers policy
were concerned, such "worker capitalism" was not perceived
as being in conflict with labour's overall interest.
While viewing the policy as an extension of the movement's
long-standing cooperative relationship with the government
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and the employers, the advocates of the New Frontiers also
seemed convinced that the rationale of employment creation
Justified the policies. To what extent the unions'
economic ventures could really help to alleviate the
unemployment problem did not seem to matter much. Around
1976 only about 1,500 to 2,000 jobs were estimated to have
been created by trade union business and commercial
establishments (Rao, 1976). Further, there was little
concern with the implications of the policy (particularly
the unions' business ventures) for the principles and
aspirations of trade union struggle. As Yahaya Mohd.Ali,
MTUC's Acting Secretary General (1975-76) put it, although
some doubt the necessity of this policy and "question the
principle of the actions", "many applaud the power labour
could marshall in a field which has been the traditional
monopoly of capitalists" (MTUC, GCR 1974-76:2). In the
same report he also maintained that the policy was an
attempt to find a break-through in the "traditional
concepts of labour", in fact, "an attempt to find another
direction in	 improving the quality of life of the
workers".
Lest the New Frontiers appeared too devoid of social
content, some of these unionists also maintained that the
policy encompassed activities which emphasised service
rather than proflt.(9) Examples often cited in this case
were such projects as cooperatives and training centres
operated by a number of unions. This included the Trade
Union Training Centre by NUBE, the Workers Institute of
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Technology by the TWU, and the scholarship, loan, and
hostel schemes for high school and university students as
well as the Agro-Industrial Training Complex by the NUPW.
The Workers Institute of Technology was established with
the support of the MTUC, ICFTU, ILO and Asian-American
Free Labour Institute (AAFLI), whilst the Agro-Industrial
Training Complex was run in conjunction with the Swedish
Lutheran Church and the Negeri Sembilan Development
Corporation (David, 1984:161-63). While the Workers' Bank
was originally intended to be a cooperative bank. But,
because of what appeared to be certain technical and
"feasibility" problems, particularly in the eyes of the
authorities concerned, the bank was later registered as a
commercial bank. Although the social purpose and emphasis
of cooperatives was on "service",, it was the case that
cooperatives usually operated on the basis of their tax
exemption status as well as along business lines, both of
which tend to point to considerations other than "social".
Notwithstanding the people's need for more
educational and training facilities, it was also
questionable how many students really benefitted from such
union schemes. It is possible that the chanelling of the
already limited union resources into these projects was
only to prove to the government that the unions were
prepared to assume some responsibility for education and
training.	 The objective of these schemes was to produce
skilled manpower that might well fit the need of industry
or capital, while the question of providing systematic
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educational programmes to unionists which would help raise
their socio-political cosciousness or enhance labour's
ideological and organisational potential was less evident.
Despite the need for trade unionists to undergo various
workers' or trade union education courses, the unions and
the MTVC were unable, to any great extent, to provide such
educational opportunities in union-run training centres.
At any rate, even the courses conducted by these few
unions and the MTVC tended to be more "contingent" in
_
nature, with very few unionists gaining access to them
(see MTVC and FES, Publication No.4).
	 It should also be
noted, in spite of their apparent concern for the
education of the workers' children, it was an irony that
the poor state of Tamil education in most rubber and oil-
palm estates throughout the country seemed unproblematic
to the NUPW leaders. In the words of Stenson (1980:205),
the higher education scholarship and hostel schemes by the
NUPW illustrated the "empty formalism" of a union "that
continued to ignore the initial closing of opportunities
caused by the estate Tamil school system. It also reveals
the orientation
	 of a	 union leadership intent upon
liberating a few talented students from the estate
proletariat while in no way attempting to emancipate the
working class as a whole".
Closely related to above, the New Frontiers policy
which placed the MTVC in closer collaborative role with
capital and government had the effect of undermining the
MTUC's overall position in relation to the government. As
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mentioned above, it was difficult for the MTUC to argue
against the restrictions imposed on labour and the unions
when those restrictions were the essential.prerequisites
for the	 success of	 business ventures now actively
encouraged by the MTUC. The MTUC, CUEPACS, and a number
of major unions were embroiled in a pursuit of profitable
ventures to Justify their New Frontiers policy. On the
one hand, they raised the expectations of members as thy
popularised these activities. On the other hand, they had
to submit themselves to the "free" market.
	 Indeed, in
promoting these
	 policies, the advocates of the New
Frontiers also denied themselves the opportunity of
arguing against the very logic of the market system which
necessitated the exploitation and repression of labour in
the first place.
All these developments point to the New Frontiers'
subordinate role to the NEP and to a situation which
placed a further obligation on the MTUC ledership to abide
by a government inspired code of industrial conduct. An
amendment to the Trade Unions Ordinance to allow unions to
invest in business (with the written approval of the
government and subject to such conditions as it may
impose) was made by the government in 1973, apparently in
response to a request from the MTUC. The government also
agreed to declare Labour Day as a public holiday beginning
in 1973 (indeed, another timely achievement for the MTUC),
and raised a token sum of M$10,000 from the employers as a
support for the MTW's new building.
	 Perhaps, as a
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further sign of governm ent encouragement for these
activities, details of unions' total assets were now
regularly published in the Ministry of Labour's annual
reports. (10]
In any case, althou gh the New Frontiers policy was
adopted by the MTUC and a number of relatively large
unions, most other unions did not venture into any
business activity of their own. In 1976, at the height of
the New Frontiers activities, only about 15 unions with a
total investments of about M$25 to M$35 million were
estimated to have been engaged in some form of business
activity (Rao, 1976). Some unionists were critical of and
even opposed to the policy. While some were of the
opinion that mixing trade unionism with business would
subject the movement to various forms of abuses,
particularly favouritism and corruption, while others
suggested that certain union incumbents were using the
business and other economic projects to silence critics
and to direct attention away from the "real issues" faced
by the unions.(11) Nevertheless, the New Frontiers
policy continued to prevail throughout the decade under
Consideration.
7.2. Cooperation for Industrial  Harmony
The post-1969 situation not only prompted the MTUC
leadership, and major affiliate unions to subscribe to the
idea of the NEP, but also, as a complement prompted it to
initiate as well as to support industrial peace-keeping
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measures. As with the earlier New Frontiers policy, these
Initiatives and the attitude of the MTUC again underlined
its compromising tendency and, in the process, tended to
further undermine
	 labour's position with respect to
government and capital. Two events which confirmed this
were the- promulgation of "A Blueprint for Industrial
Peace" by the MTUC in June 1972, and its full support for
the government-initiated "Code of Conduct for Industrial
Harmony" in 1975.
Submitted to the Deputy Prime Minister on 6 June
1972, the blueprint, which in Zaidi's word "was by far one
of the most innovative pieces of work that the MTUC had
issued during its 25-year history" (Zaidi, 1975:370)
charted out the various undertakings and measures which
the MTUC believed should be taken by itself, the
government, and the employers to secure industrial peace
and guarantee the success of government development plan.
Under this plan the MTUC pledged itself to promote a full
understanding and	 appreciation of
	 the	 government's
economic policy; to assist in the growth and development
of democratic trade unions (that is "free of subversion
and anti-national elements"); to promote racial harmony;
to impress upon unions the importance of exercising
restraint and showing tolerance in their relations with .
employers; to encourage unions to refrain from taking
industrial action unless all other means are exhausted and
have proved futile; to provide courses and training
programmes on such matters as greater productivity and
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higher levels of efficiency in the industry; to encourage
direct union involvement in industrial, economic, social
and cultural activities, to popularise family planning
among the workers, and to project the image of
Malaysia. [12]
To enable the MTUO and the unions to play their
"proper role" the blueprint called upon the government to
intensify cooperation with the MTUC, to improve its
industrial relations machinery, and to amend some clauses
in the labour legislation. This was in reference to the
provisions in the Trade Unions Ordinance, 1959 which
prevented the organisation of workers in rural areas and
the fishing	 sector, and
	 which also restricted the
establishment of	 unions only	 along similar	 trade,
occupation and industry, "similar" being the opinion of
he Registrar of Trade Unions. 	 It also called for the
removal of restrictions on the use of union funds so as to
allow unions to invest in industrial and economic
projects, and cooperative societies; the setting up of a
tripartite Price and Income Statutory Board, and the
declaration of the first day of May as a national holiday.
Appeals were also made to all employers to cooperate with
the MTUC and the unions to preserve "durable peace and
harmony_in the industry". The employers were asked not to
abuse what the MTUC termed as their privileges (such as
"dismissing their workers without valid reasons and just
cause", and practising discrimination in promotions and
transfers); to take workers into their confidence, and to
232
involve the	 workers
	 in	 all	 aspects	 of	 company
undertakings; to help facilitate the workers to attend
trade union education programmes, and to cooperate with
the unions to improve minimum wage levels (MTUC, GCR 1971-
72:306-11).
The blueprint clearly highlighted the MTUC's support
for the government's NEP programme, and further underlined
the centre's own undertakings with respect to the New
Frontiers policy. It also reaffirmed MTUC's commitment to
tripartism and	 to ensuring industrial peace.	 This
initiative by	 the MTUC	 was well	 received by the
government. As indicated in the previous section, the
government responded by a series of goodwill gestures of
its own such as an amendment to the trade union law (such
that it allowed the unions to invest in economic projects)
as requested by the MTUC, by agreeing to declare the
-
Labour Day as a national holiday, and by contributing
M$10,000 to the MTUC's Building Fund. Later, as a further
show of appreciation, a cabinet minister also commented
that the MTUC's support for the government's NEP has
contributed towards the favourable industrial climate in
the country; attracting foreign investments which made it
possible for an industrialization programme to move
forward (Straits Times, 27.7.74).
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Meanwhile, the tripartite NJLAC, which had been
suspended with the declaration of the Emergency, was
revived in 1971, indicating that the government was keen
to secure labour's cooperation for the implementation of
the NEP.	 The MTVC participated in these deliberations
with renewed enthusiasm. Although the tightening of the
laws had made it difficult for the unions to take
industrial action, the period from 1971 to 1974 saw a
steady increase in the number of strikes, including an
increase in the total number of workers involved in
strikes, and total person-days lost due to strikes.(13]
The steady increase in strikes during the first half of
the 1970s, in part, prompted the government to encourage
the MTVC's overt commitment to industrial harmony. This
took the form of the "Code of Conduct for Industrial
Harmony" signed by the MTVC and the Malayan Council of
Employers' Organisation (MCEO) in February 1975, through
the mediation of the Ministry of Labour.
The 1975 code, as the name implies, aimed at
etablishing "principles and guidelines to employers and
workers on the practice of industrial relations for
achieving greater industrial harmony" (Ministry of Labour,
1975). The code (as with the 1964 code discussed in
Chapter 5) had no force of law, but urged both employers
and workers "to refrain from taking unilateral action with
regard to
	 any industrial	 dispute"; to resolve all
grievances and disputes in accordance with the agreed
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grievance proc.dures or by negotiation, conciliation and
arbitration; to ensure that all matters in dispute were
dealt with by the proper machinery established for the
purpose; to promote cooperation at all levels in industry;
to establish a procedure which would ensure a prompt
investigation of grievances leading to a joint settlement;
"to refrain from resorting to coercion, intimidation,
victimization and to avoid go-slow, sit-down and stay-in-
strikes"; and "to educate managements and workers in their
obligations to each other". The code also spelt out in
detail the guidelines and procedures which should be
followed by employers and workers for establishing "good
industrial relations practices"; an employment policy; the
procedures for the conduct of collective bargaining and
disputes resolution, as well as the procedures for
improved communication and consultation between employers
and workers (Ministry of Labour, 1975).
As was the case of the New Frontiers policy, there
were a number of questions pertaining to the blueprint and
the code, as well as their implications for the role and
orientation of the MTUC-led movement, which should be
considered. For one, the blueprint and the code clearly
placed a further obligation on the MTUC to work closely
with the employers and the government to achieve or to
maintain order and peace in the industry. A Standing
Committee with representatives from both the MTUC and the
MCEQ sides under the chair of the Minister of Labour was
•
formed
	
to	 examine,	 evaluate,	 and	 monitor	 the
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Implementation of the code as well as to undertake
" appropriate measures to secure greater compliance" of
same.(14) However, while this kind of pro-capital,
policing role would certainly please the government and
employers, it could also result in the MTUC losing the
confidence and support of labour and the unions.
For the MTUC, the New Frontiers policy which entailed
a subscription to the logic of capital accumulation and
profit, tended to make the whole idea of tripartism more
appealing. After all, cordial employer-employee relations
and, as the Minister of Labour put it, the containment of
"the destructive expression of industrial conflict", which
constituted the hallmark of tripartism, were now as
important to the MTUC and the business-owning unions as
they were to the employers. Unlike the past, when
participation in tripartite arrangement was informed more
Ine the need to secure the support and confidence of the
government and employers for the labour leadership role of
the MTUC, participation by the MTUC and the businees-
owning unions was more due to the stake the had in the
tripartite arrangement itself. In that sense, tripartism
was more in the interest of worker capitalism, rather than
for "purely" trade union interest, and hence raised the
question of the role and orientation of the MTUC as a
leader of the union movement.
It should be noted that in the drive to project its
new "pragmatic" image, and despite the many outstanding
statutory restrictions against the unions which had been
the subject of its bitter contest against the government,
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the MTLIC was particularly cautious or even evasive abput
the blueprint. Apart from its new call for the removal of
statutory restrictions on the use of union funds for
investments in economic projects (which later earned it a
satisfactory response from the government), few issues
were raised by the MTUC. This included the provisions
which prevented "the organisation of workers in rural
areas and fishing sector" and which restricted "the
establishment of unions on the basis of trade, occupation
and industrY"	 which highlighted	 the plight of the
predominantly non-unionised, rural Malay workers.
One of the major themes of the blueprint and the code
was the
	 need to	 improve the	 industrial relations
machinery. The idea seemed to be that labour grievances
and industrial conflicts were largely due to the poor
working of the industrial relations machinery (both at
establishment and government levels), rather than because
of the capital-labour relation. The MTUC's acceptance of
this "industrial relations" logic has already been pointed
out in the case of the Railway Dispute in Chapter 5. The
present recommendation and endorsement for a more
elaborate industrial relations machinery and procedures
showed the extent and persistence of the MTUC's notion of
"responsible unionism". More importantly, a preoccupation
with the mechanics of industrial relations might ignore
the concrete problems and situation faced by the workers.
In this context it is certainly difficult to see how the
position adopted	 by the MTUC (with respect to the
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blueprint and the code) could be regarded as a service to
or in the interest of the workers and the unions.
Apart from that the code which called for labour
restraint, encouraged the workers to settle their
grievances through compromise, and to avoid resorting to
unilateral action in the pursuit of their cause also again
served to	 undermine labour's bargaining position in
relation to employers.
	 In a situation where the workers
and their unions were increasingly being disciplined
through new restrictions by the government, then
industrial harmony, could not have been other than harmony
for capital and the government. Indeed, the impact of the
compromises by the MTUC and affiliate unions was evident
throughout the 197gs with their relatively low levels of
strikes and the public declarations of cooperation between
the MTUC and the government.
7.3. Conclusion
For the MTUC-led movement which was further weakened
by a series of government legislative onslaughts, the
1970s which brought the NEP into focus saw an increasing
interest among some important sections of the unions, as
well as the MTUC for economic ventures. The situation, as
seen through the MTUC's New Frontiers policy, encouraged
the centre's more compromising posture in its relationship
with the government and employers. This compromising
posture of the MTUC was also seen in the Blueprint for
Industrial Peace which was unilaterally issued by the
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centre and	 reinforced by
	 the Code of Conduct for
Industial Harmony,
	 signed with
	 the MCEO
	 and the
government. As in the case of the New Frontiers policy,
both the blueprint and the code of conduct placed further
obligations on the MTUC to ensure order and peace in the
industry which essentially served the interest of capital
and undermined labour.
It was as if the MTIJC had at last found a role which
was reciprocated and supported by the government. The
MTUC and key unions embraced "employer" unionism and
undertook commitment to the pursuit of industrial harmony
and peace. While this had major implications for its role
as a representative of the organised working class, it
also rinforced and underwrote the dependent relationship
with the government. What was different from the earlier
periods was that its role as a facilitator of industrial
peace and
	 order was
	 publicly acknowledged
	 by the
government.
Notes 
[1] For detailed results of the 1969 elections see Vasil
(1972), especially Chapter IV.
[2] The full text of the blueprint is reproduced in MTVC,
GCR 1971-72:306-11, Appendix I.
[3] Perhaps, the unionists' inclination towards this line
of thinking was also boosted by talks/papers presented by
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K.S.Nijhar and P.Arulsothy, two economic lecturers at
Universiti Malaya in 1971. A summary of Nijhar's talk to
the MTUC Executive Committee in 1971 can be found in
A.Ragunathan (1975?), Who's Who in the Labour Movement
1974-75, pp.168-69, while Nijhar's paper, "Employment
Opportunities in the Second Malaysia Plan and the Role of
the MTUC" is published in MTUC and FES, Publication No.1,
pp.39-54. Arulsothy's statement on "The Second Malaysia
Plan and Labour" is also found in the latter publication,
pp. 67-71.
[4] This is mostly based on the interviews with the tarde
unionists. According to Suara Buroh (August 1969) the
idea of trade union economic/business ventures started in
New Delhi, India in the first Asian Trade Union Economic
Conference organised by the ICFTU which the MTUC took
part.
[5] See an extract of the speech by the Deputy Prime
Minister in CUEPACS' monograph entitled "Relations Between
the Government and the Trade Union Movement in Malaysia"
(undated), pp.45-49.
[6] 8ee NUPW, NVPW and Its Industrial Projects, (a
pamphlet by NUPW) (undated), 17 pp.
[7] Interview with the unionists.
(8)	 See NUPW's pamphlet just cited. By 1975 Narayanan
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was claiming that "the members of NVPW today are not only
owners of rubber estates, but partners of a textile mill,
a confectionary, a training institute, an agro industry,
and also a bank" (NUPW, General Report 1972-75:3).
(91	 Interviews with P.P.Narayanan, Yahaya Mohd.Ali, and
Jamaluddin Isa.	 See also an extract of speech by
Narayanan in Morals (c19857:154).
(101 For a summary of unions' assets during part of the
period under review see, for example, Ministry of Labour,
Labour and Manpower Report 1980:146-47.
(111	 Interviews with K.George, A.Bosco, A.V.Kathalah,
A.H.Ponniah, N.Krishnan, and S.Shahril. Such scepticism
and opposition to the policy, also formed part of the
challenge against the incumbents in the MTVC to be taken
up in the next chapter.
(12)	 For the full text of the blueprint see MTUC, GCR
1971-72:306-11, Appendix I.
[13] See Ministry of Labour (1977). A brief discussion
on the major industrial disputes in the 1970s is taken up
In the following chapter.
(14] See "Forward" to the "Code of Conduct for Industrial
Harmony", in Ministry of Labour (1975).
241
CHAPTER EIGHT 
INTERNAL Risspm , AND SPLIT UNDER WISAN NASIONAL
(197o-p1) 
As stated in the introduction of Chapter 7, the
present chapter continues the two-part discussion of the
MTIJC in the era of Barisan Nasional government. While in
the previous
	 chapter the	 focus has	 been on	 the
compromising ideology	 of the	 movement, the present
focusses the conflicts and divisions within the movement.
Apart from the compromising and increasingly
opportunistic tendency of the MTUC leaders, two other
major factors which tended to undermine and to weaken the
MTUC were the internal divisions within the movement, and
the government's increasingly anti-labour and anti-union
policy.	 During the	 1970-81 period these internal
divisions were especially evident in the mounting
criticisms and challenge against the MTUC leadership and
the withdrawal of the CUEPACB-led public sector unions
from the national centre. Further, the government's anti-
labour and anti-union policies also became more and
evident thus weakening the gains that the responsible
unionism" wing thought they had made in the first part of
the 1970s.
In this chapter I shall point out that the criticisms
and challenge against the MTUC leadership underlined a
-
growing disillusionment within the movement with the
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centre's overall compromising posture and general lack of
commitment to the cause of labour. I shall suggest that
the agitation against the leadership eventually bore some
results, including a reassessment in the MTUC which
culminated in he Cameron Highlands Declaration. Even so,
those committed to "responsible unionism" were still much
in control of the movement. This, together with the
government's increasingly tough line in dealing with
labour had the effect of undermining what had been
achieved through this process of internal arrangement and
debate. I shall also suggest that the internal divisions
and split in the MTVC were also brought about by the
cautious approach and compromising attitude on the part of
these unionists in their dealing with the government. In
the context of the government's New Economic Policy
mentioned in the previous chapter, and in the light of
some major labour issues and disputes at the time,
particularly the MAS-AEU dispute, I shall also suggest
that the policy Pursued by the government was essentially
and increasingly anti-labour and anti-union. I shall
argue that with the internal problems still persisting,
this government posture created new constraints in the way
of the MTVC-led movement.
This chapter draws on personal accounts of the
protagonists in the movement, reports and documents of the
MTVC, and comments made by other students of Malaysian
labour and trade unionism.	 In the first section I shall
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deal with the frictions within the MTUC and trace out the
challenge mounted against the established leaders of the
MTUC. The second section considers the major labour
issues and disputes and, in relation to that, the policy
of the 13arisan Nasional government towards labour and
trade unionism. In the third section I examine the
history which culminated in a split between the public and
private sector unions in the MTUC. Finally, in the fourth
section I draw the analysis to a close by pointing to the
key features of this phase of MTVC history.
8., 1. The Leadership Challenged
The growing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with
the compromising attitude of the MTUC leaders, and with
what increasingly appeared to be their lack of commitment
to the cause of labour prompted some section of the
unionists to criticize and later to mount a challenge
against this leadership. This had an impact on the
organisation, particularly in forcing the MTUC to review
its policy orientation and role. However, the continued
influence of the established and long-serving leadership
coupled with organisational weakness of the dissenters,
meant that there was little change in the overall posture
of the MTUC.
As suggested in the previous chapters, the leadership
factor was crucial in a central, coordinating organisation
like the MTUC. With the leaders of afiliated unions tog
preoccupied with the affairs of their own unions, most of
the actual work of decision-making in the MTIJC were
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undertaken or determined by a handful Qf the centre's
Principal Officials. For most of the 19705, for instance,
the key-
 positions in the MTUC were held by men like
P.P.Narayanan (NUPW), Yeoh Tech Chye (NUB), T.Narendran
(President of CUEPACS), S.J.H.Zaidi (Commonwealth Services
Employees Union, CSEU), and Yahaya Mohd.Ali (RUM).
Although Zaidi left his post as Secretary General of MTUC
in 1975, he was replaced by Yahaya Mohd.All of RUM who was
a close associate of Narendran in CUEPACS. 	 Their long
tenure in office and, in relation to that, the rapport and
links which they managed to establish with various
individuals, groups and organisations both within and
beyond the union movement, enabled them to exercise
crucial and important influence on the overall policy and
conduct of the MTUC.
The positions which these leaders continued to occupy
in the tripartite and other consultative/advisory bodies,
and their relatively easy access to the various
international trade union programmes, also allowed them to
acquire a considerable understanding and sophistication of
the mechanics and politics of trade union work.
	 Their
experience and proficiency in trade union matters (locally
and	 internationally)
	
tended	 to	 make	 them	 seem
indispensable to the movement, which in turn, enabled them
to further consolidate their ledership position, both in
their own base unions and the MTUO.
As in the previous decades there was also a
correlation between the senior leaders of the MTUC and the
relative size of their unions or the group of unions from
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which they derived their support. For example, Yeoh Tech
Chye (NUBE) and Narayanan (NUPW) who between them served
as President of MTUC, Narendran (CUEPACS group) as Deputy
President, Zaidi (CSEU and some large unions), Yahaya
Mohd.Ali (RUM) and David (TWV) as Secretary General, and
G.Perumal (NVPW) as Financial Secretary were either from
relatively large unions or groups of unions thus
mentioned. This and the fact that the number of delegates
sent by a union to the MTUC's annual (and beginning early
1970s, biennial) conference was determined by the union's
membership strength suggest that the relatively large
unions like the NUPW, RUM, NUCW, NUBE, ANULAE, NUT,
CUEPACS group, and TWV were in a preeminent position to
have their leaders elected as Principal Officials of MTUC.
In relation to this there was also the critical
question of union membership fees. As mentioned above the
MTUC continued to be preoccupied with a lack of finance
for its upkeep, and the failure of some unions to pay
their subscription fees. 	 This reinforced the importance
of the
	
large unions, who were the major financial
supporters of the MTUC. They did not hesitate to exercise
the influence that this implied. The situation in turn
tended to place an obligation on the MTVC to keep these
unions contented, mainly by way of returning or retaining
their leaders in positions which appeared commensurate
with their unions' financial role in the movement. It was
these people who had the opportunities to travel abroad to
seminars-, conferences,	 courses, workshops	 or	 study
toprs.(1) In this way they were able to build up networks
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of international importance and thus play their part with
governments who saw this as an important aspect of a newly
independent country. Similarly, in order to Justify the
union leadership and representative role of the MTUC it
was important that these unions (with their large
memberships) were kept secured within the movement, thus
further obliging the national centre to further the
specific interests of these unions with the government or
employers.	 While the situation suggests that most of the
general posture of the MTUC tended to reflect the views of
these large unions, it also explains the growing
dissatisfaction and disillusionement among some sections
with the conduct of the MTUC leaders and MTUC policies.
-
Before outlining some of the major examples of this
dissatisfaction and disillusionment it should be noted
that following the developments in the 1960s, the 1970s
also paw a good number of "younger" unionists beginning to
play an important role in their respective unions and
through this, the MTUC General Council. Among the most
prominent of these unionists were G.RaJasekaran and Harun
Nawawi of	 Metal Industry	 Employees
	 Union	 (MIEU),
A.V.Kathaiah of All Malayan Estate Staff Union (AHEM,
A.H.Ponniah of Amalgamated Union of Employees in
Government Clerical and Allied Services (AUEGCAS), and
A.Bosco of Electrical Industry Workers Union (EIWU).
Although himself a veteran unionist, K.George of the Union
of Employees Jf Trade Unions (UETU) was not only regarded
by the younger unionists as one of the foremost critics of
the "moderate" leaders of the MTUC, but also an inspiring
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figure in his own right.	 As these "younger" leaders
became better informed and critical of the compromising
attitude of the dominant MTUC leadership, they became
increasingly critical of the traditional role of the MTUC.
The dissatisfaction with the incumbents in the MTUC
was evident in a number of cases, ranging from questions
of policy to that of the attitude and conduct of the
incumbents. For example, in the case of the New Frontiers
policy discussed earlier, there was concern among some
section of unionists, including the "younger" unionists
about the whole rationale of the policy and, in
particular, the nature of involvement of certain leaders
In the business ventures. Although some of these
unionists admitted that they did not properly understand
the situation at the time, they somehow thought that it
was not proper for the movement to go into business
because of a conflict of interests involved. There were
also complaints about the alleged abuses by certain
business unionists. The top leaders of the MTLIC were also
said to be particularly busy with the Workers Bank,
spending too much time in seeing government officials,
preparing papers	 and writing	 letters regarding the
project, and thus ignoring traditional trade union
matters, such as issues of union recognition, dismissal of
workers, and other labour grievances.(2]
These doubts, and the ensuing debates surrounding
union business ventures, prompted some unionists to move
two important resolutions: first, they requested all
members of the General Council to declare their assets,
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and second, the proposed ban on direct involvement in
business. The earlier resolution was first adopted by the
General Council
	 in 1974, and later at the Special
Delegates Conference, 26-28 March 1978. The second
resolution was adopted at a seminar on "The Past, Present
and Future of the Trade Union Movement in Malaysia", 30
January - 1 February 1978.(3)
	
However, as with many
resolutions adopted by the MTUC, no concrete follow-up
occurred thus further disillusioning the critics.
According to one MTUC official interviewed by this writer,
the earlier resolution was not fully implemented because
it stated that non-compliance would subject the members
concerned to expulsion from the Council and thus was
opposed by certain members who regarded it as ultra vires
the MTUQ's constitution.
There were also doubts surrounding the seriousness
and the level of commitment of certain leaders to the
cause of labour. The real interest of the MTUC leaders
was questioned as there was no concrete effort on their
part to promote or encourage a second-echelon leadership
in the MTUC among the younger unionists despite the fact
that	 certain important	 incumbents	 had been	 in the
leadership position 	 for decades.	 (Indeed, the post of
MTUC President which since	 1965/66 session was held by
Yeoh Tech Chye was now (beginning in 1974) taken over by
P.P.Narayanan, the foremost incumbent of all. Narayanan
was to hold on to this position throughout the period
under review in this chapter).
	 Some were said to be
"trade union politicians" who always skillfully danced to
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the tune of the unions on one side, and that of the
employers' and the government's on the other (interview:
K.George, 7.1.87). Likewise, by not implementing a number
of important resolutions adopted at the delegates'
conference, a critic of the incumbents also maintained
that "the leadership did not respect the wishes of the
ordinary members" (interview: A.V.Kathaiah, 5.4.86).
One of the most common complaints levelled against
the MTUC leaders concerned the overseas programmes. Some
trade unionists on the General Council were said to have
been toa much preoccupied with these overseas programmes
which accordingly appeared as the major attraction of the
General Council meetings (interviews: A.Bosco, 9.10.86;
Mohamad Abas, 4.12.86; K.George, 7.1.87). Trade union
leaders were also criticized for stepping on each other's
foot in order to secure selection for overseas trips with
the MTVC being regarded as a kind of "travel agency" for
the unionists. Some top leaders were also alleged to have
used the travelling facilities (opportunities) in the MTUC
to "buy over" some of the critics to their side. In fact,
in his own criticism against his former colleagues in the
MTVC leadership after resigning from the MTUC in 1980,
T.Narendran, a long-time Deputy and Vice-President of MTUC
also said tha' "these trips were the main attraction, and
they take precedence over labour problems. It was a perk
to keep certain people quiet and contented" (Straits
Times, 4.1.81). So popular were these overseas programmes
among the union leaders that a number of those interviewed
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cynically suggested that "Join the Unions and See the
World" seemed to be an appropriate motto to describe the
role and image of the MTUC at the time!
Along with the overseas programmes there arose the
question of certain top leaders of the MTUC as being too
entrenched in international trade union affairs at the
expense of a number of more urgent matters at home (MTUQ,
RP, e pc 1976).(41 The President of MTUC, Narayanan, who
had long served as President of ICFTU-Asian Regional
Office and, since 1975, as President of ICFTU, was said to
have spent too much time overseas, and had little time for
labour matters at home. If attendance at the MTUC
meetings suggests something about a unionist's attitude
towards the matters being considered it may be worthwhile
to note that for the General Council's meetings, for
example, Narayanan attended 1 out of 4 meetings in 1971-
72, 3 out of 7 in 1973-74, and 3 out of 5 in 1974-76,
••
while for the more regularly-held Executive Commitee
meetings he only made 4 out of a total 26, 4 out of a
total 36, and 13 out of a total 27 in the same years
respectively.[] At the same time, his regular absence
from the meetings was said to have placed his colleagues
from the public sector unions in untenable positions (for
example, the Vice-President Narendran and the Acting
Secretary General
	 and then Secretary General Yahaya
Mohd.Ali). This resulted in what the critics regarded as
the MTUC's further neglect of the problems faced by the
workers because these individuals lacked the understanding
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of the especially industrial, private sector workers'
problems (like worker victimization, retrenchment, and the
like).
The MTUC leadership was said to be a a failure on
other matters such as the restrictive labour laws,
problems of organising the unorganised workers, and the
question of worker and trade union solidarity. Critics
within the movement, particularly the "younger" unionists
complained about the lack of effort on the part of the
dominant leadership to pursue these matters effectively.
They suggested that certain top leaders appeared to assume
a "statesmanship" role rather than that of trade unionist
(interviews: A.H.Ponniah,
	 4.12.86; A.V.Kathalah, 4.10.86;
S.Shahril Mohamad,
	
15.,8.87).	 Some	 critics
	 were
increasingly impatient with what they regarded as some
leaders' "over-compromising"
	 posture in
	 relation to
government which they maintained not only did not
contribute towards improving the situation faced by the
movement, but also tended to undermine the movement's
bargaining position.(61 There were also misgivings as to
how the Minister of Labour "had been kept informed" about
what was happening in the MTVC and hence tended to ignore
the centre's resolution and pressure (MTUC, RP, 130C 1976).
The education programme, a major programme of the
MTVC, was also a subject of internal discontent. Critics
pointed out that it lacked social and political content.
Instead,
	 it	 emphasised	 industrial
	 relations
	 and
mechanistic labour	 law matters.	 The programme was
considered by some unionists to be H imbalanced u at best,
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and a diversion from other issues of importance at worst.
A review of the programme also suggests that despite the
more regular and better organised courses and seminars,
there was a general lack of "labour" content and
creativity in the whole approach (Azizan Bahari, 1986).
The continued heavy reliance on external fundings for this
programme, particularly from the German-based Friedrich-
Ebert-8tiftung (FES) and, after 1977, from the alleged
CIA-backed Asian-American Free Labour Institute (AAFLI)
also	 raised	 doubts	 surrounding	 the	 independence,
integrity, and seriousness of the MTUC in designing and
implementing its own educational policy and programme.
While a notable critic called for caution against the
danger of certain foreign institutions (see MTUC, RP, BDC
1976), others called for a stop to the external aid.
Following some criticisms against MTUC's collaboration
with foreign agencies on grounds of possible infiltration,
a resolution, for instance, was moved in the General
Council meeting calling for a stop to the continued
external aid for the programme. Most of the Council
members, however, voted for aid "without strings attached"
(Minutes of General Council Meeting, 25.4.76). The MTUC
leaders apparently were satisfied with being able to offer
a more regular programme to the affiliates which, in some
ways, served	 j highlight the significance of the centre.
The question	 Of trade union education becoming the
movement's important vehicle in the struggle against
government anti-labour	 policy and	 the dominance of
capital, for instance, never featured in the Council's
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meetings.
Some relatively small affiliated unions were
increasingly dissatisfied with the overall modus operandi
of the MTUC, particularly in what they regarded as the
"unfair representation" of the affiliated unions in the
MTUC which allowed it to be continually dominated by a few
relatively large unions. As one of their leaders
remarked, these big unions had more representatives in the
General Council and could also send a lot more delegates
to the MTUC conference thereby enabling them to exert a
strong influence on the policy and activities of the MTUC
although, as a coordinating body, the centre should listen
to and speak fairly for all (interview: S.Shahril Mohamad,
20.9.86). There were also those who claimed that the MTVC
was too much under the influence of the public sector
unions (cited above) and other "affluent" private sector
unions, and too preoccupied with "big", image-building
issues to the extent that it had little time for, and even
_I.
insensitive to the daily and immediate struggle of the
workers at the workplace.
The increasing dissatisfaction and disillusionment
with the MTUC leadership brought some of the critical
unionists together. The question of "what's wrong with
the MTUC" began to be forcefully articulated although by
no means systematically (interview: A.H.Ponniah, 4.12.86).
At the MTVC Special Delegates Conference held in June
1976, some of the "younger" unionists argued for
accountability, and for change in the modus operandi and
policy orientation of the centre. They also called for an
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immediate improvement in the leadership (including a clean
and accountable leadership), for more services from the
MTUC, and for a democratization of the centre. 	 Their
comments and criticisms continued at the Biennial
Delegates Conference held in December 1976, and culminated
in their combined bid for office. A.V.Kathaiah contested
for the post of MTUC President against P.P.Narayanan and
Zamri Abdul Ghani, Harun Nawawi contested for Deputy
President against T.Narendran, A.H.Ponniah contested for a
Vice-President post,
	
and	 G.Rajasekaran	 for	 Deputy
Secretary General post against V.David and N.S.Wigneswaran
(MTUC, RP, BDC 1976).	 However, due to their lack of
preparation for the election, and the still strong
Influence of the incumbents, mainly through the block
votes of the big unions or groups of unions, all except
A.H.Ponniah (who also happened to be part of the "CUEPAC$
group"), failed to get elected.
The internal dissension continued after the
conference. In response to this the Executive Committee
formed a Solidarity Committee in April 1977 "to study the
grievances of affiliated unions, identify their causes and
make recommendations to resolve dissatisfaction wherever
there exists". The committee was made up of 21 unionists
wlth Narayanan serving as the chairperson, and A.Mathews,
the MTUC Education Director, as Secretary. It should be
noted that, among others, the two major groups, the
Incumbents (for example, Narayanan, Narendran, and Yahaya
Mohd. Ali), and 'the "younger" unionists (for example,
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Rajasekaran, Kathaiah, and Ponniah) were also
"represented" in the committee. As its "ground rule" the
committee called upon the union leaders and the MTUC
officials to refrain from making any press statements
"attacking one another regarding the MTVC crisis".
Twelve unions responded to the committee's call for
submission of complaints and grievances. ' Some of these
twelve unions were among the most critical of affiliated
unions of MTUC, namely, Metal Industry Employees Union,
Vnion of Employees in Trade Unions, Transport Equipment
and Allied Industries Employees Union, Electrical Industry
Workers Union, Amalgamated Union of Employees in
Government Clerical and Allied Services, Kesatuan Pekerja-
Pekerja Perpsahaan Membuat Tekstail dan Pakaian Perak,
Kesatuan Pekerja-PekerJa Perusahaan Membuat Tekstail dan
Pakaian SelangoZ, and Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Perusahaan
Kumpplan United	 Motor Works.(7)
	
Apart	 from	 the
deliberations of the committee itself, the views and
suggestions of these unions formed the basis of a
discussion paper tabled at an important seminar for the
General Council members held at Cameron Highlands in early
1978.
Meanwhile, as an indication of its readiness to
pursue some of the outstanding issues of the movement the
MTUC leadership also organised a special meeting of
Presidents, Secretaries and Treasurers of affiliated
unions in August 1977 to consider a one-day work stoppage
by all members of the affiliated unions as a protest
against government
	
persistent refusal
	 to amend the
restrictive labour laws (MTUC, OCR 1976-78:17). However,
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no decision was taken at thi$ meeting and there was no
concrete follow-up forthcoming at the General Council
which met at the end of September of the same year. The
Council decided "to indefinitely postpone the proposed
action" as "a specially constituted tripartite body was
looking into various amendments proposed by the MTUC",
although the biggest tripartite body, the NJLAC, was not
in session for some time (see MTUC, GCR 1976-78: 17, 28-
29).
The above situation suggested that the divisions
within the MTUC were becoming more vocal, although there
were no substantive changes achieved. The fact that the
Solidarity Committee was led by the incumbents who had
been the target of criticisms in the first place raised
doubts in some section about the sincerity and seriousness
of the MTUC to seek redress for grievances or to implement
decisions. This and the continued dissatisfaction with
the leadership prompted some unions to disaffiliate from
the centre at the end of 1977. Among these were the Metal
Industry Employees Union, All Malayan Mining Industry
Staff Union, Transport Equipment and Allied Industry
Employees Union,	 Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja
	 Perusahaan
Kumpulan United Motor Works, and Kesatuan PekerJa-Pekerja
Perancanq Keluarga Negara (MTVC, GCR 1976-78:88-89). Some
of these "rebel" unions from the private sector soon came
up with the idea of setting up a new coordinating body,
the Congress of Industrial Unions (CIU). The proposed
CIU, however, failed to establish itself allegedly because
of the refusal of the Registrar of Trade Unions to
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register it as a trade union, as requested by the
unionists concerned (interview: G.Rajasekaran, 12.8.87).
In any case, although the challenge did not result in any
significant change in the MTUC leadership, the impact of
this challenge, together with the general dissatisfaction
within the movement itself, forced the MTUC to review its
policy orientation and role. This was undertaken in a
three-day seminar involving the members of the MTUC
General Council.
The Cameron Highlands Declaration
Following the deliberations and recommendations of
the Solidarity Committee a three-day seminar beginning on
30 .January on the theme "The Past, Present and Future of
the Labour Movement in Malaysia" was held at Cameron
Highlands for the members of the General Council. The
seminar discussed and debated the main issues of concern
and the complaints made by the unionists. All this was
summed up in a charter called "The Cameron Highlands
Declaration" which was adopted by the General Council on
31 March 1978.(81
The charter spelt out the aspiration of the MTUC-led
movement which included the desire to play an important
role in the nation's development plan; the importance of
freeing labour from "the shackles of the restrictive and
obnoxious labour laws"; the urgent need for "a philosophy
of political trade unionism"; the importance of trade
union solidarity around the national centre, and the
necessity to cooperate with the government "to improve the
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income, quality of life and social status of the working
people". Following this the charter also outlined the
proposed programmes or issues to be pursued or addressed
by the MTUC, which, apart from the ones mentioned below,
also included membership loyalty and effective
participation, an efficient administration of the national
centre, organising the unorganised, and the need "to mount
an intensive	 campaign to
	 remove the obnoxious and
restrictive labour laws".
On "politics" the charter criticized the past "drift
without aim" and the "anti-political posture" of the MTUC
which it said had alienated the workers. It called for
the establishment of a political bureau to develop "a
philosophy of political unionism" and to enhance social
and political awareness amongst the workers which it
believed would "uphold the democratic values of the
movement and ensure equality, dignity and fraternity of
man". The way the bureau was going to function, and what
"a philosophy of political unionism" really meant was not
clear although a brief mention was made about it being "an
Instrument for the attainment of a cohesive force".
Indeed, it should also be noted that despite the
proposals, and resolutions of a series of seminars and
discussions on politics held in the 1970s, they were not
significantly reflected in the charter.[9]
On the question of the MI= leadership the charter
stressed the need for better rapport, unity of purpose and
solidarity among and between the leaders, the affiliated
unions and the workers. 	 The leadership was urged to
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display qualities of honesty and integrity as well as
"greater dynamism, dedication, sacrifice and the will to
protect the interests of labour". In direct reference to
the (earlier) complaints and grievances, there was an
explicit call for the leadership to place due regard to
the democratic procedures, to membership rights,
aspirations and real problems, as well as to the question
of the leadership's dedication to the cause of labour.
Likewise, the charter reminded the leaders to restrict
their outside (international) commitments in order to give
more time to the tasks and challenges at home.
The charter also stressed the importance of the
educational programme to bring about an "enlightened
membership and dedicated leadership". As the existing
programme was said to be ineffective, a more systematic
and vigorous programme was proposed in its place. A
proposal was made urging the MTUC to coordinate the
educational programmes conducted by various organisations
in the country to "supplement and complement the programme
of the national centre" rather than to undermine it.
The charter also outlined what appeared to be some
points ol caution for the trade unionists, particularly
those who were active in the New Frontiers or union
economic ventures some of which had been in existence for
nearly a decade. It stressed the need for these economic
ventures to be guided by such economic considerations as
employment generation and fair redistribution of income.
Joint ventures with "capitalist oriented groups" was
opposed except in cases where the necessary "know-how" was
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needed, and even here, the unions were urged to ensure
that the ventures (or the enterprises) came under the
"absolute control" of labour. Apart from urging principal
union officials to refrain from holding managerial
positions in the enterprises, emphasis was also given to
the need "to ensure that corrupt practices are kept in
check".
To a certain extent the charter reflected some of the
earlier comments
	 and criticisms
	 made
	
against
	 the
leadership.	 Examples of this continuity of criticism
included the promise to mount a campaign against the
restrictive legislation,	 the question	 of leadership
(including a call for their reduced commitment to
international trade union work), and the cautions relating
to union economic or business ventures. In this context,
even though the challengers were unable to make any
significant inroad into the MTUC top leadership positions,
and some of them even withdrew from the MTUC altogether,
their grievances
	 and criticisms nevertheless had an
important impact on the movement.
The situation also suggests that there was discontent
and, at least, a tacit recognition among the members pf
the General Council about the state of the movement. It
should be noted that the charter represented an important
moment of "self-criticism". The fact that it was the
incumbents themselves who presided over the declaration,
among other things, also served as a testament of their
own weaknesses.	 It also demonstrated the impact of the
critical mood (outlined earlier) in the MTUC so that the
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leaders were prepared, at least rhetorically, to reassess
their earlier positions and to adopt a new posture.
In any case, as with the previous charters and policy
statements, there was a vagueness on specific strategies
for change. For instance, the call for the MTUC to
coordinate the educational activities conducted by the
various
	
organisations
	 clearly	 posed
	 practical
organisational and policy problems. Apart from the fact
that those various organisations were under no obligation
to agree to any of MTUC's schemes, there was nothing to
suggest that the organisations concerned also subscribed
to the centre's educational policy and philosophy. The
suggestion that labour's "absolute control" must be the
condition	 for	 any	 labour-capitalist	 joint-economic
ventures, and the notion of labour's ultimate economic and
••
industrial ventures should "serve as a force against the
growing aggregated power capitalists who are amalgamating
into larger and more powerful economic force" was as much
rhetorical as unrealistic. In like manner, the charter's
call for worker participation in management (which would
accordingly "reduce industrial unrest, improve
productivity and give labour a say in the running of the
enterprise"); its clear endorsement of the role of the
leadership in economic ventures; and its request to union
principal officials to refrain from holding managerial
positions in the enterprises, served to reinforce and to
underline the centre's earlier position with respect to
the New Frontiers policy. 	 Its assertion that if labour
was to play a significant role "it must be free from the
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shackles of the restrictive and obnoxious labour laws
which have over the years eroded labour's rights" implied
that little could be expected from the movement as there
was nothing to suggest that the government would soften
its line on labour and the unions.
The Charter represented a high point in the debate
that had developed about the MTUC organisation and
leadership. A group of dissident union leaders within the
MTUC mounted a critique of the MTUC, challenging its long-
establr ished role as a dependent and petitioning body,
incapable of providing effective leadership to the trade
union movement as a whole.
	 Further it successfully
documented the corruption and nepotism of the leadership.
Even so, this was a minority position within the
leadership and the group did not have sufficient votes to
remove the long serving leaders from office. As a result
their challenge, while important, amounted to little. As
soon as the MTUC faced a new challenge from the
government, the incumbent leadership resorted to the old
and ineffective methods of coping with such challenges,
namely petitioning and promising cooperation with the
government. The foresight of the Charter was forgotten
and the dependent relationship between the MTUC and the
government underwritten.
The Charter was soon put to the test when the
government introduced a further round of coercive and
263
restrictive measures. 	 Trade union members were detained
under the Internal Security Act, 1960. 	 The Airline
Employees Union (AEU) was deregistered, and afterward the
government introduced	 even more	 restrictive . labour
legislation.	 As will be seen, the movement was unable to
respond to	 these challenges,	 except in	 the usual
petitioning way. The government's coercive measures and
the legal constraints against the unions, as well as the
Internal division within the MTUC itself, contributed to
the movement's overall state of apathy and lack of
resistance to this new round of repression.
8.2. Labour Di . ,outes and the 1980 Laws
The government's increasingly tough labour policy
contributed to Incapacity and general weakness of the
MTUC-led movement. The 1971 labour legislation which
prohibited unions from organising strikes on matters
pertaining to union recognition claims and others of so-
called managerial concerns (such as hiring, dismissal,
retrenchment, promotion, transfer, and assignment or
allocation of duties) was effective. The relatively low
levels of strike figures shown below point to this.
Year
	
Workers	 Person-days
involved
	
lost
1970 1,216 1,867
1971 5,311 20,265
1972 9,701 33,455
1973 14,003 40,866
1974 21,830 103,884
1975 12,124 45,749
1976 20,040 108,562
1977 7,783 73,729
1978 6,792 35,032
1979 5,629 24,868
1980 3,402 19,554
1981 4,832 11,850
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Table 8.2
	 STRIKES: NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED 
AND PERSON-DAYS LOST, 1970-81 
So urc es : 1. Ministry of Labour, Handbook of
Labour Statistics, 1977
2. Ministry of Labour, Labour and
Manpower Reports, 1980; 1984/85
Except for two years (1974 and 1976), the number of
person-days lost due to strikes did not exceed 100,000.
When compared with the strike figures of the preceding
decade (Table 5.3), during which time only three years
recorded-a total person-days lost of below 100,000, this
was indeed an important achievement for the government.
Not even during the period of the second Emergency with
the Indonesian Confrontation did the person-days lost due
to strike fall below the 100,000 person-days per year.
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At the same time, the government's NEP drive, the
compromising posture of the MTUC, and the closer
tripartite cooperation, particularly through the Code of
Conduct for Industrial Harmony (1975) played a part in
restraining unions.
	 Likewise, the unions were influenced
by the unsettled mood within the MTUC at the time.
Although labour disputes continued during the period under
consideration, these disputes confronted increasingly
tough government policies. This had the effect of further
weakening the MTW-led movement.
The Case of the Eleqtronics Workers 
One such dispute concerned the persistent refusal of
the Registrar
	 of Trade	 Unions to
	
allow for	 the
unionisation of the country's electronics workers.
	 In
this case, attempts were made in early 1974 to organise
and bring
	 together the country's growing number of
electronics workers under the Electrical Industry Workers
Union (EIWU), an affiliate of the MTUC. However, in
response to strong employer disapproval, the Registrar of
Trade Unions (RTU) ordered the EIWU to stop recruiting the
electronics workers.(10)
	
With the discretionary powers
provided him, including the right to interpret the term
"similar", the RTU ruled that electrical and electronics
workers did not come under "similar" industry or trade as
provided for by the law and, therefore, could not le
brought together under the same union. This was despite
the fact that .electrical goods and electronics were
classified under the same industrial category by the
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Malaya industrial Classifification 1972 (compiled by the
Department of Statistics) and also by the Dictionary on
Occupational Classification 1973 (published by the
Ministry of Labour and Manpower).
Efforts by the MTIJC (through its Penang Division) to
assist the electronics workers to form and register a
national union of electronics workers were also frustrated
by the government. Despite meeting the basic formalities
the application to register the union did not receive a
response from the RTU, although the application for the
registration of the new union was submitted by the union
leaders in May 1978 (A.Balamohan, 1985).
The problem went beyond the question of definition of
"similar" trade	 or industry	 or any	 administrative
formalities. The labour-intensive nature of the
electronics industry made it especially appealing to the
government which needed employment for the country's
especially large pool of unskilled Malay labour. Apart
from providing various incentives to electronics
multinationals, including a guarantee of low labour costs,
the government also had to make sure that the fast growing
number of workers in the industry were well under control
and would not pose a threat to these overseas firms. From
1970 to 1981 total employment in the electronics industry
was estimated to have grown from 577 to about 40,000, with
the wages/salaries bill grew from M$1.4 million to M$333
million (cited in SEAD, Electronics and Development:
Scotland and Malaysia in the International Electronics
Industry).
	
More specificlly, between 1971 and 1974, the
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total employment in manufacturing of electronic components
was estimated to have risen by 18,000, making it by far
the highest in Asia (Linda Y.C.Lim, 1980). In its letter
to the ILO in mid-1980 the government defended its
position by stating that apart from the question of
membership scope of the EIWU, its rejection of the various
appeals by the EIWU to unionise the electronics workers
was because: 1) "that the electronic industry plays an
Important socio-economic role (in attracting foreign
investment and in reducing unemployment) and that the
question of unionisation of its workers should be dealt
with in a cautious manner at the present stage of the
country's economic development, where foreign investments
are greatly needed", and 2) that the EIWU would be "too
unwieldy" (stating that electronics workers numbered
around 42,000 in 46 establishments) and this "would create
a disincentive for foreign investors".(11) The concern of
the government was with protecting the interest of
capital, and with reducing unemployment. Despite its
pledges to the MTUC and the unions to encourage the growth
of democratic and "responsible" trade unions, the
government was not prepared to observe even the basic
right of labour to organise when such rights were viewed
as a potential threat to the interests of capital.
The situation also showed the incapacity of the MTUC
to render any effective assistance to labour and the
unions. The MTUC appeared to have exhausted its efforts
with the application to the RTU for the registration of a
National Union of Workers in the Electronic Industry, and
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with the complaints submitted to the ILO (see MTUC, GCRs
1976-78:99-91; 1979-80:164-69).
	 The centre could not
organise any effective challenge against the RTU's
delaying tactic and arbitrary ruling. Even at the end of
the period under study the Secretary General of MTUC could
only report that "the application for registration of this
union has been pending with the Ministry of Labour and
Manpower for
	 years without being given a positive,
definite answer..." (MTUC, GCR 1981-82:12-13). Despite
the fact-
 that this government stance violated the very
spirit of its own sponsored code of conduct (1975), the
same report of the Secretary General reaffirmed the MTUC's
commitment to the concept of tripartism, which again
underlined the centre's weak and copromising posture.
TIe MA-AEU DisAult
Another major labour dispute which highlighted the
government's hostile attitude towards labour was the
dispute involving the Airline Employees Union (AEU) on one
side, and the Malaysian Airlines System (MAS) management
and the government on the other.[12] Apart from this,
just as in the electronics case, the dispute also served
to underline the ever-compromising postures of the MTUC
leadership. This dispute initially was focussed on the
issue of pay and conditions of lower grade MAS workers
which the union claimed were below those of the other
neighbouring airlines.	 Upon the expiry of the earlier
collective agreement	 the AEU submitted a number of
proposals for inclusion in a new agreement. In December
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1978, to further their claims, some of the workers
resorted to a "work-to-rule" and refused overtime work.
Following a deadlock in the negotiations, the MAS
management referred the matter to the Ministry of Labour
for conciliation which commenced on 4 January 1979. The
workers, meanwhile, agreed to resume their normal duties.
At this point, what otherwise appeared to be a normal
labour dispute
	 began	 to	 escalate	 into	 a	 major
confrontation between the union and the combined force of
the HAS management and the government. This followed a
directive by the RTU's on 8 January 1979 that the AEU
deregister 874 of its members who participated in the
earlier illegal industrial action ("work-to-rule") while
the conciliation was still in progress in the Industrial
Relations Department of the Ministry of Labour. The
action by these MAS workers was said to be illegal because
the procedures required by the legislation prior to an
industrial action had not been complied with. At the same
time, since MAS was a public utility service, the workers
were not allowed to refuse overtime. Provoked by the
RTU's ruling the union refused to attend the next session
of the conciliation talks, but instead, resumed its "work-
to-rule" and boycott of overtime. The situation worsened
with HAS suspending 213 workers and dismissing another
119. At the same time the RTU also served a "show cause"
letter to the AEU on 27 January as to why the union should
not be deregistered. This was followed by the Minister of
Labour ordering
	 a freeze of the union's funds and
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restricting all its activities, except those in connection
with replying to the RTU's "show cause" letter. In a
further escalation of the dispute the government took the
pnprecedented action of detaining 22 union activists and
Donald U'ren, the Asian Representative of the
International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) who was
assisting the AEU, under the Internal Security Act, 1960
on 15 February.
	 Another ITF official, Johann Hauf was
forced to leave the country. To deal with what was
regarded as a possible risk to the safety of passengers
and to preserve the image of the country, the government
also decided to temporarily cancel all MAS flights.
As a result of the efforts of the ITF, which had
rendered assistance to the AEU, the dispute received wide
media (international) coverage. This resulted in letters
and telegrams of fraternal support from transport workers
elsewhere. As a show of their solidarity with the AEU,
the airport workers in both England and Australia refused
to service MAS aircrafts, resulting in one HAS DC-10
becoming stranded at Sydney Airport. Hussein Onn, the
Malaysian Prime Minister strongly condemned the ITF which
he considered to be a "neo-dictatorial" organisation whose
aim was to destroy the economy of those countries which
were not
	 prepared to
	
succumb to it (Hussein Onn,
1979).(13)
Unlike the ITF the MTUC was a late supporter of the
AEU, and, as it subsequently admitted, only first learnt
about the dispute through the media. The AEU, which
according to the government had 3,700 members, was not a
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benefit affiliate of the MTUC at the time because it had
failed to pay the previous two years' affiliation fees.
MTUC report states that the union did not ask for any
assistance from the centre and also did not respond to the
centre's request for formal letter seeking the centre's
Intervention and assistance in the dispute (see MTUC, GCR
1979-80:90-103). The same report maintains that the
centre nevertheless decided to intervene in the dispute
because of what it considered to be its duty, "imposed on
it by it being the national centre committed to protecting
and advancing the higher cause of labour".
It should be noted that unlike the Railway Dispute of
the previous decade, local union support was limited.
Only four port unions in Kelang came out in support of the
AEU, the Uniol of Port Workers, Union of Employees of Port
Authority (Kesatuan Kakitangan Lembaga Pelabuhan), Senior
Officers' Association Lembaga Pelabuhan (PASU), and Union
of Employees
	
of Port	 Ancillary Services
	
Suppliers
Pelabuhan Kelang (Hussein Onn, 1979).	 Together these
unions formed an Action Committee which urged the
government ministries concerned to immediately withdraw
the various actions taken against the AEU or face their
Joint sympathy action. However, the government responded
to this threat by directing the unions to dissolve their
actipn committee or face deregistration under the Trade
Unions Ordinance which prohibited unions forming such
commitees without the approval of the RTU.(14]
The MTW's intervention was in the form of
resolutions and meetings with government leaders, urging
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them to release the detainees and to resolve the dispute
amicably.	 Th MTUC was very much on the sidelines during
the dispute. Irrespective of the affiliate status of the
AEU, the MTUC was unaware of the early stages of the
dispute which reflected the centre's isolation from day to
day union concerns. This isolation also explains why the
AEU relied more on the foreign-based ITF for assistance
rather than on the national trade union centre.(151 This
in turn reflects the sort of confidence a union in dispute
(such as the AEU) tended to have in the MTUC.
Action by the MTVC tended to be by the President,
acting without reference to the representative structures
of the MTUC. The President of MTUC, P.P.Narayanan went
against a decision of the Executive Committee and met the
Prime Minister alone to discuss the dispute. This broke,a
decision by the Committee, to the effect that any meeting
with the Prime Minister should also be attended by other
members of the Executive Committee (Minutes of General
Council Meeting, 18.12.79). On another Narayanan also
dispatched a telegram to Bob Hawke, the leader of the
Australian Council of Trade Unions requesting the latter
to arrange for the release of the MAS plane that was
stranded at Sydney Airport.(161
	 The telegram, copies of
which were also sent to other international trade
unionists, also gave the impression that there was no
cause for concern about the union activists and the ITF
Asian Representative detained by the Malaysian government
since, according to Narayanan, "under the Malaysian ISA if
-
there are no specific charges the detainees must be
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released as soon as questioning is over" and that "in
those cases where there are charges preferred, they will
be produced in a court of law and given an opportunity for
legal defence". In these circumstances, if it had not
been for the ITF support and the impact of international
media, the government might not have been under pressure
to release the detainees as it did on 26 April 1979.
This stance by the President was consistent with the
dependent and client status of the MTUC, although it was
counter to the public stance frequently adopted by the
MTVC. The positions held by Malaysian unionists in the
International labour bodies were often noted by the MTUC
with a sense of pride and achievement. Narayanan himself
was the ICFTU President although in this dispute he was
unprepared to use his office to express support for the
AEU, and instead called for a softening of the ITF's line.
In this case, perhaps it was not the question of
international support for the AEU or pressure against the
government but rather the form of support or pressure that
really mattered. For the President and his supporters
there seemed to be a view that international pressure
should be confined to verbal or written protests and not
action, especially grounding an aeroplane. Against this
background, the call to end the action at a time when
union activists	 were still under detention and the
government continued to threaten the union and its
sympathisers pointed to the MTUC's ineffectiveness and
irrelevance, as far as individual unions were concerned.
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The MTUC President's interpretation of the "Malaysian
ISA" and his defence of the country's system of justice
seemed especially odd when it had already become common
knowledge that the ISA, since its introduction in 1960,
had been arbitrarily used by the government to detain its
political opponents and critics. For example, in late
1974, following student uprisings in support of the
squatters and rubber small-holders the government
retaliated by sending police and troops to the university
campuses and arrested and detained a number of prominent
lecturers, student
	 leaders and activists, and youth
_
leaders under the ISA (see Hassan Karim and Siti Nor
Hamid, 1984). Whilst this incident did not seem to elicit
any serious response from the MTUC (as could be judged
from its reports and statements at the time), the idea of
ISA detainees being allowed a legal defence in any court
of law as suggested by the telegram would appear to be
wishful thinking on the part of author of the telegram.
In addition, it should be noted that the Minister of Home
Affairs had considerable discretionary powers to arrest
and detain opponents to the government. Thus, when the
MTLIC finally acted in relation to the dispute, it did so
in a questionable manner, more it seemed, to please the
government than to help strengthen the union's position.
The event fur her showed the incapacity of the MTUC-led
movement to unite and to extend any meaningful support to
a union engaged in a dispute even when the union, and for
that matter, the movement as a whole, was faced with such
dangerous and unprecedented actions from the authorities.
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Apart from demonstrating the crippling impact of the
existing labour legislation on the trade union movement,
the MAS-AEU dispute also exhibited an increasingly tough
posture by the government towards unions. There was an
unprecedented detention of union leaders and activists for
engaging in a trade dispute, and the dismissal of workers
(35 of whom were not reinstated). On 14 April 1979 the
AEU was deregistered and the membership later split into
two unions -- the HAS Employees Union, and the Foreign
Airlines Employees Union, registered in August 1979 and
April 1980 respectively. With no union to represent them,
and no other possible options seemed available to purs-ue
their claims, the MAS workers had no choice but to accept
the revised and final salary scale offered to them on 15
April.
The 1980 Labour Laws 
The government's tough line towards labour reached a
new height in 1980 with the introduction of yet another
round of amendments to the labour laws. Although much of
the impact of the new legislation is not within the scope
of this study a brief look at some major amendments shows
clearly that labour was further forced on the defensive
and into	 a much	 weaker position	 in relation	 to
capital.(17) The amendments involved two major labour
laws, the Trade Unions Ordinance, 1959, and the Industrial
Relations Act, 1967. The new legislation, effective from
30 May 1980, underlined the government's determination to
continue to discipline labour and the unions. 	 The new
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legislation, for example, redefined "strike" to include a
reduction in work; required that at least :two-thirds of
members (instead of a simple majority) give their consent
by secret ballot to take industrial action; required the
union concerned to submit the result of the secret ballot
to the Registrar of Trade Unions who then had seven days
to decide whether the proposed action would contravene the
law; and restricted picketing to workers who were directly
In the employment of the establishment concerned. In what
appeared to be a government aim at restricting the unions
from affiliating with consultative or similar bodies
within or outside the country, a situation which proved
difficult for the government in the MAS-AEU dispute, prior
written permission of the RTU (and subject to such
conditions as he may impose) was required before any such
affiliation was possible. Further, the legislation
prohibited the use of union funds for "political objects",
with the latter term being so narrowly defined as to
render impossible even political education, holding of
Political meetings of any kind, distribution of political
literature or
	 documents, and giving support to any
political candidate.
The new legislation also empowered the Minister of
Labour, with the agreement of the Minister for Home
Affairs, to suspend any union for up to six months, "where
in his opinion such trade union has acted or is being used
for purposes prejudicial to or incompatible with security,
or public order" and that this suspension order is final
and conclusive.	 As with the previous legislation, the
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powers of the RTU were further increased. For example,
the RTU could now enter union premises with a search
warrant obtained from a Magistrate to search, inspect,
examine, seize or detain any documents or articles of the
union. Unionist could be deregistered in illegal strikes,
and elected union officials could be removed from office.
The new legislation also provided legal sanctions to the
employers to communicate directly with and to present
their own views or versions of disputes to union members.
The proposed bill (before being passed by the
Parliament) drew strong verbal criticism from the MTUC and
the unions. Memoranda outlining the centre's stand on the
proposed legislation were forwarded to various individuals
and parties such as the Minister of Labour, the Prime
Minister, the Members of Parliament, and the ILO (see
MTUC, GCR 1979-80).	 A Special Delegates' Conference was
also convened	 on 24	 March 1980 when a number of
resolutions were adopted. The MTUC's attempts through the
NJLAC to	 have	 the	 proposed	 bill	 amended,	 were
unsuccessful. Further, nothing substantial was gained by
the movement c rom the four-hour meeting with the Prime
Minister and his other Cabinet colleagues on 28 March and
from the picket staged by the General Council members in
front of the Parliament House on 3 April, the day when the
proposed bill was being debated.
The MTL/C continued its campaign against the
legislation, with somewhat more vigour than the past.
Following the earlier decision by the Special Delegates
Conference a nation-wide picket was planned by the MTUC
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for 21 April 1980, while the Secretary General had the
matter brought up to the attention of the ILO. The
Special Delegates Conference held on 24 March 1980 also
declared 1 May 1980 as a "Black Day" for labour; that from
4 April to 1 May 1980 the workers should symbolise their
protest by wearing a black arm-band; the MTUC would
withdraw its representatives on the various government-
sponsored advisory boards including the NJLAC; and that
the centre would continue to campaign for the removal of
the anti-labour provisions (MTUC, GCR 1979-80). However,
as in the past, lack of unity among the unions, and the
lack of commitment on the part of the leaders made the
campaign ineffective. At the same time, some controversy
surrounding the proposed picket and the fear of a possible
government retaliation resulted in the proposal (to launch
a nation-wide	 picket) being quashed by the General
Council.	 In fact, while no effective challenge against
the new legislation was mounted, the controversy
surrounding the proposed picket brought into the open the
divisions between the public and the private sector unions
in the MTUC. This culminated in a split between the two
broad groups of unions in the MTUC, which further weakened
the movement.
8 1 . The MTUC-CUEPACS "Split" 
The weakness of the MTUC-led movement was also due to
the internal divisions, particularly between the public
and the private sector unions, which culminated in the
disaffiliation of most of the CUEPACS-led public service
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unions from the MTUC in 1980 and 1981. Although there is
no evidence to su ggest a well-coordinated action, on the
part of the public service unions concerned, the events
nevertheless point yet again, to the incapacity of the
MTUC to forge a united movement.
As seen in the earlier chapters, both the public
and the "moderate" private sector union leaders, generally
enjoyed a cordial relationship with the colonial and post-
colonial governments, were able to exert a strong
Influence in the MTUC-led movement. This was reflected in
their control of the MTVC leadership which, tended to
reproduce a
	 "moderate"	 and	 responsible"	 MTUC-led
movement. It was in fact this MTUC leadership, which had
been the subject of mounting criticisms and challenge
discussed earlier.
The long-standing and close alliance between these
two groups of unionists in the MTUC should be seen in
terms of their similar views and approach to. major policy
issues, particularly 	 "political unionism" and labour
militancy. While both the "moderate" private sector
unionists, led by Narayanan (and his powerful NUPW), and
the public service unionists appeared to exhibit a similar
dislike for "political unionism", they also showed similar
reluctance to resort to actions which they considered
might provoke pr antagonise the government.
At this juncture, it is important to note that in the
case of the public sector unionists this stance should
also be seen in the context of their employment relation
with the government.	 As public employees the unionists
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were very aware of the government expectations of them as
well as the restrictions imposed on them by rules and
_
regulations.	 In	 practice	 such	 expectations
	
and
restrictions did not necessarily keep public employees
away from "politics".	 A number of the union leaders,
especially the	 teachers were influential social and
political figures.
	
A number had always been actively
involved in electoral politics, particularly in the ruling
parties. At the same time, since any "political" action
or even "political" opinion on the part of these unionists
which did not dovetail with government policy could be
construed as undermining the government these unionists
tended to distance themselves from issues of a so-called
"political" nature.
For the "moderate" private sector unionists who were
critical or opposed to union involvement in "politics",
the position of public employees was often taken as an
important leverage against any tendency to push for a pro-
"politics" line within the MTUC. This mutually critical
or even hostile attitude towards "politics" tended to
bring the two broad groups of unionists together. Their
voting strength in the MTUC conferences ensured their
dominance of the MTUC leadership. 	 In like manner, they
also tended to complement each other with their
"moderating" intermediary role in major labour disputes,
and in their persistent reluctance to take any active
measures
	 to	 oppose	 the	 government's	 restrictive
legislation.
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The close alliance between these two groups of
unionists could also be seen in the context of their need
for each other if only to consolidate their own position
and importance within the movement as well as in their own
base unions. The public service unionists, for instance,
seemed prepared to support the "moderate" private sector
unionists as this would ensure the "moderate" posture of
the MTUC itself regarding the government. At the same
time, educated public service unionists and their ratHer
"professional" approach to trade union work, were also
seen by the "moderate" private sector unionists as an
important component of the MTUC leadership's relations
with the government. As admitted by a leading "moderate"
private sector unionist, the active involvement of the
more educated public sector unionists in the MTUC was much
welcomed by those in the private sector as this was
thought to enhance the image of the movement, particularly
in its relationship with the employers group and the
government (interview: P.P.Narayanan, 14.1.87). In this
way they were able to reproduce their ledership positions
in the movement for a relatively long time.
Even so there were frictions between the unionists
(and their	 unions) which	 appeared in the form of
public/private sector union division. The feeling that
the MTVC was controlled by the civil servants, the
complaints about too much use of English at the expense of
the vernacular languages, for instance, were all related
to the employment backgrounds, role, or influence of the
public service employees in the MTUC.
	 In any case,
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because of the apparently undisputed leadership of the
"moderate" unionists within the MTUC, and the relatively
••
secure position of the public service unions themselves,
such frictions surfaced from time to time but were defined
t-) y the participants as little more than "family disputes".
This, however, did not last, and in 1980 and 1981,
following the controversy over the struggle against the
government's new legislation, the frictions between the
private sector and the public service unionists (and their
unions) again resurfaced. This time they culminated in
the withdrawal of most of the public service unions (which
were also the members of CUEPACS) from the MTUC. Although
the controversy itself proved significant in this
withdrawal, two other important developments suggest that
the frictions between the private sector and public
service unions were already assuming a new dimension and
contributed to their eventual split.
One of these developments concerned the steady
weakening of the position of CUEPACS, the federation of
public service unions, in relation to the government as
employer. Towards the end of the 1970s and the beginning
of the -1980s, in part due to the ineffectiveness of the
MTUC itself (particularly in the face of tighter
legislation from the government), and in part due the
alleged lack of support of the national centre for the
case of the public service unionists, some public service
unionists became disillusioned with the national centre
which in turn contributed to the split. 	 As indicated
earlier, a series of events since the mid-1960s served to
283
warn the public sector unions as a whole that the
government was always in the position to control their
activities whenever this was considered necessary in the
"national interest". This included the tightening of the
labour legislation in 1965, the government's rejection for
the registration of NUEPACS as a single national union
catering for the entire civil service in 1967,(181 and
the amendment of the labour legislation in 1969, which
prohibited the public or quasi-public sector unions from
affiliating with any organisation whose membership was not
confined to public employees, and the consequent forced
disaffiliation of these unions from the MTUC.
In another move following the declaration of a state
of Emergency in 1969, the government also suspended the
National Whitley Council, the forum for joint negotiations
between the Official side and the CUEPACS-dominated Staff
side which had been in operation since the 1950s.
Although the government later agreed to set up a new
negotiating forum in 1973, the National Joint Council
(NJC), and CUEPACS was able to resume its collective
bargaining role under it, this role was very restricted.
Eventually, vi a government circular in 1979 (Service
Circular No.2 of 1979) the right of public service unions
to negotiate wages was officially removed and even the
right to negotiate conditions of employment was reduced to
that of only "giving views".
The government's increasingly tough posture in
dealing with the public service unions could also be seen
in the case of the dispute over the implementation of the
-
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new salaries schemes recommended by the Ibrahim Ali
Salaries Commission
	 in 1975.(19)
	 Named after its
chairperson, the
	 Ibrahim Ali	 Commission was a new
commission formed by the government on 10 March 1975 for
the purpose of reviewing and coordinating all the
recommendations by the earlier commissions/committees.(20)
The commission submitted its report to the government on 6
June 1975, but the government was reluctant to implement
the recommendations. This was on the grounds of the heavy
financial burden of such recommendations. Such a response
angered the public service unions. Following this, their
federation, CUEPACS decided to set 1st August 1976 as the
deadline for a positive government response, failing which
it threatened to take industrial action. However, despite
a new deadline and a claim that nearly 75 percent of the
affiliates had obtained the mandate for the action, the
CUEPACS leaders decided not to proceed with their earlier
threat.	 In line with the established MTUC leadership
practice they	 had been exchanging letters with the
government Chief Secretary, and holding meetings with the
Prime Minister.	 When the government later rejected the
Commission's report, and instead, decided to implement a
new Cabinet Report prepared by its Cabinet Committee
(which was led by the Deputy Prime Minister), CUEPACS
(which had not been consulted on the new report) withdrew
and decided to let each union make their own decisions
with regard
	 to the
	 new report	 (see Suara Buroh,
February/March 1977).
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Such government actions threatened the trade union
Status of CUEPACS and weakened its bargaining position.
They also contributed to a blurring of the line which
(legally) differentiated the federation from the society-
status and "society conscious" MTUC. The situation,
particularly in the case of the 1981 legislation (which
prohibited public officers and statutory authorities'
employees in the managerial or professional groups or who
were engaged in a confidential or security capacity from
joining or becoming members of any trade union), tended to
encourage the public service unions to look to the MTUC
for broader trade union support for their cause. The MTUC
was expected to make representation about the public
service unions' case with the government. On this
occasion the centre was seen as uncommitted and unwilling
to pursue the public service union case. This engendered
dissatisfaction among some sections of the public service
unions and contributed to a heightening of the divisions
within the movement.
While CUEPACV campaign with the government over the
implementation of the new salaries underlined their
incapacity and unwillingness to pressure the government,
the public service unionists also seemed 'concerned with
what they perceived to be a possible "dangerous" shift in
the political inclination of the MTUC which might provoke
the government and hence undermine their position. 	 In
this respect the public service unionists saw an
increasing influence of opposition politics in the MIIUC
which some felt would not further their case with the
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government. In particular, there were misgivings among
these unionists over the role of such outspoken trade
unionists as V.David (of the TWU) who replaced Yahaya Mohd
Ali (of the public service group) as MTUC Secretary
General and those unionists associated with him such as
A.V.Kathaiah, (AMES()) who was elected as the Deputy
Secretary General,
	 and Zainal Rampak (TWU) who was
reelected as one of the Vice-Presidents of MTUC in the
centre's 1979 line-up. While David's long career as a
trade unionist (including a leader of MTUC) and opposition
politician was nothing new (it should be noted that his
[opposition) political career dated back in the late
1950s), he had never held a key leadership position in the
MTUC prior to the term commencing in 1979. It was perhaps
David as the Secretary General or Chief Executive of MTUC,
and Kathaiah as his deputy in charge of the day-to-day and
overall condpct and administration of the centre, that was
a caus p of concern. David, Kathaiah, and Zainal had also
contested in	 the recent	 1978 General	 Election as
candidates of the (opposition) Democratic Action Party
(DAP). The "David factor" was also seen by some sections
of public service unionists as something which would
radicalise the MTUC, turning the centre into an "anti-
government front" which, in the process, could provoke the
government into
	
taking tougher measures against the
unions.	 Of course for some of the public service
unionists, the opposition to the "David factor" in the
-
movement was more informed by their own support for the
ruling party.
	 A good case in point was the Secretary
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General of CUEPACS himself, Jamaluddin Mohd.Isa, who had
long been a member of the UMNO Labour Bureau.(211
Prior to the "David factor", the friction and the
eventual split along the private/public sector unions line
in the MTUC should also be seen in the light of the
mounting criticisms	 and challenge	 against the MTUC
leadership. Indeed, with two leading figures from the
public service unions, T.Narendran and Yahaya Mohd.Ali
holding two of the key positions in the MTUC throughout
the second half of the 1970s (that is the posts of Deputy
President and Secretary General respectively), the
criticisms and challenge against the MTUC leadership by
the mainly private sector "younger" unionists, to a
certain extent served as a critique and challenge against
elements of public service unions in the movement's
leadership.
Coming from the backgrounds where employment
security, "fringe benefits", pension schemes, and working
conditions were guaranteed or generally better than their
counterparts in the private sector, the leaders of the
public service unions were said to be complacent and
unprepared to commit themselves to the broader struggle of
the working class.(22) Similarly, they were also alleged
to have failed to grasp the real problems faced by the
industrial workers.
	 Their apparently close link with
government leaders meant that the public service unionists
(and of course the other MTUO "moderate" leaders as well)
were also accused of being "tools" of the government. In
addition, the double leadership role of certain public
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service unionists (that is, both as leaders of CUEPACS and
the MTUC) were seen by some critics as attempts to
monopolise whatever 	 privileges
	
and	 other	 benefits
available in the two centres.
The controversy over the 1980 laws thus served as the
catalyst for the split. Following a decision adopted at
the MTUC Special Delegates. Conference a nation-wide picket
was planned by the MTUC to be held on 21 April 1980.
However, because of the conflicting views between the
members of the General Council regarding the purpose and
implications of such a picket, the Council which met on 9
April decided to quash the plan.	 The private sector
unionists accused the public service unionists of
sabotaging the plan to picket by withdrawing at a very
late stage, while the public service unionists accused
their private sector counterparts of not making a serious
attempt to represent the public employees' case with the
government, particularly in regard to Section 27 of the
Trade Unions	 Ordinance which restricted trade union
membership of the public employees. Two CUEPACS leaders,
A.Ragunathan (Vice-President) and Jamaluddin Isa
(Secreta-ry General), both of whom were also members of the
MTUC General Council were widely believed to have met and
agreed a separate deal with the Deputy Prime Minister
around that time (Damodaran, 1982; The Star, 23.8.81).
This angered some unionists in the MTUC who accuocd
CUEPAC$ of "betraying the labour movement". According to
one MTUC source, when questioned at the General Council
meeting Ragunathan denied any deal made with the Deputy
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Prime Minister. The suspicions towards Ragunathan and
certain CUEPACS leaders seemed to have heightened when
Ragunathan refused to make a public denial of any such
deal upon being challenged by some Council members.
The relationship between the public and the private
sector unions continued to deteriorate with both sides
criticizing each other, particularly following a row at
the General Council meeting on 12 May between MTUC's
Deputy President, T.Narendran who at the time was also the
President of CUEPACS, and the Secretary General of MTUC,
V.David.(231 Shortly afterwards CUEPACS called for the
reorganisation of MTUC into a trade union confederation
consisting of three trade union federations, each
representing unions of the public service, private sector
and quasi-government bodies (statutory bodies) (The Star,
16.5.80). The proposal was, however, not acceptable to
the private sector unions which saw it as a weakening of
their own role in the MTUC. This situation led the public
service unionists to stress the need to boost their own
federation, CUEPACS. The top leadership of CUEPACS seemed
confident that with the withdrawal of all their affiliated
unions	 from the	 MTUC	 the	 national	 centre would	 be
weakened, and this	 in turn would	 make CUEPACS the sole
representative of the	 public	 service unions.
$ubsequently, Narendran resigned from the MTUC on 6 July
1980, and his union, the Inland Revenue Officers Union, .
also pulled out of the MTUC, to be followed shortly by
A.Ragunathan and his union, the Malayan Technical Services
Union (9 July), Jamaluddin Mohd.Isa's Kesatuan Pegawal-
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Pegawai Hutan Melayu Malaysia Barat (12 July), and Malayan
Nurses Union (18 July) (MTUC, GCB 1979-80:34). The other
CUEPACS's affiliated unions were also encouraged to
withdraw from the MTUC although not all did so.(24)
In any case, the split was a serious blow to the
movement.	 It severely undermined any challenge to the
government's 1980 labour legislation. It also served to
push back whatever "achievements" had been made to reform
the MTUC, particularly those achieved through the internal
struggle which
	 culminated in	 the Cameron Highlands
Declaration. These developments also further underlined
the vulnerability of the MTUC to divisions within its own
rank, and it was thus rendered incapable of representing
the union movement, even in the relatively ineffective way
that it hd done so during most of its history to date.
8.4. Conclusion 
The above discussion indicates that, the incapacity
of the MTUC to forge a united labour movement and to
constitute an effective force was also due to the internal
divisions and conflicts within the movement. 	 To an
-
important extent, the increasingly anti-labour policy of
the Barisan Nasional government served to underline these
divisions. This was evident in 1980 which was a
consequence of the MTUC's internal conflicts as well as
the increasingly anti-labour posture of the government.
It was a split which further undermined labour and union
solidarity as well as MTUC's credibility as the country's
national labour centre.
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Throughout the discussion it has been made clear that
the leadership factor was ever crucial in shaping the
•.
course of the movement. The long tenure in office and the
sophistication acquired through the trade union work
tended to boost the image and position of the individual
trade unionists concerned, making them more indispensible
to the movement and to their respective unions. At the
same time the benefits and othcr privileges available by
virtue of holding office, further encouraged and enabled
them to reproduce their hold over the movement. Apart
from the lack of commitment to the pursuit of labour
Issues, the long tenure in office and incumbency also
tended to engender complacency in the incumbents which
brought about dissatisfaction and eventually a challenge
to their leadership. This situation forced the MTUC to
begin to reassess its past development and to consider a
strategy for the future, as reflected in the Cameron
Highlands Declaration issued in early 1978. In any case,
although this whole process of assesment and especially
the declaration itself marked an important policy break-
through for the movement, it could hardly be sustained,
and in fact, crumbled under the force and repercussions of
the government's tough anti-labour and anti-union measures
following the dispute between the Malaysian Airlines
System and the Airline Employees Union which began in
1979. The outcome was a divided and largely ineffectual
union centre.
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by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad at a United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Manila in
May 1979. He suggested that under the guise of "workers'
solidarity" the labour unions of the developed countries
were complementing the protectionist trade policies of
their governments, and were out to "recolonise the economy
of developing countries".	 See a report of Mahathir's
speech by Charlen Chan in Business Times, 16.5.79.
[141 Todd and Jomo (forthcoming) note that the government
also responded to this threat of sympathy action by the
port workers by sending 7 truckloads of soldiers to the
Port.
[151 According to the Secretary General of MTUC, V.David,
the AEU was more keen to rely on the advice of the ITF
rather than on the national trade union centre. Interview
with V.David, 18.8.87.
[16] The telegram which is reproduced in Todd and Jomo
(forthcoming) is reproduced here as Appendix D. It should
be noted that a number of members of the then General
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[17] For official views on some of the amendments see
Richard Ho Ung Hun (1980).
[18] Some information about NUEPACS can be found in
CUEPACS (c1977?), The Thirty Years of CUEPACS, 1947-1977,
p.8; CUEPACS Annual Reports 1965-66:39-40 and 1966-67:76-
79; Suara Buroh, June 1969.
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Straits Times, 19.7.76, and 31.1.77, and Todd and Jomo
(forthcoming).
[20] The earlier commissions/committees formed by the
government maii,ly to review and recommend salaries and
conditions of service for various categories of its
employees were the Suffian Salaries Commission, Aziz
Salaries Commission, Harun Salaries Commission, Sheikh
Abdullah Committee, and Tun Abdul Aziz Committee (CUEPACS
(c1977?), The Thirty Years of CUEPACS, 1947-1977).
[21] According to Jamaluddin Isa he has been a member gf
the VMNO Labour Bureau since the early 1970s.
	 See
Jamaluddin Isa (1983).
	 According to a senior member of
the MTUC General Council interviewed by this writer in
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Council meeting because of his opposition to David's
politics.
[22] Interviews with the unionists.
(23) Interviews with trade unionists. Accounts of this
friction and split could be found in Goh Beng Lan
(1984:68-74); and Tan Heng Fong (1985:80-100).
[24) Two of these unions, AUEGCAS and PWD Employees
Union, remained as affiliates of MTUC. Even the other 10
unions which left the MTUC, as noted by Tan H.F (1985) did
so .a different times with the Police Administrative and
Civilian Staff Union, and the Union of Post Office Workers
(UFOW), for example, leaving in January 1981, while the
last among them, RUM and NUTP leaving only at the end
of 1981, indicating the lack of cohesiveness in CUEPACS
Itself.
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
As spelt out in Chapter 1 the objective of the study
is to understand the development and leadership role of
the MTUC from its founding until 1980/81 when it entered a
new phase of its history. To this end I set out to
consider a number of themes about leadership covering a
number of related issues under the heading of the
"responsible unionism", government incorporation of the
movement, controversies surrounding the MTUC's stance on
"politics", the relationship between the MTUC and the
unions, internal
	 frictions and conflicts within the
movement, and the impact of communalism on the MTUC.
The mTup Leadership 
For the most part the MTUC was led by or under the
strong influence of the same "moderate" labour leaders or
similar group of unionists who had become labour
professionals. Because of their cumulative experience and
considerable understanding of the mechanics and politics
of trade unionism, particularly with respect to the
practice of industrial relations, tripartite bodies,
labour legislation, and the international labour movement,
these unionists appeared indispensible to the movement.
This made it difficult if not impossible for the others to
replace them. Much in the way described by Michels
(1915), these unionists enjoyed a long tenure of office
which provided them with the necessary means to reproduce
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their leadership positions in the MTUC as well as in their
own base unions. The situation resulted in the movement's
policies being largely determined by them, and in
accordance with what they perceived to be the interest
of the union movement.
As part of the process of government incorporation,
and having experienced successive governments disciplinary
and coercive measures towards unions, these unionists were
conscious that "excessive" or "intolerable" demands on the
government and capital might lead to their demise. This
underlined their compromising posture, hence the notion of
"responsible" unionism as elaborated and articulated by
the MTUC-led movement. Of course, as far as these labour
leaders and the MTUC were concerned, being "moderate" and
"responsible" also entailed the adoption of an approach
that they believed would help secure or sustain government
confidence in them. This meant a rejection of the idea of
active union involvement in politics, and a cautious and
compromising approach to issues which they thought would
provoke a repressive response by the government.
So as to Justify their role and to secure the
position of the MTUC, these "moderate" labour leaders
advocated tripartism	 and campaigned	 for "industrial
peace". In different ways, and with various degrees of
emphasis, this was a position that was held from the
founding of the MTUC in 1949/50 to 1981 when the MTUC
split. Attempts to influence state anti-union policies
failed and in the end came to reflect the personal and
institutional opportunism of this leadership. In fact the
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policies, particularly those associated with business
ventures were instrumental in further undermining the
ideological base of the movement and thereby weakening the
union movement in its relations with the government and
employers.
9 : 2. mTvc an Government
From the account above it is clear that government
played a crucial role in the growth and development of the
MTUC and the "new" unions. More than any other factors,
the government, informed by its priorities and the
interests of those whom it served, dictated the "rules of
the game" and regularly disciplined labour and the unions.
I•
Indeed, the very formation and development of the MTUC
itself was very much determined by the colonial government
and the circumstances of its anti-Communist Emergency rule
which began in 1948. The relationships established in
this period became the dominant feature of relations
between the MTUC and the government up until 1981.
A mix of state paternalism and government
incorporation characterized the early government-labour
relationship.	 While state paternalism underwrote the
union dependence on the government for political-legal
	 •
gights, incorporation was evident from the early
cooptation of "moderate" labour leaders in government-
sponsored bodies as well as in the MTUC's pursuit of the
idea of tripartism. It is also clear that this process of..
government incorgoration was facilitated by the early
conditions of the Emergency rule, by the restrictive
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labour legislation regularly introduced by the government
of the day, and by the readiness on the part of the labour
leaders to cooperate with the government as a way of
consolidating their own positions in the movement.
The posture of the MTUC as a "moderate" and
"responsible" body was by no means fully endorsed by the
unions, but the ledership was sufficiently in control to
discourage unions from pursuing a tough line of their own
in their relationship with the government. Even so, there
were times
	 when the
	 government appeared
	 to	 make
concessions to the MTUC. In addition to the improved
economy and the need to win labour's support to boost the
NEP programmes, the situation of the 1970s prompted the
government to grant what appeared to be some concessions
to the movement. This was evident in such limited gains
as the national holiday on 1st May in 1973, and the
approval of the Workers' Bank (Bank Buruh) in 1975.
However, notwithstanding this kind of "good will", the
government, as indicated in the earlier cases, was not
prepared to tolerate labour actions or trends which were
seen as threatening to state policies. The desire to
attract and sustain capital in order to strive for a
greater and speedier expansion of the economy in turn
required a "peaceful" industrial and political climate.
Thus, as_ the discussion under Chapter 8 shows, when the
MAS-AW dispute in 1978/79 was seen as a threat to
government interests, the government responded vigorously
and shortly afterwards promulgated the 1980 labour laws.
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In relation to this it is also obvious that the
"moderate" and "responsible" labour leaders were unwilling
to risk government reprisal and were only prepared to
pursue policies	 within the	 framework	 of	 existing
legislation.	 The series of legislation initiatives
instituted in 1959, 1965, 1967, 1969 and 1971, and 1980 in
effect steadily reduced the collective rights and
potential of the unions to defend and pursue labour
interests and underlined the view that the government was
increasingly anti-labour. Experience showed that not only
were the challenges by the MTUC ignored by the government,
but the latter became more uncompromising towards the
unions. This situation not only forced the MTUC to "play
safe" in its relationship with the government in the hope
of protecting labour's deteriorating rights, but also, as
seen in Chapter 7, tended to encourage the centre and a
number of its major affiliates to pursue policies which
further underlined their leadership role, for example, the
business -venture policies.	 This, however, is not to
suggest that organised labour could not in any way
influence these dominant trends.	 But, in a situation
where labour is organisationally weak and internally
divided, and	 its leadership	 lacked a working-class
Ideological perspective, the "external" forces,
particularly the state and foreign capital (upon which the
economy depended), were clearly more determining.
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9.3. mTuq and "politics" 
It has been shown that for the most part, especially
after Independence, the MTUC adopted either a cautious, or
a critical view of "politics". This was mainly due to the
impact of government opposition to "political unionism",
_
and government demands for a "clearly defined" industrial
relations role for the unions. 	 Behind this lay the
centre's quest for government acceptance and recognition
of its role as the organisational leadership and
representative of the union movement.
I have indicated that this attitude was influenced
by the main "moderate" tendency within the movement which,
in view of the communal nature of the country's mainstream
political parties and their practices, maintained that
"politics" was potentially divisive for a multi-racial
movement. In the discussion I suggested that this view
could hardly be justified since politics did not have to
take communal forms, as shown in the case of the early
Labour Party 1 Malaya to which many unionists affiliated.
I also suggested that since the prominent "moderate"
labour leaders themselves earlier on served as
(government-appointed) members of the legislature and, at
the early stage of the movement, were also involved in
canvassing for labour's support for political parties,
their opposition to "politics" later had a ring of
expediency to it. The fact that the political parties
which they initially supported were either defeated or
forced to assume an opposition role tends to suggest that
they were trying to gain acceptance from the ruling party.
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After all, as I have indicated, these leaders and the MTUC
as a whole did not make any serious attempt to address
communalism or problems of communal nature within the
movement itself. This suggests that communalism was a
convenient excuse for their so-called "non-political"
-
stance.	 Of course the question of MTUC involvement in
politics also hinged upon the delicate balance between the
broad private and public sector unions which constituted
the MTUC. Here it was possible that the generally "no
politics" posture of the broad public sector unionists
(and unions) was in congruent with that of their
"moderate" private sector counterparts and together this
served to reinforce the non-political stance of the centre
as a whole.
There were certainly cases of political agitation and
some kind of "political action" advocated or undertaken by
the MTUC. As shown in Chapters 4 and 6 the continual
failure of the MTUC to create the necessary impact on the
government's
	
labour	 policies,
	 and	 the	 successive
legislative onslaughts against the unions, prompted some
elements within the MTUC to campaign for labour's
participation in the legislative process. It was thought
that since laws were made in Parliament it was necessary
for workers to be represented in this state organ.
Although-this idea did win the support of some sections of
unionists the agitation which saw the centre issuing the
"Workers' Charter" and supporting a number of political
candidates, were, in the main, pursued within a "neutral"
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policy perspective.	 This further underlined the centre's
cautious approach to the issue.
The discussion also pointed out that while this
attitude and view of politics tended to discourage the
politicization of labour and the unions, it had been
tacitly encouraged by the British, as a way of diverting
labour from possible appeals of the Malayan Communist
Party. It denied labour and the unions an otherwise
potentially important platform through which they could
defend and pursue their rights and interests. This,
however, was an option rejected by the dominant "moderate"
leadership in the MTUC.
9.4. MTUC, the Unions and Labour 
Chapters 1 and 2 showed that the MTUC was largely
created by the colonial government as part of its strategy
to fight comn lism. It was suggested that the colonial
Trade Union Adviser played the key role in the development
of the centre. Further, a number of "moderate" labour
leaders, themselves supported by the government, and whose
unions were of the crucial sectors of the colonial
economy, also played an important part in the formation
and early development of the centre.	 In fact, with the
combined voting strength of their relatively large unions
••
in the MTUC, these labour leaders continued to exercise a
major influence on the policy orientation and conduct of
the centre throughout its history.
As a loose confederation the MTUC provided a channel
for the unions to express their views and grievances,
305
especially to the government. Equally importantly, it
attempted to assume the task of spokesperson on behalf of
labour and the unions. In this role the MTUC or some such
body was considered vital, despite its incapacity to
affect major change in government labour policy. As a
result, despite its imperfections and seeming impotence it
-
continued to
	
enjoy varying degrees of support from
the unions.
As indicated above, the MTUC was constrained by a
number of factors, not least, from within the movement
itself. First, there was preponderance of Indian
unionists in leadership positions which undermined its
claim to be non-communal and representative of the whole
organised working class. Second, as shown in Chapter 8,
the MTVC leadership and affiliated unions was not always
united, a situation that was aggravated by the inter-play
of government demands for "responsible unionism" and the
personal and institutional interests of the unionists and
their unions respectively. In the second half of the
1970s these f ictions and conflicts were expressed in the
challenge against the MTUC leadership. Similarly, these
frictions and conflicts culminated in the split of the
MTUC along the public/private sector lines beginning
in 1981.
To secure and sustain the confidence and recognition •
of the government, hence its viability as the country's
labour centre, the MTVC also assumed the role as a
,.
mediator between labour and the unions on one side, and
the government	 (and, through
	
the	 government,
	 the
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employers) on the other. This role was especially evident
in the Railway Dispute of 1962/63, at the height of union
militancy in the mid-1960s (Chapter 5), and in the MAS-AEU
dispute in 1978-79 (Chapter 8).	 The role entailed a
"compromising" posture towards these issues and an
adherence to "an orderly conduct" of industrial relations.
Thus, while reliant on unions, the MTUC also did not want
the unions to become too persistent or "excessive" in
their demands as this might lead to some retaliation from
the government. While this role of the MTUC was
understandably appreciated by the government, as seen
through their collaboration in the tripartite machinery
(including the signing of the "industrial peace" codes in
Chapters 5 and 7), it did not seem to help increase the
centre's influence upon the government on other non-
"industrial peace-keeping" matters.
9.5. MTUC and Communalism
In the context of Malaysia's multi-racial society
whereby economic and political cleavages also took
communal forms, and despite the claim by a good number of
unionists interviewed that the MTUC was free from communal
bickerings, it has been shown that the development and
conduct of the centre and the movement as a whole were
also influenced or affected by communalism. As shown in
Chapters 2 and 3, state repression of the predominantly
Chinese PMFTU-led militant unionism by the colonial state
and the persistent campaign against the Chinese-dominated
MCP by both the colonial and post-colonial governments
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served to discourage the Chinese workers from taking an
active part in the MTUC-led movement. The situation also
denied the MTUC the opportunity to forge a solidified,
inter-communal movement.
The early years of the MTUC-led movement was also
characterized by the predominance of the Indian unionists
of the plantation (rubber) and public service sectors. It
was suggested that given the limited potentials of the
minority Indians in exercising any significant influende
over the political affairs of the country, the support,
ecouragement, and importance accorded to the Indian
unionists by the colonial authorities could also be seen
as part of their decolonization strategy which would
contribute towards undermining the position of organised
labour in the country.	 In this respect, the Indian
leadership was hamstrung in its attempts to move beyond
communalism.	 The late entry of the Malays into the
industry, and consequently, their lack of trade union
experience, also further compounded this problem. This
situation provided the Indian unionists with a near-
monopoly hold	 over the leadership positions of the
movement_and, with their cumulative experience in trade
union work, also had the tendency to inhibit the emergence
of Malay unionists in important leadership roles.
On their part, and in relation to the above
situation, the Indian unionists understandably tended to
regard trade unionism as their "special domain". Through
the rapport established with the early colonial government
and their role and position in the various state-sponsored
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agencies (including the legislature), the Indian unionists
also saw their role in the movement as a means of
offsetting the Indians' overall marginalised role in the
country's political structure. This situation also
encouraged them to reproduce their control over the
movement, and although they may have seen the need to
recruit more Malay unionists into the leadership, no
serious or concrete effort was made in that direction.
Of-course, as implied in the discussions, this is not
to suggest that the Indian and, for that matter, the
Chinese and
	
the Malay	 workers and unionists, were
homogenous groups as such.
	 There were differences and
conflicts between the English-speaking and the non-
English-speaking Indian unionists, for example, which cut
across communal lines and which continued to undermine the
solidarity of the movement.
	 But, because of their
"headstart" in trade union work, the Indian unionists were
in the	 position to	 consolidate and maintain their
leadership positions in the movement. The events and
developments discussed also suggest that in a communal
political environment in which the indigenous Malays were
in the position to exercise a dominant administrative and
political role, and hence, to dominate the state apparatus
meant that it was difficult for the Indian-led MTUC to
really create much impact on the labour policies of the
Malay-dominated government.
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9.6. The Fqture of the MTUC 
The 1980 laws and the split in 1981 represent a new
••
stage in the development of trade unionism in Malaysia.
The government role in encouraging the split was evident
with the immediate recognition and representative status
accorded to CUEPACS in state bodies and particularly the
ILO conferences (Damodaran, 1982: 42-48). The latter move
Infuriated the MTUC and engendered a new round of heated
exchange between the two centres both locally and at the
ILO headquarters. The Barisan government, particularly
its new Prime Minister who took office in 1981, continued
to show its preference to CUEPACS. This is not to suggest
that there were no problems between the government and
CUEPACS. The public sector employees' (including CUEPACS)
"wage struggle" of 1984-85 following the government's
refusal to consider a revised pay for its employees is an
Indication of this persistent tendency of government
scepticism towards unions. Nonetheless a relatively close
relationship between the government and CUEPACS has
continued to prevail ever since, thus confirming my
analysis of the more "moderate" and collaborative posture
of the public service unionists in relation to the
government.
Meanwhile, other developments after 1981 also
reflected some of the earlier events and developments
within the MTUC that have been discussed in the previous
chapters. For example, many of the business projects
undertaken by the MTUC and the unions were reported to be
a failure.	 Apart from a series of court cases and media
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coverage relating	 to its	 management and	 financial
discrepancy, Bank Buruh (Workers Bank) is now effectively
under non-trade union interests. The NUPW's estate
projects and textile mill also proved unsuccessful, while
opposition	 has	 been	 mounting	 against	 Narayanan's
leadership for its alleged mismanagement of the union's
funds. By 1984 the incumbent Narayanan, who had been the
President of MTUC since 1974 was facing a challenge from
the pepvty President, Zainal Rampak, a prominent Malay
unionist from the TWU. Although Zainal was not a member
of the "rebel group" discussed in Chapter 8, hc, as David
the Secretary General, nevertheless represented a more
critical tendency in the movement.	 Fearing that an
election contest with Zainal might expose his flagging
support among the delegates and thereby damage his
otherwise "successful" trade union career, including his
presidency of the ICFTU (since 1975) Narayanan worked for
a compromise with Zainal and agreed to step down as
President in early 1986. Apart from the question of
incumbency in the MTUC, Zainal's rise to presidency also
reflected the growing size and importance of the Malay
membership of trade unions in the country. By 1980 and
1981 the Malays constituted 50.6 percent and 51.6 percent
respectively of the entire union membership, and their
numbers continued to rise.(1)
_
Of course a change of a few leaders is but one aspect
of the whole picture. Even this change is subject to
question when one considers the bureaucratic culture of
the MTUC and personal and institutional interests and
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opportunism which had come to influence and characterize
these leaders. For instance, V.David, the present
Secretary General of MTUC, and the long-time Secretary
General of the TWU who had inspired some of the earlier
"younger" unionists was himself the target of a new series
of attacks from a growing number of unionists and unions.
Apart from working closely with Narayanan as the top
leaders of the MTUC since early 1979, David was said to be
holding too many positions in various organisations at the
same time, and gave little attention to the MTUC.(21
David was also alleged to have used his union (including
_
MTUC) positions to pursue and sustain his political
career. Further, the MTUC is still under the influence
(if not domination) of some large unions such as the
Narayanan's NUPW, the "CUEPACS group" (most of which had
rejoined the MTUC by 1987), and others indicated earlier.
To Justify its continued spokesperson status the MTUC
could not risk offending some of these large unions, a
situation which implied a sustenance of its "moderate" and
"responsible" unionism discussed throughout the chapters.
As implied above, apart from the impact of the 1980
laws on unions, the MTUC-led movement continued to be
constrained by
	 the uncompromising	 attitude of
	 the
government. In fact, with the new government policies of
"Look East" ( uch as urging workers to emulate the so-
called "Japanese work ethics", emphasising productivity
and discipline, and encouraging "in-house" instead of
industry-based, national	 unions), privatization,
	 and
"Malaysia Incorporated", there was evidence to suggest
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that the government attempted to further weaken and
undermine the already limited role of the MTUC.
While suggesting that the post-1981 era was a
difficult time for the MTUC and union movement as a whole,
the developments just indicated also imply that the MTDC
still occupied a role central to union development in
Malaysia. Indeed, the fact that the MTUC was still able
to bring back into its fold most of the traditional
affiliated unions from the public service sector, despite
all the attacks and challenges both from within and
without and the government's tough labour policy, suggests
that the national centre was still regarded as the main
spokesperson for the country's unions, however ineffective
this may turn out to be.
Notes 
(1) The Malay membership of trade unions in West Malaysia
continued to rise, for example, from 53.1% in 1983 to
55.78 in 1984 to 56.6% in 1985. See Ministry of Labour,
Labour and Manpower Report 1984/85:190, Figure 11-3.
12] David has been the full-time General Secretary of the
TWU since 1960. Apart from this, David also served as the
Secretary General of MTUC, member of the Governing Body of
ILO, member of the Executive Board of ICFTU (since 1979),
President of World Federation of Tamils, Secretary of the
United Labour Cooperative Society, Chairman of the Workers
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Institute of Technology, and Member of Parliament (on the
DAP ticket).
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Appendix A
A NOTE ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The information and material for the study were
acquired through two major methods, namely, consulting the
primary sources, and undertaking interviews with MTUC and
union leaders and officials. Before dealing with these
methods, a brief mention should h p made about the initial
work which preceded the main research.
As normally the case with most studies, I first
conducted a literature review on various aspects of labour
and trade unionism in Malaysia based on the material
available from a number of libraries in England.
Following this I also undertook a series of exploratory
interviews in England and Malaysia with a former leader of
the MTUC i the current MTUC President, and a number of
students of Malaysian labour. 	 Together the literature
review and the interviews gave me some idea about the
state of research and studies on the subjects and,
following Thompson (1978:165-85), helped me identify some
of the major concerns of the organisation. As suggested
above these two initial tasks also served as an important
guide for identifying the areas of focus of study as well
as a guide for my "field study" in Malaysia.
As for my entry into the MTUC, this was facilitated
by my previous job with the Malaysian Youth Council, a
national coordinating	 body of	 the country's	 youth
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organisations. My working relationship with a few leaders
and officials of the MTUC and, to a certain extent, my
familiarity with the functioning of a national
coordinating Ludy, contributed to my coming into contact
with the other union leaders and officials and also my
appreciation of the nature of the organisation.
primary Sources 
The most commonly consulted primary sources are the
annual reports or General Council's Reports of the MTUC;
minutes of meetings of the MTUC General Council; reports
of	 proceedings	 of	 the	 Annual/Biennial	 Delegates
Conferences; other MTUC and union reports and
publications; acts of Parliament (labour laws); annual
reports of the Labour Department, Trade Unions Registry,
and Ministry of Labour; texts of speeches; books and
monographs written by participants; as well as newspaper
reports.	 Most of the materials were consulted at the
MTUC library and secretariat, CUEPACS office, the Ministry
of Labour	 library, Universiti Malaya libraries, and
the offices of some affiliated unions and participants.
These materials
	 provided most	 of	 the	 information
required for this study .
Of course this is not to suggest that there were no
problems with the material.
	 Some of the MTUC annual
reports of
	 the early
	 1950s,
	
for	 instance,	 were
missing altogether.
	 Likewise, poor record-keeping and
documentation in	 the MTUC	 secretariat and
	 library
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prevented me from having access to the centre's early
minutes of meetings and even some later documents. Even
so, the available material provided a reasonably good
coverage of t'e events and developments taking place in
the MTUC through the years under consideration. In any
case, much in the way suggested by Stacey (1969:47-48),
the problem of record-keeping prompted me to conduct
interviews and discussions with a number of "key
informants" as indicated below.
Nnstructured Interview" 
I•
To complement this documentary material, I conducted
a series of "unstructured interviews" and discussions with
a number of MTUC leaders, officials, and ex-leaders. A
list of persons interviewed, their positions in the MTUC
and the unions, as well as the dates of interviews appears
as Appendix E. Apart from serving as as an important
background for my argument, the interviews with persons
who were very much involved in the country's trade union
movement also enabled me to explore the unionists'
personal views and attitudes and, to a certain extent, to
gauge the impact this had on the overall policy and
conduct of the MTUC. Most of the unionists and officials
interviewed were also the leaders or officials of the
affiliated unions so these interviews also allowed me
access to material about thesc unions.
As the term "unstructured" suggests, the interviews
were not strictly based on any standard interview schedule
although I did prepare and tried to use one at the initial
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stage of the study. As the inquiry progressed, I
discovered that same of my prepared questions were either
redundant or irrelevant, especially when the focus of
interview was very specific and demanded more time for
deliberation.	 This prompted me to use the schedule as a
general guideline for the interviews/discussions.
Some of the interviews were taped while others were
not. This inconsistency seemed unavoidable because some
intervie-wees were rather uneasy about expressing their
views in front of a tape-recorder. In this situation
personal discretion had to be exercised, whether to use
the tape-recorder all through the session, or to put it
aside in the hope of getting the "best" and the most from
the interviewees.	 In either case, I noted down as far as
possible all the important points which were raised by
interviewees.	 Subsequently I wrote these up as detailed
field notes.
As far as possible I tried to interview all the
surviving main	 leaders and	 officials of the MTUC,
particularly	 the	 Presidents,	 Deputy-Presidents	 and
(General) Secretaries. I considered the views and
attitude of these unionists to be especially important for
an understanding of the policies and conduct of the MTUC.
Otherwise, as implied earlier, the selection of sample was
based on the role or part played by the unionists
concerned in certain issues or events under consideration.
It must be noted that having earlier identified a few
quite different	 tendencies in the movement, I also
318
attempted to get a fair representation of the views of
these different tendencies through interviews/discussions
with their "leaders" or "representatives".
Altogether, thirty unionists were interviewed or
consulted between April 1986 and December 1988. In most
cases I spent not less than two hours per person per
session. As shown in the Appendix, in a number of cases I
also conducted follow-up interview(s)/discussion(s) with
the unionists concerned.
As another supplementary exercise during the course
of my "field study" I observed the way the MTUC
administration was being run and witnessed some sample
programmes organised by the centre. For instance, apart
from having the opportunity to discuss and interact with
the leaders and officials of the MTUQ, I also attended
such programmes as the Biennial Delegates Conference,
rallies,	 forums,	 and	 educational	 seminars	 which
contributed to my general understanding of the attitude
and actions of the personalities involved in leading and
administering the MTUC, the nature of response of the
affiliates towards the MTUC, and the nature of problems
1
encountered by the MTUC in pursuing its policies and
programmes.	 While these observations covered a later
period than my study, they did have the value of
sensitising me to some of the procedures and practices of
an organisation like the MTUC.
Since the subject of research was the MTUC and the
time of my "field study" in Malaysia was quite limited I
decided to
	
abandon my	 original plan	 to interview
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government leaders and officials concerned with labour
matters although I did consult with a few of them. This,
however, did not significantly affect the study as such.
After all, government labour policies which constitute a
major variable in the study are already well documented,
especially in the official reports of the Ministry of
Labour and Manpower, the reports of the Trade Unions
Registry, published texts of speeches of government
leaders, and in the relevant acts of Parliament.
Problems and Limitations 
As with other studies on trade unionism the present
one, and the methods employed here, certainly had their
limitations and shortcomings. For one, it is obvious that
the interview exercise and the study itself is leader-
centred.	 It tends to ignore the role and impact of the
ordinary- trade union members and workers (at the
workplace) upon the movement. In that sense the interview
(and the study as a whole) would certainly be more
encompassing, at least in terms of its treatment of the
attitudes and views prevailing within the movement, had I
also interviewed or held discussions with the state or
branch union leaders and activists. In any case, while
the object and subject of this study is rather specific
and limited, the leader-centred approach adopted here
should serve as one of the early steps to be taken to
develop a more comprehensive and penetrating account of
the movement.
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As indicated earlier, the other problem concerned the
standard of record-keeping and documentation in the MTUC
and the unions. Even the office of the Registrar of
Societies which was supposed to keep at least all its
recent correspondence files with the MTUC proved to be of
little assistance.
	 The shifting of premises and the
"fully occupied" staff seemed to have made even file-
search a difficult task.
	 The situation reflects the
general level of education and seriousness (if not
sophistication) of trade union work in the country. This
problem is perhaps to be expected. A researcher thus has
no choice but to make do with whatever material was still
available, besides trying to generate further data through
interviews and other oral sources.
The interview exercise posed certain problems which
could affect the study. For example, it was quite
difficult to interview certain important unionists and ex-
unionists who were generally very busy people. Some of
them seemed less cooperative and rather reluctant to spare
their time for an interview. This perhaps is due to what
they appeared to regard as a routine academic exercise by
a student without any apparent "benefit" to them or the
union movement. In certain cases, even though an
interview was finally secured, it was not a comprehensive
interview. An overall lack of understanding of the
purpose and role of research seemed to influence some
participants in their response to the questions.
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However, despite the problems, the whole study and
methods nevertheless provide a useful start for a proper
appreciation of the development and role of the MTUC to be
undertaken. The methods employed enabled a reasonably
sufficient information to be gathered and generated for
the purpose of the study. This in turn should contribute
to a better understanding of trade unionism in an ex-
British colony generally, and Malaysia particularly.
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Appendix B 
TRADE UNIONISTS INTERVIEWED 
1. Adam Abdullah, Executive Secretary, Printing Industry
Employees' Union (20.10.86)
2. Ahmad Nor, Ex-President CUEPACS (3.9.87)
3. A.Bosco, Executive Secretary, EIWU (9.10.86)
4. Ching Chat_	 Research Officer, MTUC, President UETU
(2.10.86)
5. V.David, Secretary General MTUC, Secretary General TWU
(2.10.86, 18.8.87, 19.8.87)
6. K.Durraiappah, Ex-Education Officer, MTUC,
Ex-President NUTE (16.12.88)
7. Joseph Fong, Education Officer, MTUC (3.9.87)
8. K.George, Ex-Vice President MTUC, Ex-General Secretary
FAFCSU, Ex-President UETU (7.1.87, 12.8.87, 18.12.88)
9. Jamaluddin Isa, Ex-Secretary General CUEPACS
(11.12.86)
10. V.E.Jesudoss, Ex-President MTUC, Ex-President CUEPACS,
Ex-President MTSU (9.1.87)
11. A.V.Kathaiah, Ex-Asst.Secretary General MTUC, Ex-
President AMESU (5.4.86, 7.5.86, 4.10.86)
12. N.Krishnan, Chairman, MTUC Youth Section, NUPW
Research Officer (29.10.86, 19.8.87)
13. Andy Rozario, Editor, Suara Buruh (26.9.86)
14. G.S.Maniam, Secretary General AMESU (8.10.86)
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15. Mohamad Abas, Ex-Vice President MTUC, Secretary
General CUEPACS, President RUM (4.12.86)
16. Mustafa Johan Abdullah, Secretary, National Joint
Council of Statutory Bodies (Staff Side) (9.10.86,
13.8.87)
17. P.P.Narayanan, Ex-President MTUC, Secretary General
NUPW (14.1.87)
18. T.Narendran, Ex-Deputy President MTUC, Ex-President -
CUEPACS (10.10.86)
19. A.Navakumundan, Executive Secretary NUPW (28.1.87,
29.7.87)
20. G.Perumal, Ex-Treasurer MTUC, Ex-Deputy Secretary
General NUPW (12.12.86, 16.12.88)
21. A.H.Ponniah, Vice-President MTUC, Secretary General
AUEGCAS (4.12.86, 21.12.88)
22. G.Rajasekaran, Deputy Secretary General MTUC,
General Secretary MIEU (3.10.86, 12.8.87, 20.12.88)
23. A.Ragunathan, Ex-Vice President MTUC, President
CUEPACS, General Secretary MTSU (22.12.86)
24. Dali Ravindran, Industrial Relations Officer MTUC,
(19.8.87, 9.9.87)
25. Syed Shahril Mohamad, Executive Secretary, Transport
EcBlipment and Allied Services Workers Union (20.9.86,
15.8.87)
26. S.Venkateswaran, Executive Secretary, TWU (4.10.66)
27. Yahaya Mohd.Ali, Ex-Secretary General MTUC, Ex-Deputy
Pres-Went CUPACS, Ex-President RUM (12.12.86)
329
28. S.J.H.Zaidi, Ex-Secretary General MTVC (18.9.86)
29. Zainal Ariffin Mohammad, Chief Clerk, MTUC (8.10.86)
30. Zainal Rampak, President MTUC, Deputy Secretary
General TWV (18.9.86, 8.10.86, 11.1.87, 16.8.87,
9.12.88)
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Itppendix C 
MTUC MEMBERSHIP ., 1949-81
Year	 No. of Membership % of total
_
membership
1949 83 n.a. n.a.
1950 111 n.a. n.a.
1951 120 n.a. n.a.
1952 128 81,407 63.6
1953 129 n.a. n.a.
1954 141 76,000 67.0
1955 118 111,878 76.8
1956 111 185,195 79.8
1957 71 159,235 71.7
1958 67 149,340 70.9
1959 68 122,605 70.1
1960 67 128,839 70.1
1961 67 155,761 73.8
1962 85 204,003 79.4
1963 79 213,052 77.4
1964 83 253,487 78.6
1965 92 212,690 64.9
1966 89 215,171 61.9
1967 91 223,798 60.6
1968 92 219,097 61.4
1969 44 132,328 38.8
326
1970 47 134,172 41.7
1971 73 172,261 55.8
1972 82 199,882 60.3
1973 89 234,960 63.1
1974 91 308,301 71.4
1975 103 321,415 67.3
1976 107 319,321 66.3
1977 104 328,445 70.0
1978 97 323,183 67.0
1979 104 361,956 74.0
1980 99 333,076 57.57
1981 103 276,852 46.63
S9u.Kgga : 1. Trade Unions Registry, Annual Reports
(various years).
2. MTUC (1979).
3. Ministry of Labour, Labour and
Manpower Reports 1980; 1984-85.
-
327
Appendix D 
TELEGRAM SENT ON 15TH MARCH 1979
BOB HAWKE
ACTRADUNI
MELBOURNE
AUSTRALIA
LT
I HAD A TWO HOUR INTERVIEW WITH DATUK HUSSEIN ONN
MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER AND DISCUSSED THE WHOLE QUESTION
OF MAS/AEU DISPUTE WHICH COVERED IN ADDITION TO THE
NEGOTIATION ASPECT ALSO THE QUESTION OF TWENTY-THREE UNION
MEMBERS DETAINED AND ITF REPRESENTATIVE DONALD UREN (.)
UNDER THE MALAYSIAN ISA IF THERE ARE NO SPECIFIC CHARGES
THE DETAINEES MUST BE RELEASED AS SOON AS QUESTIONING IS
OVER (.) IN THOSE CASES WHERE THERE ARE CHARGES PREFERRED
THEY WILL BE PRODUCED IN A COURT OF LAW AND GIVEN AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR LEGAL DEFENCE (.) THE REST OF THE ASPECTS
OF THE DISPUTE IS BEING TAKEN CARE AT LABOUR MINISTRY
LEVEL (.) AS THE DC-10 HAS REACHED THE POINT OF NATIONAL
ISSUE I WOULD REQUEST YOU TO MAKE USE OF YOUR GOOD OFFICES
AND SPEAK TO THE UNION CONCERNED AND ALLOW THE DC-10 TO
LEAVE SYDNEY AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE (.) I SPOKE TO HARRY
WILSON AT 1.00 A.M ON 15 MARCH 1979 AND HE SAID THAT MUCH
DEPENDED UPON A MEETING THEY WERE CALLING AT 9.00 A.M
WHICH I HOPE WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER BY NOW C.) EVERY
ENDEAVOUR IS BEING MADE BY US AT KUALA LUMPUR LEVEL TO
RESOLVE THE DISPUTE AS A DOMESTIC ISSUE (.) I AM SENDING A
COPY OF THIS TELEGRAM ALSO TO OTTO KERSTEN TO COMMUNICATE
ALSO WITH ITF GENERAL SECRETARY HAROLD LEWIS (.) EXPECTING
AN EARLY RESPONSE (.) WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS (.)
P P NARAYANAN
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